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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
RUSSIA’S ISLAM: DISCOURSE ON IDENTITY,
POLITICS, AND SECURITY
by
Simona Emanuela Merati
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
Despite the long history of Muslims in Russia, most scholarly and political literatures on
Russia’s Islam still narrowly interpret Muslim-Slavs relations in an ethnic-religious
oppositional framework.
In my work, I examine Russia’s discourse on Islam to argue that, in fact, the role of
Islam in post-Soviet Russia is complex. Drawing from direct sources from academic,
state, journalistic, and underground circles, often neglected by Western commentators, I
identify ideational patterns in conceptualizations of Islam and reconstruct relational
networks among authors. To explain complex intertextual relations within specific
contexts, I utilize an analytically eclectic method that appropriately combines theories
from different paradigms and/or disciplines.
Thanks to my multi-dimensional approach, I show that, contrary to traditional
views, Russia’s Muslims participate in processes of post-Soviet Russia’s identity
formation. Starting from textual contents, avoiding pre-formed analytical frames, I argue
that many Muslims in Russia perceive themselves as part of Russian civilization – even
when they challenge the status-quo.
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Building on my initial findings, I state that a key element in Russia’s
conceptualization of Islam is the definition, elaborated in the 1990s, of traditional Islam
as part of Russian civilizational history, as opposed to extremist Islam as extraneous,
hostile phenomenon. The differentiation creates an unprecedently safe, if confined, space
for Islamic propositions, of which Muslims are taking advantage. Embedded in debates
on Russian civilization, conceptualizations of Islam, then, influence Russia’s
(geo)political self-perceptions and, consequently, its domestic and international policies.
In particular, Russian so-far neglected Islamic doctrine supports views of Islamic
terrorism as a political and not religious phenomenon. Hence, Russia interprets both
terrorism and counterterrorism within its own historical tradition, causing its strategy to
be at odds with Western views. Less apparently, these divergences affect Russian-U.S.
broader relations.
Finally, in revealing the civilizational value of Russia’s Islam, I expose intellectual
relations among influential subjects who share the aim to devise a new civilizational
model that should combine Slavic and non-Slavic, Orthodox and Islamic, Western, and
Asian components. In this old Russian dilemma, the novelty is Muslims’ participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, Islam is the second most important religion in the Russian Federation, after
Christian Orthodoxy, and Muslims represent a consistent minority of the population.
Estimates vary between 12-20 million, although according to most commentators the
correct figure is 16 million. The most important historical communities are Tatars and
Bashkirs in the Volga-Ural region, of Turkic heritage, and Muslims of the North
Caucasus, belonging to diverse Caucasian ethnic groups. Additionally, significant
Muslim communities are present in major cities, notably Moscow and St Petersburg.
Despite this significant presence, the general image of Russia’s Muslims is of
exogenous elements in a monolithic Slavic-Orthodox civilization. In fact, Muslims have
lived on Russian territory for centuries. Generally identified as “Tatars”, Muslims belong
to Russian popular, literary, and political imagery. Yet, most scholarly and political
literatures on Russia’s Islam still narrowly interpret Muslim-Slavs relations as defined by
an ethnic-religious opposition. The reality, however, is much more fascinating.
Muslims in Russia, Muslims of Russia
Early Russia’s exposure to Islam began in the 9th century and continued under their
submission to the Tatar Empire (13th -14th centuries). After fighting for their
independence from the Tatars (the “Golden Horde”), the Slavic tsars, who had founded
the reign of Muscovy, directed their expansion eastward. The Russian conquest of
Muslim-inhabited territories in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus began in the
sixteenth century with the victory over the Kazan’ Khanate, and ended only in the
nineteenth century, on the verge of the October Revolution. Throughout this uneven, but
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uninterrupted expansion, the Russian Empire acquired significant numbers of Muslim
subjects.
Surrounded by potential Islamic enemies – the Islamic Ottoman and Persian
powers – and under the influence of the Orthodox Church, the tsars grew suspicious of
Muslims in Russia, and they were considered potential allies of foreign powers.
However, both elite and popular cultures held mixed views on Russia’s Muslims and
their communities. For example, Tatar leaders were still valued as loyal subjects, and all
that was required from the Tatar notables to be granted the permission to live at the tsar’s
court was to convert to Orthodoxy, at least nominally (Figes 2002).
Although the socio-political supremacy of the Orthodox Slavic majority was
undisputed, the tsars were aware of the importance to avoid social conflicts in their vast
and composite dominions. They attempted to create a cohesive empire through an
extensive “Russification”, that is, the harmonization of cultural (especially linguistic),
social, and administrative practices according to one imperial (Slavic) model. From
Catherine the Great onwards, they also increasingly – if irregularly – replaced repression
of ethnic minorities with toleration. The Empire officially acknowledged the ethnic and
religious differences among its subjects, and employed more or less effective actions to
assign a proper place for each of them within the highly codified imperial hierarchy.
In this rigidly regulated social structure, each individual knew his or her rank,
which came with specific duties and rights attached. The Orthodox Slavs stood solidly at
the top, followed by the Catholics, and then the Muslims. Below them on the social
ladder, other groups enjoyed progressively less rights until some, like many Orthodox
sects, were classified as illegal. While Orthodoxy and, on a lower step, Catholicism (but
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not Protestantism) were “official” religions, Islam was “tolerated” – a legal term that
imposed certain obligations and granted certain rights, although more limited than those
of official cults (Codevilla 2008; Crews 2006).
As a way to incorporate Islamic communities into the imperial construction,
Catherine II founded the first Islamic Council in Ufa, to secure the cooperation of
Muslim elites (Van der Oye 2010; Hunter 2004; Khalid 1998). Muslim leaders, despite
local resistances and a general tendency to keep their communities separate from Slavic
ones (a relatively easy task, given the extension and scarce population density of the
Russian territory), Muslim leaders proved willing to cooperate and adapt their existing
social structures to the imperial requirements (Crews 2006; Frank 1996).
The Empire, the Church, and Islam
The tsars’ vision of themselves as masters and protectors of all peoples of the empire
contrasted with the Orthodox Church’s fundamental conception of Russia as Christian
champion (defensor fidei), whose historical mission was to perpetuate Christianity’s
expansion after the fall of Rome and Byzantium. As some recent research shows (Van
der Oye 2010; Crews 2006; Werth 2002), while the tsars strove to fulfil their idea of the
Empire as a “multi-ethnic, multi-religious” state (with a strong privilege for Orthodox
Slavs), the Church was much more intolerant of Islam than the tsars. In particular, it was
worried with the difficulties encountered by Christian missionaries in the central and
eastern provinces of the empire, where Islam boasted a much higher number of
conversions among the local heathen populations.
Initially, the bigger success of Muslims was attributed to similarity in language
and habits between Muslim Tatars and other peoples of the region. It was believed that,
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in the absence of such affinities, Islam would not have been a threat in the conversion of
other peoples of the empire (non-Tatar pagans, Orthodox sectarians). Werth (2002)
attributes to the appointment of the Russian priest Nikolai Ivanovich Il’minskii as head of
the Orthodox missions the Church’s ideological turn to hostility against Islam. From then
on, Werth notes, Islam was considered a fierce enemy of Christianity. In the Church’s
view, Islam not only constituted an attractive religious alternative for pagan potential
converts, but it also actively encouraged its followers to openly despise Christianity,
accusing it to be an obscure and irrational religion. Il’minskii realized that, in order to
respond to the threat coming from Islam, it was not enough to call it vaguely a “wrong”
religion. He advocated the necessity to defeat Islam on its own doctrinal terms. On this
purpose, a missionary academy was set up in Kazan’ to study oriental languages and
Islamic theology. However, very few missionaries completed their education, and even
fewer went out to the field to try to convert Muslims and pagans. Eventually, the
academy was closed (Werth 2002).
The different approaches of the tsars and the Church toward Islam and Muslims
expose a crackle in the allegedly symbiotic arrangement between secular and religious
powers in Russia. For the Church, Islam was an aggressive enemy that had to be fiercely
contrasted. For the Empire, Russia’s Muslims were, above all, its subjects. While
Orthodoxy was the official religion, to the state the “social peace” (Catherine the Great,
quoted in Hunter 2004) achieved by a policy of toleration was more important than
theological disputes.
The foundations of Russian “symphonic” model, which theorized the perfect
accordance of intents and actions between the Church, embodiment of Christianity, and
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the tsar, its temporal champion, were crumbling. Some observers note that, in fact,
“symphonia” had really worked for very short intervals in Russian history (Bodin 2012;
Codevilla 2008). The ontological legitimation given to the Russian state’s power by the
Orthodox Church is a very important point of contention still today. While there is no
doubt that the Church had a primary influence on the origins and development of Russian
culture, the exclusivity of such heritage, and especially the political rights that it would
grant to the Moscow Metropolitan even today, are contested (Solodovnik 2013; Bodin
2012; Bennet 2011; Laruelle 2009; Codevilla 2008).
Concerning Russia’s Muslims, the differences in tsars’ and Church’s visions were
perhaps more visible in the ambiguity with which Muslims were treated. The strong
religious sentiment of Russia’s Muslims, which in most cases was entrenched in their
traditional customs and in their ethnic or community affiliations, rendered many Slavic
elites suspicious about the loyalty of Muslims as subjects of the Empire. Muslims
maintained frequent and regular exchanges with the rest of the Islamic world, even after
the Russian conquest of the Kazan’ and Bukhara khanates (which had been important
centers of Islamic authority in the Middle Ages). The ties of Russia’s Muslims to the
world ummah could generate in the former a potential conflict of interests on what
mattered most – being Russian subjects or followers of Islam. The Slavic majority kept a
mostly skeptical attitude toward Muslims, who were generally believed to despise being
subjects of a Christian Empire.
Russian Orientalism
Edward Said (1979) defines Orientalism as
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the distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly,
economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; […] an
elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction […] but also of
a whole series of interests; […] a certain will or intention to understand,
in some cases control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a
manifestly different […] world. [It] has less to do with the Orient than
it does with “our” world.” (Said 1979: 12, italics in the original)
Although much of this definition also applies to Russian Orientalism, Said’s
conceptualization does not fully account for Russia’s view of the Orient. For Russia,
differently than Europe, the Orient has never been a very distant world. In Russian
perception, the Orient is, above all, Muslim Eurasia. Throughout its history, Slavic
Russia has been in direct and virtually uninterrupted contact with the Islamic world:
Muslims lived along its internal and external borders; the Golden Horde had been its
suzerain for two centuries; and Russia kept expanding into Asia. Tatar elite members
married into Russian noble families, and many Tatar words, habits, and administrative
structures remained in Russian culture and state. Yet, Russia has always struggled with
the “Asian” component of its identity, in a constant oscillation between a certain affinity
with the East and the burning aspiration to belong to the Western world, perceived as
modern and powerful, and not Oriental.
In the case of Russia, Said’s “elaboration of interests” is not conducted through a
confrontation with an alien, “different” world. On the contrary, Russian Orientalism is an
operation of self-reflection on Russia’s own identity, both the origin and the result of a
constant confrontation with its own geographical, ethnic, religious, and cultural
multiplicity. While the European Orientalism analyzed by Said did not necessarily
attempt to “incorporate” the Orient, Russia’s history testifies of a constant struggle to
come to terms with the state’s variety – politically and, if possible, socially. The
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establishment by Peter I of the Kazan’ school, Catherine II’s legal “tolerance” of Islam
and her creation of the Spiritual Board, the numerous initiatives to regulate Muslim
community rules in the nineteenth century (Crews 2006) are manifestations of the
necessity of the Empire to come to terms with its Orient.
This internal tension is reflected in Russia’s intellectual history, notably in the
debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles that have divided Russian intelligentsia
since Peter the Great’s modernist reforms. Westernizers considered Russia to be a
European power and advocated a massive, top-down modernization. Slavophiles, on the
contrary, emphasized the uniqueness of Russian blend of European and Asian (Tatar)
traits. The Westernizers-Slavophiles dispute has never found a lasting solution. After the
dominance of Soviet ideology, which was fiercely modernist, but not pro-West, the
debate about Russian identity re-emerged. The elites’ embrace of Western liberalism,
strongly supported by President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, gradually left ground to a
resurgence of neo-Eurasian views. As I show in this dissertation, it was at this point that
Russia’s Muslims have seen an opportunity to contribute to processes of identity
formation (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010).
The persistent dilemma about the “true” Russian nature is reflected in the
different assessments of Russian Orientalism given by scholars and commentators. The
Dutch historian Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (2010), in his organic account of the
history of imperial Russia’s relation with the East, notes that Russian Orientalism has
been benevolent toward Muslim-Tatars. Contrary to the European approach described by
Said, van der Oye claims, Russians have shown their willingness to accept – at least to a
degree – their Asian heritage. Conversely, the Russian scholars Gatagova (2005) and
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Ryzova (2005) represent the opposite view, which over-emphasizes the pressure of the
Slavic majority’s domination, which attempted to impose on all imperial subjects a
single, homogeneous identity based on the Orthodox religion.
The Soviet regime tried to accomplish a similar project of social engineering, but
with the aim to shape a completely new identity for Russia. The project envisioned the
formation of a new “Soviet man” (“homo sovieticus”) through the eradication of existing
ethnic, religious, and political affiliations and the inculcation of Communistinternationalist values into Soviet citizens. This purpose was subject to various
modifications and amendments, notably by Stalin’s nationalities policy (which
opportunistically emphasized ethnic affiliations) and the resistance of “bourgeois” habits,
such as religious sentiments.
However, both Orthodoxy and Islam suffered under Lenin’s ideological
modernism that despised religion as illusory and dangerous. Russia’s traditional
ambivalence toward Muslims and the East persisted. On one hand, Soviet Oriental
studies, heavily dominated by Ljucian Klimovich’s derogatory and aggressive positions
(Kemper 2009), became a tool to demonstrate Muslims’ backwardness and legitimize the
regime’s forceful actions of secularization and modernization (Kemper 2010, 2009;
Sartori 2010; Khalid 2007, 1998; Ro’i 1984; see also Bodansky 1984).
On the other hand, the Soviets boasted about being a “Muslim country”, in which
Muslims enjoyed the benefits of modernization and economic development, with the
intent to gain influence in the Third World – with less success than they had hoped
(Westad 2005). In the words of Michael Kemper, “Red Orientalism” not only resembled
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the paternalistic, “bourgeois” Orientalism of the empire, but it “reinforced [it with] an
equally essentialist class approach” (2010: 476).
Russia’s Muslims and imperial foreign policy
The increasing menace of the Sublime Porte, pressing at the Russian Empire’s borders,
contributed to the rise of the “Islamic factor” as an issue of Russian foreign policy. Werth
(2002) observes that Islam clearly appeared as a major political factor in Russia only
three centuries after the conquest of Kazan’. In his view, it was the Crimean war (185356), during which half a million Crimean Muslims accepted the protection of the
Ottoman Empire, to show how religious affinities might become political weapons. In
fact, Catherine the Great, a century earlier, had already been aware of it. She had
consistently proclaimed Russia a safe haven for Muslims, inaugurating a fight with the
Ottomans over Muslims’ patronage that intensified in the 19th century during the two
Empires’ military confrontations in the Caucasus (Crews 2006; Vitale 2006).
To be sure, Slavic Russians, including the elites, maintained a sense of cultural
and political superiority over Muslims, inside and outside the Empire (Figes 2002).
However, Russia had also found that its considerable Muslim population could actually
be of some advantage in international politics. Thanks to their knowledge of Middle
Eastern languages and their mastering of “Asian shrewdness” (van der Oye 2010),
members of the Tatar community were regularly employed as envoys to Muslim states, or
as counselors to the Tsars for generically “Oriental” issues.
Peter the Great, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, established an
Orientalist school in Kazan’ for the specific linguistic, cultural, and political education of
bureaucrats who were supposed to deal with Muslims within and outside the empire (van
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der Oye 2010). The Kazan’ institute’s main objective was to mold Russia’s Muslims into
imperial bureaucrats. However, it was also conceived as a research venue for oriental
languages and cultures. As such, it revealed itself a place in which Muslim and Slavic
scholars could meet, with mutual benefits. The institute remained the most authoritative
(and only) higher education establishment of this kind in imperial Russia until, about two
centuries later, the Oriental Faculty in St Petersburg, which had a more academic and less
“technical” curriculum, diverted most of Kazan’’s prestige.
Soviet Orientalism
The establishment of a harmonious, modern multi-ethnic state was also the purpose of the
Soviet regime, which often claimed to have fully succeeded in its intent. Its apparent
triumph, however, could not conceal the strong prejudice of Soviet elites about the
“backwardness” of the Muslim peoples of the Union, which was at the origin of harsh
campaigns for the eradication of traditional customs, including, of course, religious
beliefs (Kemper 2010, 2009; Ro’i 1984).
Soviet Orientalists openly despised the backwardness of the regions with a strong
presence of Muslims (especially in the Soviet Central Asian Republics). The
“development” and “modernization” of these areas and their populations were both an
implicit duty of Communism and an opportunity to display Soviet efficiency to the
(Muslim) Third World. The accelerated development of Soviet Muslim communities was
accomplished through a series of violent campaigns of modernization. “Sovietization” – a
parallel to imperial “Russification” – took place with a series of impositions, from the
mandatory adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet to the prohibition of wearing headscarves,
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the forced emancipation of women, and the prohibition of every public expression of cult
(Kemper 2009; Ro’i 1984).
Domestic and international political factors, similar to those faced by the Empire,
induced the Soviet regime, from time to time, to relax its rigid atheist stance, and to allow
very few local Islamic institutions to operate legally, even if not freely (Kemper 2009;
Khalid 2007a, 1998; Ro’i 1984). By doing so, the Soviet Union aimed to create a tighter
social cohesion among its Muslim citizens. At the same time, a more accommodating
policy allowed the Soviet regime to appear in front of Muslim countries as a friendly
power. However, while some observers note that the Soviet approach was, indeed, part of
a process of decolonization from Russian Empire’s dominance (Khalid 2007), Soviet
Orientalism maintained, in its theorizations, a very aggressive and derogatory stance
toward Muslims and their “backwardness” (Kemper 2010).
Muslims in post-Soviet Russia
Toward the middle of the 1980s, the new policy of socio-political transparency
(glasnost’) inaugurated by then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev created a safe
environment for Muslim communities in Russia to (re)discover their religious heritage
and affirm their specific identities. After the Soviet collapse in 1991, freed from the
regime’s religious repressions, post-Soviet Russia, as a whole, has experienced what has
been defined a religious renaissance. Official cults, old sect, and “new” spiritual
movements enjoyed an extraordinary diffusion. In the course of the 1990s decade, both
the Orthodox Church and Islamic institutions emerged as the most influential religious
organizations in the country (Filatov 2007; Hunter 2004).

11

The emergence of nationalist movements in various former Soviet republics
caused the secession of all of them, including Muslim Central Asian and South Caucasus
ones, and generated separatist movements elsewhere, notably in Tatarstan and the North
Caucasus. The numerous terrorist attacks conducted on Russian territory since the mid1990s were also frequently reclaimed by, or attributed to (generally Muslim) separatists.
Because of these factors, Russia’s Muslims are often still object of skepticism and
outright racism.
Compared to the past, however, Russian discourse about Islam has visibly shifted
from a discussion of solely ethnic-religious oppositions, to be a multi-dimensional
debate. First, Islamic traditional religious organizations (muftiats) openly and consistently
reject allegations to be encouraging or supporting separatist claims. They firmly condemn
any form of Islamic-inspired terrorism, and reassure about their loyalty to the state.
Indeed, many Muslim leaders are actively advocating for the acknowledgment of
Muslims’ historical and cultural contribution to Russian civilization.
Second, the Russian government legitimizes the muftiats by authorizing only the
form of Islam historically developed in Russia, and by blaming foreign extremists for
terrorism. Third, and unprecedentedly, Russia’s Orthodox Church and Muslim leaders
joined efforts against secularization and “non-official” cults. Renewed Islamic studies,
after decades of prohibition, foster reflections about the place of Islam in Russia’s
political system, and Muslims are still put in charge of Russia’s relations with the Islamic
world. Calls for community cohesion or more autonomy still exist but do not challenge
the state’s unity. More controversial are (small) groups that denounce the violation of
Muslims’ human rights and, of course, the deeds of terrorists and separatist activists in
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the Caucasus. As is evident, the discourse about Islam involves actors as diverse as
scholars (of Islam), philosophers, sociologists, politicians, mass media, religious leaders,
both “authorized” and “extremists”, and private citizens.
Purpose of study
Surprisingly, most academic and public commentators, especially in the West, do not
capture the evident diversification of Russian perceptions of Islam. Instead, they continue
to apply the traditional categorization of Russian Muslims as possessors of a “split
identity” – as believers and as citizens. According to this view, Russia’s Muslims are
always potentially influenced by other Islamic communities, or Muslim states, to act
against the Russian state. The constant tension that ensues between Muslims and nonMuslims, in this perspective, causes the outburst of conflicts, even violent ones, among
communities and with the state.
Although this is a very important aspect of Slavic-Muslim relationships in Russia,
it is often interpreted within an essentialist “ethnicity/security” model that misses the
complexity of Islam in Russia. It is, instead, my contention that the discourse about Islam
should be conceived as part of a broader process of self-reflection on a new identity,
which involves Islam, Orthodoxy, and secularism as potentially competitive models for
Russia. In this way, the discourse affects Russia’s (self)-positioning in the world and thus
influences the conceptualization and implementation of state policies, especially security
and foreign ones. An effective analysis of Russia’s discourse on Islam, therefore, should
broaden the traditional, univocal ethnicity/security scheme to offer a multi-dimensional
interpretative framework that unveils the links between discourse and policy.
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This work intends to conduct such analysis and has three main objectives:
1. Demonstrating that the Russia’s discourse on Islam reflects the complexity of the role
of Islam in Russia’s society, culture, and politics, re-elaborates historical
conceptualizations of Islam, and creates new ones to face contemporary challenges
like globalization and secularism, thus going well beyond the binary opposition
“ethnicity/security” that is the general approach of the existing academic and political
literature.
2. Identifying the intellectual, political, and institutional networks of Russian religious
and secular authors who shape Russian discourse on Islam, while drawing from – and
contributing to – internal and global debates.
3. Explaining the mechanisms by which Russia’s discourse on Islam significantly
influences processes of identity formation of a “new” Russia that determine its (self)positioning within the world order, especially with respect to the Muslim and Western
worlds, and therefore has direct and indirect effects on Russia’s security and foreign
policies, at the domestic, regional, and global levels.
Literature Review
After the demise of the Soviet Union, many Russian ethnic groups, including Muslim
ones, have proclaimed their political autonomy. Such ethnic-nationalist enterprises
required the reconstruction of lost identities and peoples’ histories. For Russian Muslims,
this has meant the retelling of national narratives (Khurmatullin 2010; Chabutdinov
2003) and the rediscovery of transnational ideas like pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. In
this process, Islam proved to be a powerful motive, which has induced many scholars to
equate religious with ethnic identity.
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Several elements appear to corroborate this interpretation: initiatives to revive the
Tatar language (Wertheim 2005), attempts to substitute the ethnic “Tatarism” with the
territorial “Tatarstanism” as a unifying factor (Yuzeev 2005), calls for school reforms and
the teaching of Islam in the local languages, and the anti-Russian conflict in the
Caucasus, to name a few. In surveys showing the disaffection of Russian Muslims for
consistent religious practices, Islam appears to be rather a sign of cultural and identity
affiliation, than a religion (Stepanjants 2003; Lehmann 1997).
The value of Islam as prevalently social practice has been investigated by Russian
studies of local communities, which have shown the capability of Islamic traditions to
create social cohesiveness, and their adaptability to different, local contexts (Michaleva
2011; Nazukina 2011). The high political visibility that Islamic (nationalist) movements
and Islamic leaders have enjoyed in the 1990s has urged the creation of a new analytical
standpoint. Many observers, both in Russia and abroad, have interpreted the emphasis
given by many local leaders to their own Islamic identity primarily as an attempt to
exploit popular religious sentiment to maintain or acquire power (Azamatov 2005;
Laruelle 2005; Mukhametchin 2005; Yuzeev 2005; Hunter 2004). “Instrumentalization of
religion” quickly became an analytical category readily applied whenever a political
project or a public figure appeared associated with Islam.
It is true that many political actors who had been Soviet high bureaucrats and
proclaimed secularists (or even atheists) accentuated or “rediscovered” their Islamic
identity. This operation was eased by the fact that, in Soviet times, often individuals kept
their religious identity secret. Additionally, in the post-Soviet space the definition of
“ethnic Muslim”, which has little anthropological meaning, has become a current term to
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indicate the members of historically Muslim communities, further blurring the line
between sincere believers and opportunistic ones. However, as Johnson (2005) notes, the
fact that local elites recur to Islam to secure political success clearly hints at the
possibility that, in fact, religious identity may be more than a secondary marker of
ethnicity.
Narratives of national security and geopolitics
The allegedly “split identity” of Russian Muslims has often generated mistrust among
ethnic Russians. The emergence of separatist movements and the series of terrorist
attacks of the 1990s and 2000s have reinforced these suspects. In order to deal with the
necessity to contrast violent actions, without demonizing Russia’s whole Muslim
community, in the mid-1990s the Russian government introduced a conceptual
differentiation between homegrown (“good”) and foreign (“bad”) extremist Islam, and by
making the latter a matter of national security (Yemelianova 2010a, 2010b; Tsygankov
2006; Hunter 2004; Herman 1996). Although noted by several observers, this distinction
has been generally dismissed as artificial and ineffective. In fact, as I reconstruct in
details in this dissertation, it has now become a pillar, albeit not always visible, of
Russia’s doctrines on terrorism, security, and geopolitics, and is going to affect Russia’s
relations on multiple levels.
The ignorance of the complex view of Islam in Russia and the tendency to
homologate it to the Western prioritization of the “war on terror” are probably
responsible for the narrow, security-centered perspective taken by observers of Russia’s
Islam. In particular, the actions of separatists in the Caucasus, who perform terrorist
attacks elsewhere in Russia, mix Islamic precepts with nationalist slogans, and belong to
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transnational groups, induce many analysts to study Russia’s Islam in a geopolitical
perspective. Under scrutiny is especially the alleged influence of Middle East states
(Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) on Russia’s Muslims. The reappearance of versions of
pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, which do not necessarily carry a subversive message, but
do create space for “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991), detached from the Russian
state, has also raised the preoccupations of commentators (Dannreuther and Luke 2010;
Yemelianova 2010a, 2010b; Malashenko 2007; Malashenko and Filatov 2007; Hunter
2004; Eickelman 1993).
Even within this geopolitical perspective, the limitations of existing explanatory
models are evident. With few exceptions (Koolaee 2010; Mesbahi 1997, 1996), the
literature offers conventional descriptions of transnational connections among extremists
(Yemelianova 2010a; Malashenko 2007; Malashenko and Filatov 2007; Eickelman
1993). The main narrative consists primarily of an updated version of the “Great Game”
that, in nineteenth-century Eurasia, saw the interests of the British, Persian, and Russian
Empires compete through complex foreign policy moves. Today, the “New Great Game”
could involve the U.S., Russia, and China (Rumer et al. 2007).
The “hot” areas in Northern Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and other
territories) occupy a privileged place in the literature. The large amount of works
dedicated to conflict in these areas has fostered a more sophisticated analytical paradigm.
Contrary to basic narratives, Islam is no longer considered as the sole, or even the main,
cause for conflict. Instead, ethnic-based claims, post-colonial dynamics, and socioeconomic hardships are also considered. Indeed, the latter’s relevance has grown to
become the generally acknowledged main cause of terrorism in the area (Malashenko
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2007; Malashenko and Filatov 2007; Hunter 2004; Malashenko and Trenin 2004;
Yemelianova 2002). The Russian state, through a series of official documents and
informal declarations, also supports this interpretation (Campana 2013).
Against this backdrop, the few treatments of questions of Islamic political theory
appear commendable, even when they prove inadequate to the task (Stepaniants 2003). A
specific version of the geopolitical approach is represented by (Neo) Eurasianism.
Drawing from emigration discourse of the 1920s, it asserts the uniqueness of Russian
identity as simultaneously European and Asian. Its emphasis on the ethnic element and
on Russia’s geopolitical particularism (Dugin 2007) sides it with the Russian right, and it
is being treated in the literature accordingly (Umland 2009; Laruelle 2008; Wiederkehr
2007).
One strain of Eurasianism, however, diffused especially in Tatarstan, emphasizes
the civilizational contribution of Islam (Khakimov 2003). Although observers have
noticed how that it has lost political momentum (Khurmatullin 2010; Khabudtinov 2005;
Laruelle 2005), the conceptualization of a common Orthodox-Islamic civilization still
finds authoritative proponents (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010). Thanks to this latter
literature, Islam-Eurasianism partakes to the discourses on identity, religion, and
secularism of the state. As a civilizational discourse, it also falls into the broader debate
on the parallelisms between Islam and Christianity (Bulliet 2004; Lewis 2002).
Russia’s Muslims’ views of Islam
The interest of the Russian elites for their Muslim co-citizens seems not to have been
always reciprocated, at least not in the Russian language (Sartori 2010). Russian
Muslims, though, did and do reflect on their relationship with the central state. In the
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nineteenth century, European-inspired nationalistic movements forced Russian Muslims
to choose between affiliation to the state (citizenship), or to the nation (ethnic). The
ensuing dilemma was linked to issues of modernization and secularization. For example,
Gasprinski and other jadidists denounced the lack of national pride of Russian Muslims,
and advocated for more cooperation with the state, especially in education and the role of
women (Kurzman 2002; Khalid 1998). Discussions on Islam were inevitably tampered by
the Soviet regime.
Only in 1991, freed from oppression but in socio-political disarray, Russia’s
Muslims explored again their relationship with Islam. Two important aspects of the
renewed debate concern the legitimacy of Russian traditional practices and the authority
of Russian muftis (religious leaders). Russian muftis are criticized by Middle Eastern
Muslims and by young Russian Muslims educated abroad for deviating from strict
Islamic precepts and rules. The muftis, who have received a relatively poor Islamic
education in Soviet times, reject the critiques as non-pertinent to the Russian situation.
They claim that Russia’s Muslims have developed their own versions of Hanafi
Islam and Sufism, and that local religious leadership requires the mastery of traditional
practices. Russian muftis argue that foreign organizations covertly aim to take control of
Russian institutions and disrupt the traditional customs of Russian communities. They
contend that Russian Muslims educated abroad after 1991 are too young and too detached
from the reality on the ground and/or are agents of “fundamentalist” Muslim states.
Finally, revivals of pan-Islamism and (especially in Tatarstan) pan-Turkism have
been popular in the aftermath of 1991. The encouragement that they often received from
Turkey and Iran has been often interpreted, by state authorities and commentators alike,
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as a foreign intrusion in Russia’s internal affairs. As emerges from this overview, the
same questions that preoccupied Russia’s Muslim communities in the nineteenth century
– ethnic versus state identity, loyalty to the state and to the ummah, and the nature of
Russia’s Islam – ae still at the center of today’s discourse (Michaleva 2011; Nazukina
2011; Wertheim 2005; Antonenko 2003; Chabutdinov 2003; Agadjianian 2001).
Contemporary Russian Oriental Studies and Islam
In 2007, Vladimir Bobrovnikov, a prominent scholar of Islam at the Institute of Oriental
Studies in St. Petersburg, published a critical review of scholarly works on Russia’s
Islam. His comments, in particular in reference to interpretations of Islam and security,
provide an insight on the main analytical currents and testify of the degree of academic
sophistication that Russian specialists had achieved by the mid-2000s, which, with the
exception of few authors, is overlooked by Western observers. Bobrovnikov declares that
“every month” dozens of works on Islam are published in Russia. By this rate,
Bobrovnikov’s account, dated 2007, may result very partial. However, it is still very
illustrative of the mechanisms by which much of the scholarly debate trickles into
Russian public discourse.
The author identifies three fundamental traditions in the research on Islam that
influence today’s perceptions: academic studies of Islam; Soviet scientific atheism; and
the Western tradition. For Bobrovnikov, the Soviet Orientalist school was dogmatically
hostile to Muslims and geared not to study Islam, but to expose Muslim elites’ (alleged)
“ignorance, self-interest and hostility” (Bobrovnikov 2007: 10). Western “Cold-War
Sovietologists” (experts of Soviet affairs), led by Alexandre Bennigsen, exposed the
alleged “falsification” of Soviet atheist scholars. However, because of Soviet censorship,
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they were compelled to conduct their analyses on the same sources – even if Bennigsen
came to opposite conclusions than Soviet scholars (10). Bobrovnikov notes critically that,
fundamentally, Soviet and Western analysts of the Cold War maintained the same
“cliché” that depicted Russia’s Muslims as fundamentally hostile to the empire and
reluctant to cooperate with it (Bobrovnikov 2007: 11).
This “cliché”, Bobrovnikov observes, has been exposed by the American Islamist
Devin DeWeese, who has criticized the whole work on post-Soviet Islam by the Israeli
scholar Yaakov Ro’i. Bobrovnikov notes that even some very talented scholars, like the
French Olivier Roy and the Russian Arabist Dmitrii Makarov, in their works still apply
analytical categories devised by Bennigsen. While Bennigsen and his contemporaries
were justified, because operating under some attenuating circumstances, Bobrovnikov
criticizes young scholars. He complains that, in Russia, they just compile lists of
references while, in the West, scholars of Islam lend themselves to political sciences or
propaganda journalism.
Bobrovnikov notes that, in the best cases, scholars simply report the innovations
of recent times, such as the issue of fatwas over the internet, the calling to prayer through
megaphones, or Sufis’ use of portraits of sheiks during their meditation, in search of a
spiritual connection, without appropriately contextualize their behaviors within the
Islamic tradition. Unfortunately, he observes, the level of analysis by international
political scientists is not deep either. For example, he rejects Yaakov Ro’i’s argument
that the Soviet mullahs were ignorant of Islam because they could not translate the
Qur’an in their local languages:
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this is not less absurd than, for example, to pretend from the Party
secretary of the kolkhoz to know Marx’s “Capital” by heart in German.
(Bobrovnikov 2007: 12)
Bobrovnikov finds that works conducted “in the style of classical academic
Islamic studies” are generally of good quality. Especially commendable are the works of
specialists on Maghreb: Robert Grigorevich Landa, Aleksey V. Malashenko, and
Aleksander A. Ignatenko, even if, he complains, they are not very accurate in their
methods: Ignatenko does not quote the location of his sources, while Landa makes factual
mistakes – and his work is little more than a list of issues. Malashenko’s books are more
solid (Bobrovnikov 2007: 14). However, his focus on “professional politics” seems to
prevent him from following the dynamics within the Islamic movements in Russia – for
example, all but one of the groups he describes have disappeared from the scene.
Finally, Bobrovnikov takes position on Islam and security. In his judgment, the
Russian political analyst Aleksandr Ignatenko is the major responsible for the
exaggeration of the meaning of Islamic extremism. Although Bobrovnikov admits that
Muslims “are not to be idealized”, and that there have been terrorist acts and violent
Muslim leaders, like the Chechen Basaev, he observes: “it is not these people who shape
the face of Islam in Russia” (Bobrovnikov 2007: 14).
Although Bobrovnikov acknowledges the relevance of political Islam, he also
notes that, from scientific point of view, it is more important to analyze the relations, in
Russia, between Islamic knowledge and power (Bobrovnikov 2007: 15). In his opinion,
much has been done by Russian and foreign Islamic studies about Islam in Russia. The
recent research suggests that, in the last two and half centuries, Muslims have had a voice
in the dialogue between Russian society and central authority.
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In particular, Bobrovnikov praises the work of the German Orientalist Michael
Kemper, who is revealing the existence of an Islamic “discourse” held not only in
Persian, Turkic, or Arabic, but also in the languages of Central Asian communities. Texts
(treatises, articles, letters etc.), written by Russia’s Muslims in Soviet and pre-Revolution
times are being translated. From their contents, Bobrovnikov re-evaluates Soviet policy
on Islam. For him, it is incorrect to consider the Soviet time as completely negative for
Russia’s Islam. For example, the Soviet rule had allowed the switch from Arabic to
Russian and to local idioms as languages of cult, which today is beneficial (Bobrovnikov
2007: 15).
Theories and Methods
Conceptually, this study shares with Social Constructivism within International Relations
the emphasis on the role of values, interests, beliefs, and ideas as primary causes of
political change (Kubálková et al. 1998; Onuf 1989). For social constructivists, constant
social interactions make negotiations on values and ideas inevitable. Such negotiations
occur through speech acts that, at length, produce rules able to influence agents’
behaviors. Communication (discourse) is defined not only as a way of transmitting a
message, but also as a fundamental process by which rules are constantly produced and
modified. As such, it influences normative arrangements, decision-making processes, and
state policies, including policies of security and foreign relations (Campana 2013;
Tsygankov 2006; Hopf 2002; Herman 1996; Katzenstein 1996). Of particular relevance
for this study is Kubálková’s argument (Kubálková 2003) that the attention given by
Social Constructivism to “meaning” makes it particularly suitable for the discussion of
religious ontological foundations of a society.
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Although Social Constructivism provides the general framework for my analysis,
the complexity of my object of study requires that, for its full comprehension, I recur to a
range of theories from different paradigms and/or disciplines, in the spirit of the analytic
eclecticism of Sil and Katzenstein (2010). Their pragmatic approach purports to analyze
“real world” questions – poorly explained by one theory alone – in a way that makes the
outcomes meaningful at both the academic and policy levels.
For the purposes of my analysis, I have identified five themes that recur in
contemporary Russian discourse on Islam:
1. Identity: discussions on the identity of Russian Muslims as “Russians”.
2. Religious institutions: the institutional role of Islamic organizations.
3. Security: discussions on the (perceived) existential threat by Muslims to the State
that may require military response (for example, religious terrorism).
4. Islam and politics: the place of Islamic (political) doctrine in a modern, secular
state.
5. Geopolitics: the issues that arise from Russia’s assessment of its role in the
international system, in particular the conceptualization of its geopolitical
situation in Eurasia and its reaction to the presence of Muslims at its internal and
external borders.
Each of these issues requires the support of one or more theoretical approaches.
On identity, Russia’s debate on Islam moves along the lines of citizenship- and ethnicitybased nationalism (Smith 2006; Anderson 1991), and within the linguistic-philosophical
discussion on ethnic and religious myths (Smith 2006; Bakhtin 1993; Barthes 1970). At a
deeper conceptual level, the fundamental question about the nature of Russian identity
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(European or Asian) has reemerged two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union. In
particular, the traditional philosophical discourse on the “Russian idea” (Berdjaev 1947)
is being revamped, especially, but not exclusively, among ultra-nationalists and NeoEurasianists (March 2012a; Laruelle 2008; Wiederkehr 2007).
The study of historical primary sources (Berdjaev 1947) reveals the multiplicity
of possible interpretations of the Russian idea in the construction of Russian identity
throughout Russian history. An adequate understanding of the Russian idea, and of its
fundamental role in the elaboration of Russian self-identity throughout history (Strada
1991), is necessary to comprehend the present discourse on Russian civilization,
including civilizational nationalism (March 2012a, 2012b). Several contemporary reelaborations of the Russian idea also envision a role for Islam within a broader Russian
civilization. On this instance, the civilizational discourses held both in the West and in
the Muslim world (Esposito and Voll 2008; Bulliet 2004, 1993; Lewis 2002) serve as
backdrop for comparison with their Russian counterparts (Gavrilov and Shevchenko
2010; Silant’ev 2008, 2007, 2006).
The traditional influence, also political, of religion in Russia makes the
international debate on secularism (Habermas 2011; Taylor 2011, 2007) relevant for
Russia, where contentions about cultural, social, and political power underlie the relations
between the state and religious institutions. Hence, debates about the ontologically
foundational character of Islamic political theory (Euben 1999) reverberate in the
suggestions by some Russian authors to include broad Islamic principles in Russia’s laws
(Siukiianen 2010).
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Buzan and de Wilde’s Securitization Theory (1998) can help to explain the
dynamics of the “Islamic threat” by looking at Russia’s debates about real and perceived
danger – and can be effectively integrated with the literature on religious terrorism
(Juergensmeyer 2003). Constructivist models of the political value of ideas highlight the
influence of public opinion, interest groups, and the government on each other and on
policy (Wendt 1999, 1992, Katzenstein 1996; Holsti 1962). Critical geopolitics (Ó
Tuathail 1996) and critical security (Booth 2007) set Russia and its perceptions of
globalization and power relations among states in the global context, while at the very
important (for Russia) regional level, the need for security at the borders and the related
geopolitical concerns are well captured by the Regional Security Complex Theory of
Buzan and Wæver (2008).
Studies of discourse in the post-Soviet space have been already conducted
through textual and/or socio-political analyses, with good results (Campana 2013;
Gatagova 2005; Wertheim 2005; Hopf 2002). Methodologically, I have structured my
work according to Fairclough’s theorization of discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003). A
communication act in written, oral, and video form is a “text” (Fairclough 2003: 35).
Texts do not stand alone, but are part of a multi-level system of at linguistic, textual, and
social meanings. The interactions of these three levels determine the meaning of the text
itself (Fairclough 2003: 11). Located at the “intermediate” level of textual analysis, midway between the pure structural (social) and the pure syntactical (language) levels of
texts, “discourse” is defined as
the particular view of language, […] an element of social life which is
closely interconnected with other elements. (Fairclough 2003: 3)
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Fairclough argues that an effective discourse analysis cannot be only the study of
the linguistic elements of even complex texts, but must include the evaluation of their
social context (Fairclough 2003: 2). Particularly relevant for discourse analysis are the
concepts of “intertextuality” and “assumptions”. Intertextuality is the interaction of the
text with other texts (directly or indirectly). Similarly, assumptions indicate that relations
with other texts are present, but do not specify to which texts they refer to (Fairclough
2003: 40). Both concepts provide an analytical roadmap within a discourse, which is
usually made up of identifiable and hidden authors, clear concepts, cross-references, and
vague ideas.
Because of its emphasis on the importance of historic and social contexts for the
comprehension of discourse, Fairclough’s method has proved particularly appropriate for
my work. My research focuses on discourse about Islam conducted in the so-called
“Putin era”, which goes from the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Boris Yeltsin’s Prime
Minister in 1999, to the present day, with a special emphasis on the years after the
“official”1 conclusion of the second Chechen war in 2005. As I explain in my work, this
event represents a watershed for Russia’s Islam, at the conceptual and institutional level,
but most of the literature has not captured the changes occurred in the last ten years.
Despite my attention to contemporary texts, however, I have had to account for
the fact that, as Bobrovnikov (2007) notes, many traits of Russian contemporary
discourse on Islam are rooted in the recent and distant past. Therefore, I have drawn on
my academic background and training in Russian language, culture, and history, to

1

Moscow declared to have won. In fact, the conflict continued beyond that year in form of policing
interventions, terrorist attacks, and Special Forces operations.
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appropriately assess the value of texts in their specific historical contexts, and their
possible meanings in contemporary discourse.
The main sources for my dissertation have been texts in the Russian language
about Islam in Russia, produced by authors from the state, religious institutions,
academia, local communities, public media, and unofficial and underground
organizations and groups. Following Fairclough, I define text in a broad sense, which
accounts for differences both in forms (written, oral, and video documents), and in ways
of communication, for example statements (one-way) and interviews (two-ways; see
Fairclough 2003: 35). Taking advantage of some of the largest archives of East European
materials in Europe, the Bayern State Library in Munich, Germany, the Virtual Library
Eastern Europe, I have consulted primary sources in printed form (books, journals,
magazines, and newspapers).
The characteristics of contemporary social communication, which takes place via
virtual networks of communities and individuals, have imposed that at least an equal
amount of materials be found on the World Wide Web, in online editions of large mass
media, official institutional websites, and blogs. The availability of virtual sources also
outside of Russia has reduced the need to conduct field research in the country – at least
for the purposes of this study, which does not intend to provide an exhaustive index of
Russian sources, or even themes, on Islam.
The selection of the relevant sources and the assessment of their importance
relative to other sources and to the contexts are two major challenges in discourse
analysis. In my study, I have started from those authors whom I have encountered in the
literature (for example, Malashenko), or whose works are so immediately visible that
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cannot be ignored (for example, articles in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta). I have proceeded
by systematically identifying, for each text, eventual references to other texts
(intertextuality) and to the context (assumptions), in order to both establish
affinities/oppositions and to estimate thematic and authorial influences on the discourse.
The frequency of intertextual references testifies, to a certain degree, of the significance,
in the discourse, of a given topic or author. In addition to the tracing of networks of
intellectual relations, by way of indirect quotations or argumentative references this
procedure helps to compensate for eventual paucity of materials related to significant
authors.
Significance of Study
The intended contribution of this study to the scholarly work is manifold.
1. The main purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of Russia’s discourse
on Islam that reflects the diversity of the authors, texts, and themes that constitute
Russian thinking about Islam. It intends to close the gap in the scholarly and political
literature that tends to identify Islam solely as a marker of ethnic identity and/or a
cause of security concerns.
2. With my research, I have devised a composite method of analysis of the complex
subject that is Russian discourse on Islam. This work shows how an analytically
eclectic approach consents not only the identification of key issues and their relations,
but also an adequate explanation of single topics and their context.
3. Further, this study aims to contribute to the subfields of religion and security in
International Relations, by showing the development of contemporary Russia’s
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conceptualizations of key issues like religion in a secular state, inter-religious
relations, and domestic and international religious security.
4. Finally, I provide scholars and commentators of Islam in International Relations with
a compelling case study, thus undermining their assumptions of Russian
exceptionalism and its subsequent absence from their comparative literature. As
Dannreuther (2010) points out, this is a task long overdue.
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CHAPTER II
THE IDENTITY OF RUSSIA’S MUSLIMS

Scratch a Russian, and you will find a Tatar.2
Despite its claims of Europeanness, Russia was a Eurasian Empire, multiethnic and
multi-religious. Russia’s desire to belong to the clique of European great powers was
frustrated by this same clique’s perception of Russia as “oriental” and thus extraneous, if
at times exotically attractive. In fact, the contradictions of its own self-conception
dominated much of Russia’s intellectual history and concretely affected the Empire’s
strategies in foreign policy.
Even the Soviet Union, which had intended to sever all ties with the imperial past
and create a new society, communist, modern, and atheist, could not solve this
fundamental dilemma. Despite the intense and often ferocious zeal with which Soviet
authorities and bureaucrats pursued their task of replacing tsarist imperialism with
socialism and multi-nationalism, traces of the pre-revolutionary mindset survived in
social habits and, especially, in the citizens’ consciences. They found expression mostly
in the secrecy of private spaces. Paradoxically, despite the Soviets’ emphasis on the
novelty of their political idea, much of the internal (and external) rhetoric of the USSR
recalled the imperial, messianic idea of Russia as a predestined world power. Indeed,

2

The expression was actually coined by the Marquis de Cuistine, a French aristocrat who traveled in
Russia in the 19th century. Originally intended to expose the Russians’ glossy, but superficial European
identity, it has since then entered Russian popular culture, with ambivalent meanings: either to expose
ethnic Russian’s racism, or the opposite.
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since the time of Stalin’s rule, and especially since World War II, it was expressed in
various forms of Soviet “nationalism” (Laruelle 2009).
Under both the Romanovs and the Soviets, the Orient has remained a constant in
self-conceptualizations of Russian people and state – through its presence as well as
through its absence. The idea of an Oriental Russia was criticized in the campaigns of
modernization fiercely conducted by Peter the Great, Alexander II, and various Soviet
governments; it represented Russia’s mythical heritage for the nineteenth century’s
Slavophiles; finally, it was the implicit enemy in Struve’s and Stolypin’s early-twentiethcentury’s efforts to bring Russia to an industrial par with England. Even the Russian
emigrants in Paris engaged with the Eurasian question in the 1920s.
The discourse on Russia’s identity, of course, could not be completed without the
participation of the Orthodox Church, which had fundamentally contributed to the shape
of Russian culture, society, and politics, and which held an even more ambiguous stance.
Throughout the centuries, the efforts of so many parties involved have only brought
temporary agreements. Indeed, the definition of what Russia is and where it should
belong appears to be extremely elusive, even to Russians themselves.
Geography of identity
In this search for identity, what remains constant is the oscillation between two
geographical poles – Europe and Asia – and the civilizational implications that belonging
to the one or the other carries. The apparent impossibility to opt for one by excluding the
other induced many Russians to envision a unique Russian character, an idea of Russia
that would actually combine the best elements of Europe and Asia. According to this
vision, in the same way that Russia’s territory determined Russians’ squinting
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geopolitical perspective, it also conferred on Russia a pivotal role in the world.
Geography determined civilization. For Russians, it proved the uniqueness and
importance of Russia’s civilizational mission, of its special place in history, and of its
future as pivotal world power. It is not therefore a surprise that, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the invalidation of its ideological certainties, and its crumbling as a world
great power, the majority of citizens remained deeply disoriented; not knowing their
place in the world anymore, they were at loss in their own country.
One model to look at was, of course, the West, which had prospered while
Communism had failed. Yet, the failure of the liberal reforms promised by Yeltsin and
his ministers and the excesses of capitalism – which in Russia had been interpreted as the
triumph of business shrewdness, opportunism, and “survival of the fittest” – quickly left
the great majority of the population in miserable conditions. Thus, Yeltsin’s initial
enthusiasm for Western liberalism, sustained by the United States, failed to plant Western
values on the Russian “national” soil (Laruelle 2009). Soon enough, a strong wave of
anti-Western attitudes grew among Russians, who gradually turned away from the United
States as an economic and, especially, cultural model and began to look inwardly for
alternatives.
The Religious “Renaissance”
In the 1990s, once repressed religions emerged and blossomed, offering individuals both
immediate consolation to endure hard times and, if they needed one, a new basis on
which to build individual and collective self-identities. For Christians and Muslims alike,
as well as for all those following the other religions and the numerous spiritual
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movements that blossomed in the 1990s, there was an opportunity to express alternative
existential, social, and political values.
Against this backdrop, the nostalgia for the tsarist epoch, which had lingered in
Soviet times, also grew, and in the 2000s became even stronger. This positive imperial
image is reinforced by the prestige that pre-Revolution Russia enjoyed in the world
community and, in only apparent contradiction, by the status of “great power” even more
prestigiously held by the Soviet Union (Laruelle 2009). Indeed, a significant debate
among commentators, in Russia and abroad, has developed about the “imperial”
character of post-Soviet Russia’s, especially Putin’s, foreign policy (Trenin 2011;
Laruelle 2008). Although the recall of past imperial glory, in nationalist movements, is
more a vague sentiment than a re-proposal of tsarist values – also because it is mixed
with nostalgia for Soviet-era prestige – it may have contributed to the birth and success of
what Marlène Laruelle (2009) calls “Putin’s nationalism”: a mixture of economic
Westernism, Russian exceptionalism, and political pragmatism. Not all Russians, though,
agree with Putin.
The search for a satisfying definition of Russia’s new identity, in fact, is far from
being completed. Once more, the state, the Church, and the intellectuals are attempting to
determine the self-perception of Russians as a nation and, subsequently, their conception
about what their place in the world should be. Differently from the past, though, today
another group intends to participate in this crucial discourse: Russia’s Muslims.
As will become clear in the course of this work, many Muslims are constructing
their arguments within the traditional Russian dichotomies of modernity and tradition,
East and West, and – now – globalization and particularism. For many, to find a national
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identity requires some elaboration of a (new) “Russian idea”. Only apparently
paradoxically, Muslims also appeal to this all-Russian concept. Their motivations, and
the bases for their claims, become apparent through a close examination of what actually
the “Russian idea” is supposed to be.
The Russian idea as identity foundation
In Russian discourse about Russia, in conceptualizations of Russia’s place in the word, as
well as in discussions of foreign and security policies, the absence of an ideological
cohesion that would properly place Russia and guide its actions: a “new ‘Russian idea’”,
is often lamented. The expression refers to a general conceptualization of Russian
identity elaborated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More specifically, The
Russian idea is the title of a very significant essay published in 1946 in his Parisian exile
by the Russian philosopher Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdyaev (also Berdiaev or
Berdjaev). In his work, Berdyaev (1947) embraced and further elaborated the thought of
the influential nineteenth-century philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev, and summed up
general sentiments shared by many of his contemporaries.
According to Berdyaev, the “Russian idea” was the true glue that held together
the vast and diverse Tsarist Empire. It had a strong religious component, which was
Christian-based but not necessarily embodied by the Orthodox Church and its doctrine.
Rather, it was theorized by Berdyaev as an ideal of shared community values, mutual
respect, and, above all, a deep sense of Russia’s uniqueness, substantially consisting in
Russia’s destiny as the world’s savior of truth against evil, of Christianity against
paganism. The Slavic Orthodox Christian Church, though, proved inadequate to fulfill
such mission, either practically or ontologically. The “idea” was a general and all-
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embracing theological-philosophical concept of harmony among civilizations. Russia’s
historical destiny was to achieve such peace. Proof of its mission was Russia’s nature, at
the same time European and Asian.
The Asian element in Berdyaev’s idea of Russia
Berdyaev’s essay is the account of the evolution of the Russian idea throughout the
history of Russia and its civilization. Fundamentally, for Berdyaev the identity of Russia
was Christian. Yet, although he considered Russia’s “Asianness” the heritage of
“barbarian” times, he underscored that it was exactly the Asian element that distinguished
Russia from the rest of Europe and put its historical mission above all others. Exhibiting a
perhaps Orientalist self-image typical of many Russians, especially of noble heritage, he
romantically praised “Asianness” as the most worrisome, savage, adventurous, and brave
side of the Russian soul (Berdjaev 1947; see also Figes 2002, esp. Chapters 5 and 6).
Indeed, the Asian (Tatar) element appeared in the essay in few but significant
remarks. At first, Berdyaev spoke derogatorily of it. He called the years spent under the
Tatar yoke “barbarian” times. Then, he complained about the Muscovy tsardom (the
reign of the first tsars, between the end of the Tatar domination in the fifteenth century
and the ascent of Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth century) being still “too
Asiatic”. Further in his account, though, Lenin is presented as belonging to Russia’s
historical evolution, the significance of which transcends Empire and Church. Despite
having been himself expelled from the Soviet Union, in fact, Berdyaev spoke with a
certain admiration of Lenin. Namely, he saw the Bolshevik project as in line with
Russia’s historical mission:
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Marxism was adapted to Russian conventions and was Russified. The
messianic idea of Marxism, which was connected with the mission of
the proletariat, was combined and identified with the Russian messianic
idea. […] But the communist revolution which was also the actual
Russian Revolution was a universal messianism. (Berdjaev 1947: 249)
For Berdyaev, the Russian soul is Christian, even when it is communist, and
Lenin was “an admirable theoretician and practitioner of revolution; he was a
characteristic Russian with an alloy of Tartar [sic] traits” (250, italics mine). It seems
that Berdyaev, like many Russians before and after him, was in search of an elusive
balance between Europe and Asia, East and West. Like many others, he could not come
to final terms with the Oriental side of the “Russian soul”, although differently from
many others he did not deny its centrality.
Civilizational interpretations of Berdyaev’s “Idea”
It would seem undeniable, then, that “Asianness” belongs to the Russian idea, even
within the fundamentally Christian interpretation that Berdyaev gives to it. From here, it
is a short step to take a civilizational, rather than exclusively religious, perspective, and to
interpret the nature of Russia as multi-ethnic and multi-religious all along. It is possible,
therefore, to construct a Russian identity that relies heavily on the country’s history and
composite population, rather than on its Christian Slavic roots. In this process, even the
religious communities (Christianity, ummah) take secondary roles.
I will examine the details of Russian institutional Islam and its relations with
Orthodoxy and with the Islamic world in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Here, it is
relevant to mention that, historically, Russian Orthodoxy has been dismissive of other
Christian confessions, especially Catholicism which is a direct rival to Moscow’s claim
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to be the “third Rome”. This hostility went as far as making the Orthodox Church less
hostile to Islam than to Catholicism (Christiakov 2005; Werth 2002).
Conversely, Muslims in Russia have traditionally cultivated very close relations
with the ummah, also in consequence of the great prestige that Kazan’ and Bukhara had
enjoyed as doctrinal centers in the Middle Ages. Today, though, Russia’s Muslims are
critical of the “Arabic” form of Islam and defend their own traditional (“customary”)
Islam. For Russia’s Islamic and Orthodox authorities, the centrality of autochthonous
religious institutions and doctrine has superseded the ideal of a religious world
community (at least in practice). They motivate their arguments with the uniqueness of
the Russian civilization. Their similar pretensions about the key role that religion plays in
the Russian character have led them to ally on specific topics, even against the secular
power. To succeed in their work, they are willing to accept each other’s cooperation.
Despite the inevitable difficulties that such joint efforts carry, they also contribute to the
shaping of an identity much more inclusive of religious, ethnic, and geographical
diversity than its traditional definitions.
The role of myth in the “Russian idea”
Accounts of national identity that, like Berdyaev’s, attempt to uncover the ontological
roots of a nation have a strong mythopoeic quality. For some scholars, the creation of
myths is a narrative work about the pre-history of a certain community – or of all
humankind – that is presupposed to have existed, but of which there is no longer any
factual knowledge (Jung and Kerenyi 1969). For some observers (Bakhtin 1993; Barthes
1970) the creation of myth is a linguistic process, a speech act that maintains its
ontological validity even if it may be untrue. The revision of myths simultaneously
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presupposes and originates a change in the ontological foundations of a society. Since
myths may lie about the “true” history of a nation (Barthes 1970), conflicts may arise
when different mythological narratives meet within a broader discourse.
What Russia’s Muslims are attempting to do today is re-interpret key events and
facts that mark fundamental passages in Russia’s civilization. Thus, the inevitability of
the conversion of Vladimir to Christianity in 988, which in Russian national sentiment
marks the destiny of Russia as heir to Rome and therefore the world’s ultimate savior, is
contested. Muslims recall how, in fact, the foundational chronicle (povest’) of Nestor
explains Vladimir’s choice for Christianity over Islam with rather shallow, non-doctrinal
motives (appreciation for alcohol, admiration for Byzantium’s riches). Analogously, they
point out that the symbol of Russia’s power, the crown of medieval prince Monomakh, is
actually Tatar.
How true a mythological account is perceived to be is directly connected to its
normative effect. It is a two-way road because, if the myth is perceived as truthful, then
the precepts that it implies are to be followed; and, if normative actors are authoritative
enough, then every normative account can potentially be transposed into myth. In
rectifying allegedly misleading accounts of early Russian history, Muslims contest the
general conceptualization of Russia as a uniquely Orthodox Slavic nation. Their intention
is not to replace the Christian account with their Islamic counterparts. Most Muslims,
instead, intend to stress the centuries’ long coexistence of Muslims and Slavs within the
Russian empire, and to appreciate the contribution of both groups to the development of
Russian civilization.
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On their part, Orthodoxes strive to reinstate the Church’s authority in the face of
the state’s secular official character and citizens’ tendency to keep religion in their
private sphere. To sustain their claims, both Orthodox and Islamic speakers appeal to
civilizational arguments. It is within these (re)conceptualizations of the traditional
ambiguities of Russia’s (self) identity that a new, inclusive identity may find its shape –
even through the re-elaboration of the Idea.
Religious components in contemporary conceptualizations of Russia’s identity
The atheism imposed by the Soviet Union has left a strong legacy in the secularism of
state and citizens in Russia. Yet, although some observers note that today the different
versions of the “Russian idea” may be based on either a Soviet or an imperial narrative,
or a combination of both (Vujačič 2009), their religious components remain strong. Not
only does it appear in theoretical discussions about nationalism and in more general
philosophical disquisitions, it also often constitutes the analytical premise for
considerations of more pragmatic nature.
For example, the materials of the 2010 international conference on Russia’s
national security issues in the 20th and 21st centuries; lessons of history and modern
challenges (a collection of essays by scholars from all over Russia) treat as issues of
national security, along with military and economic factors, questions of the building of
national identity through religion. In particular, B.V. Aksiumov (from Stavropol’), in his
essay National Idea as a Foundation of the Russian Security amid the Conflict of
Civilizations, complains that after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has not
(re)gained international relevance. More regrettably, it has not developed a new “national
idea”. This absence is particularly important in today’s “conflict of civilizations”, a
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“meta-cultural conflict of the contemporaneity” (Aksiumov 2010: 10), that is, Russia’s
civilizational conflict with the West. This unjust weakness of Russia is the result of the
lack of a (renewed) national idea, because
[…] in the national idea the whole purpose, the whole meaning of a
civilizational development are formed, which unite the partial world
conceptions that have gone astray into a sole national conception of the
world. (Aksiumov 2010: 10)
Therefore, Russia’s new idea should equip the country with the civilizational strength to
reclaim its rightful “first-class role” in world history.
Classical arguments for Russia’s exceptionalism and its messianic mission are
updated to respond to new geopolitical circumstances. Thus, Russia’s enemies are not
only “Western globalization” and the USA’s desire to govern the world, but also China’s
intrusion into Russia’s Far East. Interestingly, similarly to Berdyaev, Aksiumov denies
that Christianity alone may represent such a national idea, despite his numerous
references to (Orthodox) Christian values. He has no suggestions as to what might
complement or substitute his vague Christian-inspired assertions, but he is certain that the
new “Russian idea” shall express Russia’s unique, elected destiny.
In the same collection, L.A. Boikov (from Krasnodar’) is more precise. In The
Idea of Spiritual Identity of the Orthodox-Slavic World in I. A. Ilyin’s Philosophy of
History she points to religious (Orthodox Christian) and ethnic (Slavic) indivisible
affiliation as the basis of the national survival of Slavic peoples. Indeed, for Boikov the
belief crisis among the Slavs explains today’s disadvantageous geopolitical positions of
Slavic countries. Boiko notes how one of the essays of the Russian conservative
philosopher Ilya Ilyin, Toward the West we are neither pupils nor teachers. We are God’s
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pupils, and teachers of ourselves, explains that the crisis of Orthodox Christianity stems
from the confrontation with European Christianity. Russia does not belong to that
confession and it must find its own new creative idea, built from Christianity, without
looking at Europe.
Like Aksiumov, Boikov sees in (Slavic) Russian particularism the source of its
historical destiny and its salvation. Employing a messianic language and an apocalyptic
imagery, she draws a parallel with the early twentieth century, when “spiritual Russia”
stood against a “malicious force” (Boikov 2010: 50) – a rather ambiguous statement that
confirms the tendency of many in Russia to look back at a golden age of imperial power.
The vision of a pan-Orthodox community of Slavs, especially between Russians and
Ukrainians, is not new, nor surprising. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin has
reaffirmed the vision of a spiritual union of Orthodox Slavic peoples, which might
eventually lead to a geopolitical alliance of some sort (Trenin 2013).
In such a context, it would appear difficult for other ethnic and religious groups in
Russia to have their voice heard outside their communities, let alone at an acceptable
political level. Many authors who look at religion and the “Russian idea” ignore Islam as
a component of it, or Muslims as possible contributors (or opponents) to its
conceptualization – much as when Muslims were kept out of mainstream philosophical
discourse in imperial Russia.
Yet, in one essay about the presence of xenophobic and anti-Semitic tendencies
within the Orthodox Church, Father Georgii Christiakov, a respected religious
commentator, observes that “[p]seudo-Orthodox (okolopravoslavnaja) xenophobia
appears exclusively in relation to the West, and above all to America” (Christiakov 2005:
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59) – that is, Islam is not included in this conflict of civilizations. As a matter of fact,
many studies of Russian nationalism or even patriotism deal almost exclusively with
ethnic Russian groups and their conceptualization of the Russian state (March 2012a;
Laruelle 2009, but not 2008). It is exactly the breadth and vagueness of the religiousfounded, Euro-Asian character of the “Russian idea” as it is conceptualized by Berdyaev
that provides an opportunity for Muslims to enter the discourse, sometimes through
unexpected gates.
Neo-Eurasianism
In one of its most eloquent forms, Russian particularism today is heralded by NeoEurasianism, a philosophical current founded in the 1980s by Aleksander Andreevich
Prokhanov which has its official outlet in the weekly Zavtra (formerly Den’). Today, its
most famous and influential exponent is Alexander Dugin. Drawing from the thoughts of
1920s’ Eurasianists, a group of Russian émigrés in Paris led by Prince Trubetskoi, NeoEurasianists highlight the uniqueness of Russia as a bridge between East and West. Over
the centuries, Russia has been called to fulfill this crucial purpose, and even after the
demise of the Soviet Union, contemporary Russia holds a key place in the international
system. Neo-Eurasianists stress the centrality of Russia’s geopolitical position, from
which it derives its mission of countering the West’s hegemony, in particular that of the
United States. Elaborating on Trubetskoi’s original thought, the neo-Eurasianists came to
hold an inclusive view of Russia’s identity:
The Eurasian soul of Russia united itself with a multiplicity of races,
cultures, national beliefs, and histories. Still today, [the Russian soul] is
open to Turks, Uyghurs, Mongols, Slavs, all heathens, who have united
in a multi-faceted, hundred-colored history […] And it, this history,
will continue the joint historical action and creation, once it has passed
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through today’s chaos. (Prokhanov 1991-1992: 1. Quoted in
Wiederkehr 2007: 232)
Islam and Neo-Eurasianism
Even if at the level of nationalist discourse and even if in direct political action neoEurasianism may have lost the élan of the 1990s (Laruelle 2009, 2008; Laruelle and
Peyrouse 2005), in Russia’s discourse by and about Muslims its inclusive, hybrid
civilizational approach is still a fundamental one. Mixed with historical geopolitical
conceptions similar to Mackinder’s heartland pivot and of Russian (imperial) regional
centrality, it is also a very powerful analytical backdrop for Russia’s conceptualizations
of international security, geopolitics, and foreign policy (Sangupta 2012; Markov 2010;
Laruelle 2008; Dugin 2007).
In Dugin’s complex intellectual construction, the Islamic component of Russia’s
civilization, although present, plays a rather secondary role (Dugin 2007; 1997). Indeed,
much more influential in this respect has become the work of one of Dugin’s initial
followers, Geidar Dzhemal’, a Muslim son of an ethnic Russian mother from a prominent
family and of an Azeri father. Dzhemal’ began his political activity in the ranks of
extreme Russian nationalism and joined the Pamiat’ movement, of which Dugin was one
of the leaders. He soon started developing a geopolitical-centered interpretation not only
of Russia’s Islam, but also of its role within the largest international arena. Thanks to his
distinctive character, which makes him “one of the most original post-Soviet Russian
Islamic thinkers” (Laruelle 2008: 146), Dzhemal’ has gradually come out of Dugin’s and
Neo-Eurasianism’s shadows.
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Now president of the Islamic Committee (Islamskii komitet) and one of the most
vocal, if controversial, commentators on political Islam in Russia, Dzhemal’ has become
a key figure in the Russian intellectual panorama, especially in matters of geopolitical
conceptualizations. For this reason, his theoretical stances will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
Neo-jadidism, Euro-Islamism
Among Russians, probably the most widely circulated contribution to Muslim
Eurasianism, the so-called Euro Islamism, belongs to the former advisor to the President
of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, Rafael Khakimov. His booklet, Where is our
Mecca? Manifest of Euro-Islamism (Gde nasha Mekka? Manifest Evroislama), published
in 2003, is often cited by Muslims and non-Muslims alike as a manifesto of the adherence
of Russia’s (Tatar) Islam to the idea of a Russian state. It is perhaps the most famous
attempt by Russian Muslims to participate in the discourse about a Russian inclusive,
“Eurasian” identity that would include Slavs as well as Tatars. In fact, it follows almost
exemplarily the footprints of classical Islamic modernism.
Khakimov himself effectively summarizes his argument in an article published in
2007 by the online portal Interlos (Khakimov 2007). He starts, in the modernist tradition,
with the rejection of any allegation of Islam’s intrinsic backwardness in respect to
Christianity and the Western civilization – a clear, albeit implicit, critique to Bernard
Lewis’s influential booklet What went wrong? (Lewis 2002). Contesting the
“theologians’ fear of modernization”, Khakimov affirms that, instead, the Qur’an allows
the full participation of Muslims in scientific and economic progress. He then recalls the
moments in Tatar history in which religious authorities have hindered modernist stances.
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In fact, he notes, Islam cannot be frozen by the limited interpretations of a group of
traditionalist religious figures. Islam is “broader than its legal schools” and, indeed, can
accommodate the developments of scientific knowledge and even the idea of democracy.
On one hand, Khakimov admits that (customary) Islam, through its preservation
of language, religious and social traditions, has saved Tatar civilization “from
assimilation” (by the Russians). On the other hand, he points at the crucial moment at the
end of nineteenth century when Tatars faced the “new task not merely to survive, but to
develop”. He praises the jadidist movement (a reformist-through-education movement
that flourished in imperial Turkestan (today’s Central Asia) across the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries) as an example of a successful Tatar path to reform and
modernization – and notes how, indeed, “Tatars became strong competitors [in
international markets] and marked huge cultural advances”.
On these premises, and citing the influential nineteenth-century Islamic thinker alAfghani as support, he then calls for a sort of new jadidism that appreciates the
importance of education and information to flourish in the twenty-first century.
Khakimov does not wish Tatars to copy the West – this would be a “new Taqlid”
(condemnable imitation of the past). Instead, he underscores how both the West and the
Islamic world can and must find their own way to welcome scientific progress and enjoy
the economic and cultural development that comes from it.
Against this doctrinal backdrop, Khakimov then describes the specific situation of
Tatars who, “being at the border between West and East, not only geographically, but
also on a cultural level, developed their own sub-civilization”. Consequently, he claims
Tatars’ rightful belonging to the Islamic ummah, the legitimacy of their living under
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conditions of “abode of peace” or Dar as-Salam (oblitel’ mira), and their simultaneously
legitimate belonging to the Russian civilization. With a message that seems to address
both non-Russian Muslims (especially Saudi Arabians) and ethnic Russians, he then
affirms that
Russia’s [life] conditions for Muslims are neither imposed nor
constraining, [Tatars] were just born in this country; they perceive it as
their own, not as foreign. This country is neither worse nor better than
Muslim states, it is just different. This is our destiny and our
predetermination: to develop the experience [vyrabotat’ opyt] of the
pious path under these conditions. Saudi Arabia does not suit us, and
we will hardly become Christian Europe. We are just as we are. The
desert palm does not grow on Russian soil. (Khakimov 2007)
Khakimov refuses the teaching of foreign (Saudi) Muslims, who have no
experience of living under non-Islamic laws. He rather compares Tatars with European
Muslims, similar “islands in a Christian world”, who have also been hit by globalization
and have seen their traditional condition change. Indeed, Europe “will always be the
source [of Tatars’] wisdom and knowledge”. Therefore, Tatars’ Islam is bound to become
“Euroislam”. Khakimov also notes that an “Islamic globalization” is occurring, and
exhorts Tatars to profit from it. They should look ahead and find within Islam the proper
way to benefit from the conquests of progress without aping the West. Thus, the role of
Tatars is not to isolate themselves in a national “reserve”, but to follow the European
model and serve as a bridge “between religions, between different interpretations of
Islam, between Islam and Christianity”.
The Tatar component of Euro-Islamism
Khakimov’s article is crucial because it contains all major issues that are still current in
the debate among Tatars and between them and ethnic Russians. First, he confirms the
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loyalty of Tatars to the Russian state. He provides reasons of various nature: birth, civic
duty, and religious doctrine. This argument is similar to those advanced by other
authoritative commentators, such as the dean of the Islamic University in Kazan’, Rafik
Mukhametshin, and the renowned expert in Islamic law Leonid Siukiiianen. They
maintain that Muslims belong by history to Russia. Further, they advance the suggestion
that the new Russian socio-political arrangements can and should be shaped in a way that
is fully acceptable under an Islamic doctrinal point of view. Details of such proposals will
be examined later in this dissertation, but their theoretical premises and practical
implications are already visible in Khakimov’s argument.
Second, Khakimov contributes to the still unresolved dilemma about Russia being
Asian or European. As far as Tatars are concerned, he decidedly chooses Europe. This is
a somewhat surprising affirmation, given the traditional Oriental character that Tatars
hold in Russia’s imagery. Yet, it directly links today’s Tatarstan national sentiment to
their golden age at the end of nineteenth century and to jadidism. It also reflects
Tatarstan’s traditional independence in commercial activities, and even in foreign policy
under the Soviet regime – a relatively unknown aspect of Soviet republics’ management
(Goble 2013).
Finally, in this article Khakimov responds to those, both in the Middle East and in
the West, who for opposite reasons attribute to Islam a conservative, immutable
character. Instead, he highlights the adaptability of Islam to geographical, political, and
historical conditions, and praises its doctrinal flexibility in accommodating progress. By
so doing, he joins a group of commentators, Muslim and not, who highlight Islam’s
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dynamic, adaptable spirit and praise the variety and legitimacy of its doctrinal and
customary interpretations outside of Saudi Arabia (Esposito and Voll 2001; Bulliet 1993).
Russia’s Muslims and nationalism
In his discussion about the new Russian idea and its role in shaping Russia’s foreign
attitudes through nationalism, Luke March (2012a, 2012b) identifies three types of
nationalism in Russia: official, cultural, and political. In particular,
“Russian cultural nationalism is principally the mainstream intellectual
and media discourse that employs symbols that aim to reinforce the
historical, moral and social aspects of a distinct Russian ‘national’ way
of life” (March 2012 b: 403)
For March, the cultural nationalism crafted by the media is of “civilizational”
nature (412). He readily acknowledges being not the only one to hold this vision. Indeed,
“civilization” is a word that is liberally used by Russian authors whenever they come to
reflect upon their country’s identity. They too strive to identify the Russian way to the
future. As in the past, when various interpretations of the Russian idea have influenced
political decisions, so also today the parts involved are not just engaged in a mere
philosophical dispute, but are searching for the leading principle that would guide Russia
into its future. Since it remains unclear what the “distinct Russian ‘national’ way of life”
should be, authors today still struggle to provide a univocal definition of “Russian
civilization” – and vice-versa.
Civilizational nationalism of Muslims
Muslims see in this conceptual vagueness, which is still sufficiently fluid and permeable
to diverse inputs, an opportunity to participate in the foundational debate. In particular,
they join those who look backward in time to re-construct the history of Russia – and of
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Muslims within it. The core of the discussion is how the cultural and economic exchange
between Slavs and Muslims, under Tsarist and Soviet rules, actually worked at the
civilizational level.
Until recently, the version commonly accepted in Russia (and outside) was that
Muslims were simply subjected to Slavic dominance; they were excluded from
significant public life outside their communities, and prevented from providing any sort
of contribution (apart from a few Tatar words and merchant caftans) to the Russian
civilization. In fact, new studies, especially in the West, have demonstrated that there has
been much more interaction between Muslims and Slavs, even at the institutional level
(Crews 2006; Allen 1996). It is therefore possible to conceive of Russian civilization as
the product of a much deeper interaction among communities than was thought until now.
It is indeed possible – and here is the key argument of many Muslim authors – to see
Russia as a new civilization that embraces both Orthodox-Slavic and Muslim traits.
Thus, in the introduction to her book Islam I gosudarstvennoe stroitel’stvo Rossii
(vtoraia polovina XVIv – fevral’ 1917g.) (Islam and the building of the Russia’s state
(second half of XVI century – February 1917)), which is intended for “students in
programs of training and re-training for state officers; teachers; researchers; doctoral
students; state and municipal employees”, the authoritative Muslim scholar Elena
Barkovskaia starts by defining Muslims one of the core nations (“korennye narody”) of
Russia (2006: 2-3). Further, she observes how the century-long coexistence of Muslims
and Orthodox Russians reveals a “deeper basis of the unity of these two nations” (3).
Indeed, one must speak of
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[A] spiritual vicinity and coincidence of national mentalities, formed on
common doctrinal principles and practices of the Russian Orthodoxy
and of “[all]-Russia’s” [rossiiskogo] Islam, of mutual influence and
production of national cultures” (Barkovskaia 2006: 3)
In her Conclusion, Barkovskaia further observes that the construction of Russia’s
imperial state was a lengthy process in which the cooperation of the Muslim communities
had been essential. She highlights how Muslim practices (adat and Shari’a) could be
integrated in the tsarist system, not only at the bureaucratic but also at the normative level
(103). With her work, she claims to rectify untrue “mythological” accounts of Russian
(Muslims) history and thus to support a contemporary inclusive state building, void of
stereotypes.
A summa of traditional and new arguments
Analogously to Barkovskaia, Iuri Gavrilov and A. Shevchenko, two scholars from the
Russian Academy of Sciences, in Islam i pravoslavno-musul’manskie otnosheniia v
Rossii v zerkale istorii i sotsiologii (Islam and Orthodox-Muslim relations in Russia
through the mirror of history and sociology (2010)) also advance a civilizational
argument. They lament the absence of a new “Russian idea”, similarly to authors like
Aksiumov and Boikov. In Gavrilov and Shevchenko’s vision, geopolitics and history are
central. It is unsurprising, therefore, that for them the new idea must come from “those
spiritual bases that historically determined the civilizational unity of the political space of
Northern Eurasia” (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010: 7). Much more interesting, instead, is
that
[in addition to] these bases it is necessary to highlight above all two
religions that played a decisive role in the ethnogenesis and formation
of the socio-cultural view of the Russian peoples: Orthodox
Christianity and Islam. (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010: 7)
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Gavrilov and Shevchenko decisively reject an alleged “high potential for conflict
of Islam as religion and of the Muslim world in general” (Gavrilov and Shevchenko
2010: 7) as the possible cause of spreading inter-religious and inter-confessional conflicts
in the world. Instead, such troubles are attributable to the loss of influence of traditional
factors of stability, and especially of the religions of the world, which in the past had
offered guidance and fostered peace. In their view, Islam’s nature is revealed by the
history of Muslim-Christian relations, which has been characterized more by long periods
of peaceful coexistence, mutual solidarity, and “joint historical creation” (“sovmestnyi
istoricheskii tvorchestvo”), than by conflict. In particular, Russian history offers a very
significant example of such positive interaction, and of its fruitful results. On Russian
territory, Orthodoxy and Islam not only coexisted “side by side” for “more than a
thousand years”, but “exactly the character of the Orthodox-Muslim relations in the
Northern Eurasian space became decisive for the subsequent destiny of the Russian
civilization” (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010: 8).
To prove their claim, Gavrilenko and Shevchenko conduct a thorough analysis of
the discourse about Orthodox-Islamic relations in history. They comment on some
arguments that are among the most discussed in post-Soviet Russia. For example, they
find the Eurasianism of Trubetskoi full of rhetorically well-developed arguments, but
with very little practical consequences. Perhaps logically, not a word is spent on NeoEurasianism, besides the acknowledgement of its influence on certain Muslim discourse.
Noteworthy, instead, is their choice of one of the most influential Orthodox
Christian thinkers of modern Russia, Ivan Ilyin (the same one invoked in Boikov’s essay
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on national security)3, as provider of their foundational argument. Gavrilov and
Shevchenko recall Ilyin’s paradigm: if a “spiritually leading nation” (“dukhovno vedushii
narod”) finds in its “bosom” a “spiritually led” (“dukhovno vedumyi”) nation, it must not
superimpose itself on the latter, but “give it the possibility to join the [self-creating]
spiritual act and the spiritual culture of the leading nation and thus receive from it
creative fertilization and animation” (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010: 11). The result of
this encounter would be that the “spiritually led nation” could find its origins within the
“leading nation”, and would end up feeling to belong simultaneously to what, originally,
were two nations – the spiritually leading and the spiritually led.
The subsequent cultural syncretism ensures that the “led” nation keeps the
perception of its distinct self-identity, while at the same time it also accepts to absorb
certain traits of the “leading” nation. Gavrilov and Shevchenko maintain that this intricate
pattern of relations is typical of the Russian empire: “These were exactly, as a rule, the
relationships of the Russian Orthodox nation [as leading nation] with the other
inhabitants of historical Russia” (12).
Gavrilov and Shevchenko, though, do not place Islam at the same level of the
other non-Slavs peoples of the Empire. Muslims did not start as a “led nation”, and
indeed the development of the Slavic Orthodox and Muslim (of the Volga) nations
occurred simultaneously. Their mutual relationships, in fact, followed Ilyin’s scheme in a
different manner. In the early centuries, starting with the Tatar domination, the Muslim
nation developed more quickly. At that time, the Russian culture absorbed certain traits
3

Ivan Ilyin’s thought is enjoying a great influence in post-Soviet Russia. Allegedly, Vladimir Putin
himself, through his friendship with the Orthodox Archimandrite Father Tikhon, has been exposed to
Ilyin’s philosophy as well (see the footnote at p. 201 of this dissertation for a more thorough discussion).
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of the Islamic one: some words, literary and artistic forms of expression, and government
and administrative structures. Later, with the liberation from the Tatar yoke, it was the
Orthodox culture to develop more quickly. Muslims became the recipients of this
superiority. In any case, and this is the core message of the authors, both peoples
contributed to the formation of the Eurasian civilization of Russia.
The authors offer a series of examples of key points in history in which Muslims
and Orthodoxes cooperated and jointly built the Russian state and culture. In general,
there was a very good acceptance by the politically dominant Russians of Russia’s
Muslims; there was a certain pride in showing off the nobility’s Tatar origins; the Tatar
nobility was fully accepted and introduced into the tsarist elite; and, indeed, more
resistance and hostility came from the Church. It is noteworthy that these comments by
Gavrilov and Shevchenko have also been variously confirmed by Western scholars (Van
der Oye 2010; Figes 2003; Werth 2002).
The purposeful role of contradictions
Muslims in the Russian empire lived undisturbed and were allowed to pursue their
religious and cultural developments, which, Gavrilov and Shevchenko note, is in sharp
contrast with what happened in the rest of Europe and in reverse, with what happened to
the “infidel” Christians and Jews in the Middle East. Russian Muslims enjoyed the same
status as citizens as the Orthodoxes. Indeed, this is a rather bold affirmation. Among the
many Orthodox privileges that Gavrilov and Shevchenko fail to mention is the fact that,
while Muslims were not obliged to convert, they could not proselytize – an important
activity that the Orthodoxes not only could, but were also encouraged to pursue
(Codevilla 2008; Crew 2006; Werth 2002).
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The omission is not the only one in Gavrilov and Shevchenko’s account. In their
praise of the precursor of jadidism, the Crimean Tatar Gasprinski, they recall how, in the
second half of the nineteenth century, he had advocated the necessity for Russia’s
Muslims to overcome their traditionalism (and consequent backwardness) through the
embrace of the European model of development. In truth, Gasprinski was also a vocal
advocate of an alliance of all Turkic people of Eurasia against their oppressors and for
their own self-determination (Kurzman 2002; Khalid 1998; Bennigsen and Wimbush
1979). The Turkic nationalistic perspective went under the name of pan-Turkism; it
advocated the political union of all Turkic people and, in Russia, it was rather hostile to
the Empire. In forgetting Gasprinski’s pan-Turkism, Gavrilov and Shevchenko follow the
approach of many Tatars today. Jadidism is revalued as model for an education- and
technology-based development of Tatars and Tatarstan, but it is deprived of its politically
oppositional contents (see also Laruelle 2008).
The result is a reaffirmation of Tatar pride and socio-religious habit, centered on
customary Islam, without the nationalist-separatist stances of the early 1990s. What
Gavrilov and Shevchenko seem to value, in fact, is rather Gasprinski’s contribution to the
formation of an all-Russian (all-Tatar) self-identity, which rejects the mix-up of Russians
with “foreigners”, but values ethnic interconnection within Russia as a factor that
strengthens the cohesion of the country and reinforces its uniqueness.
Similarly, Gavrilov and Shevchenko highlight how Cossacks, the proud defenders
of the motherland Russia, even against its own rulers, when they were deemed too
despotic, and symbol of the “real” Russian soul (valiant horse-riders of the steppes, fierce
warriors and proud defenders of Mother Russia) were in fact equally constituted by
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(Tatar, Muslim) Golden Horde and (Slavic, Orthodox) Russian militia. Interestingly, the
Cossacks are being used as an example by different groups to confirm or contest the
inclusive nature of Russian identity. Thus, while some Muslims underscore the mixed
character of these elite troops, the Orthodox Metropolitan Kirill has supported the project
of resettling a specific Cossack community, known to have historically been hostile to
Muslims, to the ethnically Russian areas in the North Caucasus (Gobles 2013b).
Kirill’s suggestion has been contested by many commentators as inappropriate,
and may be seen within a broader attempt to reinstate a certain “imperial” dominance
over the troubled South (Vatchagaev 2013). As such, it testifies to a countercivilizationist argument or, rather, to an Orthodox-based civilizationist view of past and
future Russia.
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CHAPTER III
RUSSIA’S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

It is important to note that the inclusive civilizational argument occurs most often by and
about the Tatar Muslims of the Volga regions. They are the ones who can claim to have
had the longest contact with Russians, and to have shared their political and territorial
vicissitudes. Indeed, Tatars are very careful in distancing themselves from the Muslims of
the Caucasus, who show a much more controversial attitude towards Moscow.
Rafik Mukhametshin (2013), in a recent interview on the situation in Tatarstan,
constructs an argument very close to Khakimov’s position on the uniqueness of Tatars’
civilization and interpretation of Islam. Mukhametshin openly distinguishes Tatars from
Muslims of the Caucasus – ethnically, historically, and doctrinally. The Caucasus, he
notes, hosts a different tradition of Islam – Sufism instead of the Hanafi Sunni School –
but, above all, its inhabitants reject more vehemently what they see as a colonial Russian
domination. It is a distinction that appears generally clear to all Russians and that is being
reinforced by mass media and authorities alike.
The special character of Islam in the Caucasus
To be sure, Russia’s major separatist organizations are based in the North Caucasus.
Their intention is to create an Islamic Caliphate in the region, which would then be united
to a larger, world Islamic state. The most vocal organization, which has also reunited and
reorganized the various, scattered smaller groups active in the 1990s until mid-2000s
(end of the second Chechen war), has aptly called itself “Imarat Kavkaz” (“Caucasian
Emirate”). It has virtually re-designed the borders of the North Caucasian territories,
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assigned them new, non-Russian names, and appointed local (Islamist) leaders. Like the
other major organization in the region, Hizb ut-Tahrir, it has international contacts and
regularly issues anti-Russian and anti-Western proclamations. In view of the Winter
Olympics in Sochi in February 2014, it has also begun again to support terrorist attacks
involving civilians (Kavkaz Uzel/Caucasian Knot 2013).
Many religious organizations in North Caucasus, though, do not (publicly, at
least) support the project of separatism, let alone an Islamic emirate. On the contrary,
they have initiated a process of dialogue with the more moderate ones among the Salafi
groups, and with the authorities. Especially in Dagestan, these initiatives have brought
some success. For example, a clear condemnation of Islamic terrorism and
fundamentalism has been issued (Islam Tuday 2012).
Perhaps it is within this conciliating and rather pragmatic perspective that the
work of an authoritative Islamic scholar from the Caucasus, A.K. Aliev, must be
interpreted. In his co-authored book, Religiozno-politicheskij ekstremizm i
etnokonfessionalʹnaia tolerantnostʹ na Severnom Kavkaze (Religious-political extremism
and ethnic-confessional tolerance in the North Caucasus (2007)), he begins by equating
the situation of Russia’s Islam with that of Islam in Europe. The common trait is the
presence of a large Muslim population (Aliev factors in both North Caucasus and the
Volga region) in non-Muslim states. Moreover, after the demise of the Soviet Union, he
notes, Russia is “surrounded” by Muslim states – including those in former Soviet
Central Asia.
The geopolitical situation of Russia, for Aliev, turns Islam into a “factor” of
internal politics as well. To resist the potential interference (threat) of foreign actors, it is
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imperative to preserve and protect “traditional Russian Islam”. He even goes as far as to
compare the preservation of Russia’s customary Islam with the maintenance of the
Russian language. What seems to be a secondary point, in fact, links Aliev’s argument to
post-Soviet nationalistic stances in many Republics (including Tatarstan) for the
abandonment of Russian in favor of the national languages, the survival of which had
been threatened by the Soviet policies.
At a deeper level, with his comparison Aliev connects Islam more broadly with
the Russian culture. The Russian language is a fundamental cohesive element, and indeed
many Russian nationalists insist on its preservation throughout the post-Soviet space.
Furthermore, the question of the language touches on the past and present role of the
Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy had provided Russian with its written form and with its
semantic. Since both lay Russian and Church Slavonic languages have developed from
the early Slavonic, they share a very deep connection.
The origins of the Russian language are often brought up by Russian nationalists
in their arguments in favor of a restoration of the Church’s traditional role of guarantor of
the Russian soul (Bennet 2011). By insisting on the unifying role of the Russian language
for all Russia, Aliev and others who state similar points (for example, Mukhametshin
2013) acknowledge the unity of culture and language in Russia, while simultaneously
proclaiming Muslims’ share in it.
Contrary to many Tatar authors, Aliev does not distinguish between Caucasian
and Tatar Islam; he is more interested in separating Russia’s traditional forms of Islam
from foreign “Wahhabism”. Although he affirms that Wahhabism has spread especially
in the Northern Caucasus in the 1980s-1990s, he claims that the economic and socio-
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political crisis in the region has greatly favored its growth. Thus, the quick diffusion of
Wahhabism is not the result of a predisposition of Caucasian Muslims toward Islamic
extremism, but rather of external conditions.
Indeed, many commentators, including Western ones, indicate economic disarray
as one of the triggering factors for the spread of fundamentalist Islam in North Caucasus,
similarly to the situation in the Middle East. In their fundamental book on the Chechen
war, Malashenko and Trenin (2004) have explained how the religious Islamic factor has
radicalized in consequence of the mismanagement of ethno-historical conflicts.
Skepticism toward Caucasus Islam
Both the Russian public opinion and many commentators are still skeptical of, if
not hostile to, Muslims from the Caucasus. The hostility can be explained by the contrast
between what is highly visible (terrorist attacks, hostile proclamations by Salafites,
military activities, and economically-motivated protests – “stop feeding the Caucasus” is
a popular and populist slogan against economic interventions from Moscow – and what
happens at the local level (cooperation among non-extremist religious groups, the
population’s resistance to extremists’ actions and to exploitation by separatists, etc.).
What appears evident is that, while Tatars are working with a certain success
toward the re-conceptualization of their identity as part of Russia, Muslims in the
Caucasus still struggle for integration. Because of their considerably diverse ethnic and
community composition, they also constitute a much less cohesive group when dealing
with the central government and the non-Muslim communities of North Caucasus. On the
one hand, extremists’ calls for the establishment of an Islamic government, Emirate or
Caliphate, and their use of violence against authorities and citizens alike do not find
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support from the majority of Muslims. On the other hand, a recurring discourse in the
region labels the Russian presence in the Caucasus a (post)colonial occupation. Although
such perspective may be more articulated and historically more founded than the Russian
official view, it too often crystallizes in populist slogans that do not offer a shared
definition of the identity of Muslims in the Caucasus – let alone a viable platform for
eventual negotiations with Moscow.
Undoubtedly, works like those examined above would have been unthinkable
under the Soviets or the tsars. Their appearance today, although in the form of scholarly
publications, reflects a new national sentiment of a part of the Muslim community of
Russia. It also testifies to the complexity of the ongoing research for a new Russian
identity, no longer dominated by Orthodox and/or ethnic Russians. Finally, the centrality
that religious affinities between Islam and Orthodoxy hold in many debates by exponents
of both communities hints at the broader issues of the place of religion in Russia, of the
potentialities and pitfalls of inter-religious dynamics, and of state-religion relations.
These crucial topics will be examined in Chapter 4.
Muslims in an Orthodox world
Aleksei Malashenko, co-chair of the Religion, Society, and Security Program of the
Carnegie Moscow Center, is one of the most prominent authors on Islam in Russia. His
work is extensively published both in English and in Russian, and he is a referent for
many scholars and commentators. He is particularly interested in the origin and diffusion
of extremist Islam in Russia, and its consequences for social and security issues. Usually,
Malashenko’s works in English discuss Islam almost exclusively as a potential
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destabilizing factor, fundamentally extraneous to Russia’s culture and society, especially
in its extremist form.
In his works in Russian, though, he allows for a slightly more articulated
treatment of Islam within discourses on religion, society, and Russian identity. In a recent
co-edited collection of essays by Russian authors translated into English, and specifically
addressed to non-Russian readers (Heinrich, Lobova and Malashenko 2011), he seems to
combine these two perspectives. In the introduction, Malashenko (2011a) interestingly
highlights the multiplicity of the forms of Islam in Russia – whereas usually he only
distinguishes between extremists and traditionalists. Because of this diversity,
Malashenko notes, it is more correct to speak of “Islam in Russia” than of “Russian
Islam” – although further in his essay he himself uses the expression “Russian Islam”
when he juxtaposes the “traditional” Islam of Russia to the “orthodox” Islam championed
(for Malashenko, erroneously) by Saudi Arabia.
Malashenko’s perspective about Islam in Russia is hardly new. It actually follows
the official line, suggested by then-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Evgenii Primakov in the
mid-1990s that distinguishes between a Russian form of Islam, or “customary Islam”, and
a foreign version of it, generally denoted as “Wahhabism”, which is usually depicted as
extremist and threatening. The dichotomy customary = true Russian /foreign =
fundamentalist is at the basis of Russia’s security conceptualizations and policies.
Malashenko leaves up to Muslims the burden of choice:
[f]or Russian Moslems, Islamic globalization is primarily a problem of
identity. The realization of belonging to the world ummah comes into
conflict with the urge to protect the inherited ethno-cultural version of
Islam. (Malashenko 2011a: 19)
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The potential for a conflict between Muslims and ethnic Russians is clearly
ascribed to the Islamic communities. Yet, there is a subtle but important element in this
vision. Russia’s Muslims are supposedly no longer in doubt whether to be loyal to the
Russian state or to Islam: They are thorn between an idealized “orthodox” Islam,
allegedly professed by the world ummah, and the Islamic Russian tradition. It would
seem that, if a Muslim of Russia opts for customary Islam, she also confirms her Russian
identity.
To be sure, for Malashenko Islam still is a matter of security: An eventual
preference of Muslims for the “global ummah” would endanger their loyalty to Russia.
Yet, he seems to have developed a more nuanced vision of “Islam of Russia” and to
address his mistrust rather to “foreign Muslims”. These can and must be contrasted with
adequate doctrinal instruments – that is, with the support and defense of the traditional
forms of Islam in Russia. Again, this is an argument that has been largely used by the
Russian government since the times of Primakov, and that will be thoroughly discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.
Yet, perhaps persuaded about the resistance of Russia’s Islam to foreign extremist
messages (Malashenko 2011a: 20), Malashenko moderates his past tones on the threat
that Islam would represent to Russia’s security. He foresees the necessity to find a new
social arrangement in Russia that should include Muslims. Sure, he points at how
Russia’s Muslims have traditionally looked at the international ummah as a defense
against “the complex of the ‘younger brother’ ” – thus implying that Muslims’ loyalty is
unreliable and that Islam is culturally inferior (a clear echo of Ilyin’s influence) to
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Christian Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, he advocates the necessity to overcome old relations
of power and encourages the negotiation of new arrangements:
It may sound paradoxical, but precisely the recent contradictions and
conflicts on Russia’s territory provide compelling evidence for
sustaining inter-religious harmony. Even those Russians who shared
the idea of a clash of civilization avoided direct mutual abuse on
religious grounds. And even the most aggressive leader of Chechen
separatists, Shamil’ Basaev, regarded Russia not as a religious
opponent or an alien civilization, but as a political enemy. (Malashenko
2011a: 18)
Indeed, Malashenko had always judged the conflict in the Caucasus as having
mainly historical-political, and not religious, motives, at least initially (Malashenko and
Trenin 2004). Here, though, he goes beyond the simple tolerance of Muslims as
somewhat exogenous members of the Russian polity. He seems to suggest that Muslims,
in fact, are part of Russia, and he goes so far as to recommend
the splendid book of Il’dus Zagidullin ‘Islamic institutions in the
Russian Empire’ in which the dialectics of confrontation and the search
for common grounds between Islam and the state are analyzed.
(Malashenko 2011a: 18)
Further, Malashenko speaks of a Muslim “subject-ness” (30), intended as the
perception of many Russian Muslims not to have an autonomous public voice. In
particular,
the wish to imagine Islam as a concrete “subject” within the boundaries
of a civilization is understandable. [A]t issue is the integration of
Muslims on a religious basis, the elaboration of a uniform ideology (a
collection of stated beliefs) and, simultaneously, a re-vamping of the
entire Russian Muslim community. (Malashenko 2011a: 30)
For Malashenko, “Muslims themselves” realize that the danger of an excessive
inwardly cohesion of their community is self-“ghettoization”. Interestingly, here he
contradicts the analysis of another prominent commentator on Islamic organizations in
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Russia, Roman Silant’ev. In a series of controversial but very popular statements in the
mid-2000s, Silant’ev, an orthodox Islamist close to the conservative areas of the Moscow
Patriarchate, had exposed the fragmentation of Islamic communities in Russia. He
underscored the consequent weakness of the official organizations, which he accused of
representing a tiny fraction of all the Muslims in the country. He exposed numerous
struggles for power among Islamic leaders, in great part aggravated, in Silant’ev analysis,
by ethnic-based rivalries (Silant’ev 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2002). Less than ten years
later, the situation has changed, to the point that Malashenko observes that the Russian
Mufties Council, which he defines “the most powerful Islamic organization in Russia”, is
indeed right when it recommends that:
Muslims have to present themselves as Russian citizens. Muslims can
participate in the activities of secular political parties; they are obliged
to observe the Constitution, which in principle provides the possibility
to act in accordance with an Islamic lifestyle. (31)
Here, Malashenko mirrors – without mentioning them – the arguments already
proposed by commentators like Mukhametshin and Siukiiianen, who advocate for the
compatibility of Islam and the secular character of contemporary Russia. Thus,
Malashenko too conveys the issue of the identity of Muslims into the broader issue of
(new) Russian identity. Further, and perhaps most importantly, he acknowledges the
fundamental role that, for Muslims and Orthodoxes alike, religion holds within society,
even if they accept some important limits to it – and even if they are not practicing their
respective faiths. Indeed, Malashenko concludes that, in the future, “it is clear that [in
Russia] an absolute secularism is out of question” (38).
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The novelty in Malashenko’s declaration is not so much that Islam or Christianity
(or their institutions) may have a political role in contemporary Russia. Instead, it is the
allowance and even the encouragement to both religions to partake equally of such role.
So far, however, it has been the political influence, or the aspirations to it, of the Church
to capture the attention of scholars and commentators (Solodovski 2013; Filatov 2007).
The possibility for Islamic institutions to participate actively and on par with the
Church in political life has been considered by a minority among Muslims
(Mukhametshin 2013; Siukiiianen 2007a), and by very few non-Muslims in Russia – the
latter almost exclusively with negative connotations (Silant’ev 2008; Filatov 2007). The
complex relations among Russia’s Orthodox and Islamic organizations and the state will
be discussed in depth in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Here, it suffices to note that the
importance of religion in Russia is being repeatedly affirmed also by the State, which has
confirmed the “traditional” religions4 as the only “true” Russian confessions. Yet,
Malashenko’s contribution may be one of the most certain signs that the consideration of
Islam in Russia may be actually shifting from “otherness” to inclusion, even if on certain
conditions.
In the 1990s and until the mid-2000s, the discourse about Islam in Russia centered
on the possibility for Muslims to be tolerated in Russian society and, especially, on the
potential threat that they represented. Now, the discussion is increasingly about the
degree of interaction and interconnection between Muslims and Slavs, starting from their
shared history.

4

These are: Christian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Lamaist Buddhism.
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Islam vs. Muslims in the popular view
Another Russian author whose work is known in the West, Aleksander Verkhovskii,
seems to confirm this shift. In Malashenko’s cited collection of essays, Verkhovskii
(2011) offers a perspective that softens the supposed conflict of civilizations between
Slavs and Muslims. The head of the Moscow-based SOVA Center for Information and
Analysis, he acknowledges Russia’s strong internal racism, especially toward the peoples
from the Caucasus and Central Asia, who are for the most part Muslim (121). Yet, he
blames the mass media for the (mis)formation of public opinion. Commenting on the
pitfalls to a correct interpretation of social surveys, he notes how
[Russians’ opinion toward the country’s Muslim communities and
Islam is] not only shaped by some events, but also by the subsequent
debates which may be conducted for a long time and develop a
dynamic of their own. Different actors influence this dynamic and it is
not always easy to ascertain which actors contributed what.
(Verkhovskii 2011: 124)
Although he astonishingly states that “homegrown Muslims” are the result of the
first “direct encounter” of Russians with Muslims that had occurred during the wars in
Afghanistan and Chechnya (124), he argues that while the mass media tend to polarize
their audience, society’s attitude is much less trenchant:
the Chechen separatists themselves transformed into jihadists, and that
could be perceived clearly by the man in the street, since the mass
media permanently commented on this transformation and not
infrequently exaggerated it. (Verkhovskii 2011: 125)
In fact, Verkhovskii claims,
[t]he Chechen wars did not generate mass Islamophobia, if one
understands by this term a negative attitude towards Islam, and not
towards Muslims. (Verkhovskii 2011: 125)
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For Verkhovskii, Russians distinguish very well between Islam and Muslims, and
are only mistrustful of the former, while they do not perceive Muslims citizens as
threatening. Verkhovskii argues that the close and long-term interaction in everyday life
between ethnic Russian and Muslims generates familiarity. One may interpret this
observation as a version of an inclusive civilizational (as defined by March (2012b))
argument. It may mirror an increase in the degree of inclusion granted by Russians to
Muslims – but only to those who share important element such as language and habits
(the “everyday neighbors”).
A similar attitude is indeed developing in the Russian population, especially in
reference to immigration debates. Immigration from the former Soviet regions is
becoming a priority of both labor and a security concern. In particular, the large number
of newcomers from Central Asia and the Caucasus (North and South) is seen by many as
a competition for jobs and, above all, as a threat of terrorism, Islamic radicalism and,
simply, social unrest.
The influence of mass media
The role of the mass media as shapers of public perceptions about Islam is acknowledged
by many observers, and not only in the case of extremism or terrorism. Diliara
Akhmetova, director of the Russian press agency DUMER and chief editor of the website
Muslims of Russia (Musul’mane Rossii) openly admits that Muslim media often refrain
from diffusing news that may stir up social confrontation, like for example the
announcement that the construction of a new mosque has been authorized. She approves
of such practice, in her opinion justified by the necessity not to hamper the increasing
harmonization of social relations (Batrishin 2013). Indeed, the question of mosque
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construction, that is, the presence of concrete symbols of religious authority, is a
fundamental one in many countries with a non-Muslim majority and Russia is no
exception. Verkhovskii observes how, far from being divided by an alleged
fundamentalist character of Islam, Russians are “only” in conflict over “the construction
of mosques [and] problems of Russian national identity” (135).
Geidar Dzhemal’ too denounces the negative role of the mass media in fostering
Islamophobia. In Russia, he observes, the situation of the Islamic communities is
comparable to Europe, but also different, because Muslims in Russia are “autochthonous”
(Dzhemal’ 2006). He adds, though, that the post-Soviet multi-ethnic and multi-religious
social relations have become the field on which psychological uneasiness is resolved in
the form of social tension. The mass media do not help in this regard, on the contrary
they can do harm. Dzhemal’ mentions the treatment by the popular TV program Pozner
of the case of the assassination of the Dutch movie director Theo Van Gogh as an
example.
In his discussion about the status of Islamic studies in Russia, Vladimir O.
Bobrovnikov, one of the most authoritative contemporary scholars of Islam in Russia,
criticizes the formation and diffusion of “parasite words” by political scientists and
commentators, some of whom, like Malashenko and Ignatenko, are very popular (see
Chapter 1 of this dissertation). In this way, he claims, they just slur over complex
concepts of Islamic life, which they do not understand. Some of such words are
“fundamentalism”, “Islamic extremism” and “classical Islam” (Bobrovnikov 2007: 17).
The media, Islamic and non-Islamic alike, contribute to the confusion, out of their own
ignorance or, on the contrary, of “cunningness”. As example of the latter, Bobrovnikov
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cites an interview by the popular Islamic journalist Maksim Shevchenko with Sheik Said
Chirkeisk. According to Bobrovnikov, Shevchenko “polemically asked” the Sheik about
the (Sufi tariqa) Nakshbandi rules and their compliance with Shari’a, even if the answer
could only have been very critical, since Chirkeisk actually belongs to another tariqa (the
Chalidiia-Shaziliia) that is an opponent of Nakshbandi’s.
Russia to the Russians
Not everybody in Russia speaks of integration or civilizational proximity (let alone
equality) between ethnic Russians and Muslims. On the one side, many Russians hold a
rather ethnic-based conception of their identity that, if not always accurate, clearly
excludes Muslims (along with other groups like the Jews, for example). On the other
side, not all Muslims want to “belong” to Russia.
In the first group, which is of course by far the more conspicuous, the most vocal
opponents to integration are the far-right nationalists. The majority of Russian
nationalists have a strong relation with Orthodoxy, sometimes associated with
monarchical sympathies. Even if the claims of nationalists often do not correspond to
doctrinal precepts, and are ambiguously reciprocated by the Church, they offer no space
to other confessions and sometimes not to secularism either (March 2012b; Laruelle
2009). Their point of view is clear and straightforward, even if it may be not
straightforwardly elaborated.
Analytically much better constructed, instead, is the scholarly expression of one
of the mainstream views about Islam in Russia. Sergei Filatov, in his contribution to
Malashenko’s edited book (in Russian) Religion and Conflict (Malashenko and Filatov
2007), denounces the diffused civilizational discourses about Islam and Orthodoxy as a
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political maneuver of Muslims to advance their community’s interests, such as the
building of mosques – a privilege that, notes Filatov, Protestants and Catholics (the other
most significant, but not “traditional” non-Orthodox religions in Russia) can only dream
of (42). In his brief discussion about the role of Islam in Russia, especially as official
religion, Filatov draws a parallel between ethnic Russians and Muslims, noting that for
both groups religion is above all a marker of national identity (Malashenko and Filatov
2007: 41).
The reason why Muslims declare themselves so keen to support democracy and,
in general, the Russian state is not, according to Filatov’s analysis, a true belief in these
values but, more pragmatically, a way to acquire political influence. He denounces
projects like “Eurasianism” as intended just for this purpose. In order to achieve their
objectives, Muslims of Russia have been ready and willing to legitimize a form of Islam
that is unique to them. Through their affiliation to traditional Islam, they have been able
to appease Russia’s fears of the Islamic factor. Geopolitically, they have successfully
isolated themselves from other, more radical, Muslims of the Middle East. Internally,
they have demonstrated their belonging to Russia.
About Filatov’s argument, there are two observations to make. On one side, he
contrasts theories of Islamic studies, such as Bulliett’s (1993) that, instead, register as
common phenomenon the confluence of traditional, often pre-Islamic, habits and of more
canonical Islamic knowledge into local Islamic practices. Such “hybrid” or “peripheral”
forms of Islam are as legitimate as the ones expounded by Middle Eastern communities
that claim a theological superiority, such as Saudi Arabian ones. On the other side,
Filatov attributes the definition of Russian traditional Islam entirely to the Muslim
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communities, whereas it was in fact the Russian government, in the person of Evgenii
Primakov, who introduced and encouraged such an interpretation. On the verge of a
conflict with separatists in the Caucasus, Primakov, a trained specialist of the Middle
East, advanced the claim that Muslim subversive elements in Chechnya were actually
foreign extremists who had infiltrated Russian communities. Primakov’s interpretation
has remained the official line of the Russian government ever since.
Roman Silant’ev, in his enormously popular books on the history of Islam in
Russia and its present features, published in 2006, 2007 and 2008, also offers a scholarly
analysis of the dynamics that have led Islam’s development until today. His approach is
more ambiguous than Filatov’s, but he adds a slightly derogatory nuance to his
comments, although he does recur to analytically founded resources. Silant’ev’s
combination of erudition and criticism is the reason why his books have encountered both
a great success and an equally vehement opposition. Despite his contested approach,
though, Silant’ev has been one of the first scholars to offer a systematic account of
contemporary Islamic groups’ activities, their leaders, and their purposes. His
contribution to the debate is especially relevant when it comes to discuss the inter- and
intra-organizational dynamics of Islamic institutions, and their relations with Church and
State.
Resistance from the Muslim communities
Not only Orthodox and ethnic Russian nationalists reject a communality of identity with
Muslims, in every degree, and consider undesirable their coexistence. Opponents to the
Russian state within the Muslim community stem from two main groups. The first are the
Tatar nationalist circles. They claim the independence of Tatarstan, the revamp of Tatar
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culture, significantly its language, and the re-establishment of Tatars’ place within the
Islamic ummah and the world community in general. Especially strong in the years
immediately preceding and following the demise of the Soviet Union, today Tatar
nationalism, especially in these maximalist forms, has lost appeal. Rather, what worries
security forces and Tatar leadership alike is an apparent spread of Islamic fundamentalist
movements (Amelina 2013).
The appearance of extremist groups among the Tatar youth has been connected by
some to the recently revamped project of a Caliphate, advanced by Islamist organizations
in the North Caucasus. The most prominent of them, the Imarat Kavkaz (“Caucasian
Emirate”) suggests already in its name its role as founding element (or Emirate) of a
Caliphate that should stretch from North Caucasus to Central Asia, passing through
Russia’s southern territories. The idea is to restore the historical Islamic state, governed
under Islamic principles and law (Shari’a). After the second Chechen war, in 2007
Imarat Kavkaz has been able to reunite under its umbrella most of the separatist
organizations operating in the North Caucasus. Now it has spread (clandestinely) in the
whole region, in which it rejects any cooperation with the Russian authorities and with
non-fundamentalist Muslim communities and organizations (Kavkaz Uzel/Caucasian
Knot 2013). By rejecting the forms of Islam traditionally practiced in that area, including
especially Sufism, and embracing a fundamentalist, “Salafist” (as it is often called by
observers of the region) Sunni Islam, Imarat Kavkaz not only distances itself from Russia
and ethnic Russians, but also from a large part of Russia’s Muslims.
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An Islamic “Russian idea”? The Russkie Musul’mane movement
An interesting version of the debate is developing under the surface of official media,
especially in discussions held in the social networks. It is a theoretical dispute between
the exponents of certain currents of Russian nationalism and the leaders of a particular
group of Russian converts to Islam, the Russkie Musul’mane. The name translates
“Russian Muslims”, but the use of russkie (adj. = of ethnic Russians) instead of rossiiskie
(adj. = of Russian citizens) is an ideological statement. The members of this movement,
in fact, are ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam. They have no or little relation to
the ethnic Muslims of Russia – and advance different arguments. Instead, their arguments
are very close to those of ultra-nationalist groups, from which some of the members of
Russkie Musul’mane come. However, in this case their different religious affiliations are
proving a strong hindrance to cooperation.
An exemplary exchange of blog posts illustrates the positions of both sides. The
exchange has been sparked by Aleksandr Nikitich Sevast’ianov (2013), one of the leaders
of the nationalist movement, who attempts to explain the (wrong) choice of his former
protégée, Vadim Sidorov, to convert to Islam, then to adhere to the ethnic Russian
Muslims movement and, eventually, to become its leader. In Sevast’ianov’s opinion,
Sidorov made this choice out of frustration for the weakness of the influence of
Orthodoxy on Russian society, and the lengthiness with which it seemed to set political
changes in motion. Partially, Sevast’ianov “can understand” that a young, idealistic man
may choose what would seem (to become) a stronger and more aggressive force – that is,
Islam.
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Indeed, Sevast’ianov here takes the chance to denounce the “crisis of
Christianity” that is occurring not only in Russia, but in Europe as well. By doing so, he
joins the ranks of those who lament the general loss of influence of Christianity not only
as a spiritual force but also, and perhaps especially, as a geopolitical factor. In his
analysis, this is evident in the superficial nature of the professed faith of many
Orthodoxes who, while declaring themselves believers, are in fact indifferent. Even more
to blame is the Church, which is no longer able to embody the values of the Russian
nation, to foster and protect them. Nevertheless, Islam, which is “other” and “not rooted
(nekorennyi)” in Russia’s civilization, is not the right answer. In fact, Islam is a threat to
Russia’s true nature, and one day all the ethnic Russians converted to Islam will have to
choose between loyalty to “their brothers in blood” or to their “brothers in faith”.
It appears clear that, for Sevast’ianov, Russia possesses a national “core” that
must be preserved and that is the only force that can “save” Russia. While Orthodoxy
(and, elsewhere, Christianity) still is the foundation that holds the nation and the country
together, its institutions are not up to the task. In Sevast’ianov’s articles, it is easy to
devise a series of recurring themes. The conceptualization of the fundamentally Christian
essence of the Russian nation, of the inadequacy of the Orthodox Church to fulfill its
mission and protect this core, and the deriving corruption of Russia’s morality, mirrors
classical reflections on the “Russian idea”, especially as expounded by Berdyaev. The
civilizational argument is also treated, in a negative connotation, through the explicit
rejection of any claims to a particular historical influence of Islamic groups on the
Russian culture. Finally, recurring to a common theme among nationalists, Sevast’ianov
confirms his skepticism toward Muslims and toward globalization (which fosters Islam’s

75

growth at the expenses of Christianity). On this last point, it is not by chance that
Sevast’ianov highlights the role in Sidorov’s conversion of Geidar Dzhemal’, who holds
a clearly geopolitical vision of Islam in Russia. Linking the demise of the Soviet empire
to the spreading of Islam, Sevast’ianov adds that the personal situation of Sidorov, a half
Azeri who has fled Baku in 1991, had also contributed to his conversion.
The rejection of the “ethno-cultural façade” of ultra-nationalism in Russia
Also via a blog post, Vadim Sidorov (Kharun ar-Rusi) responds point-by-point to
the accusations of his former mentor and exposes the tenets of his own thought (Sidorov
2013). First, he rejects the allusion to his upbringing in Baku as a factor in his
conversion. In fact, Sidorov observes, in Baku he, as a half-Russian, was not in contact
with the Islamic community – indeed, he was not even aware of the Islamic groups of the
city. Revealing the doctrinal debate internal to Russia’s Islam, Sidorov observes that,
even today, the Muslim character of the population of Baku in the eyes of a “true
Muslim” appears rather an “ethno-cultural façade”. His conversion, he maintains, comes
from a spiritual place.
Referring to his militancy as “ultra-orthodox nationalist”, then, he contests this
movement’s alleged rooting in the Christian religion. In fact, Sidorov notes, it only
expounds a superficial and confused knowledge of Christian theology. What nationalists
see as the core of the Christian soul of Russia is instead the cult of a “mythological
Church”. In Sidorov’s analysis, Orthodox nationalists play down the idea that Russia’s
“historical paradigm” is based on the strength and preservation of its ethnic roots. In fact,
he notes, the Russian and Soviet great powers have always followed “an imperial
paradigm” – not a “national” one. This illusion of the nationalists has been created and is
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being reinforced by “non-Russian”, “external” forces, which are the ones that “have
always determined”, and still do, what ideology should prevail in Russia. Such forces
intend to control the ultra-Orthodox nationalism, despite some of its exponents, including
Sevast’ianov, “verbally” support the unity of Russians and Muslims, and oppose the use
of nationalism as a “battering ram” of Judeo-Christianity against Islam.
Sidorov’s choice to convert to Islam, in his own words, has been determined by
his rejection of the idolatry of the Church’s mythological image. In a world that has lost
its moral integrity, true Islam (as opposed to superficial Islam of many ethnic Muslims)
represents the only monotheism. To convert to Islam is not to betray one’s nation.
Instead, for Sidorov
the embracement of Islam is not like a swap of one’s ethnicity [for
another], but like an extraordinary, worldview-determining choice of a
universal, super-national religion, in which one can and needs to
remain in one’s organic ethnic milieu. […] True nationalism, which we
acknowledge, is a real ethnic nationalism, “identarism”, which consists
in the fact that we, while being Muslims, at the same time maintain our
nationality, we pass it on to our children, and we keep our own clan of
fellow believers from its ranks. (Sidorov 2013)
Sidorov notes that other Muslim communities in the world keep their national
cohesion while, within the Islamic ummah, pursue their own interests. He also clearly
states, though, that whenever Islam is menaced, internal nationalistic divisions are
overcome in favor of a common front.
Peculiarities of the Russkie Musul’mane movement
The Russian origins of the followers of Russkie Musul’mane are also evident on their
official website, where they deal with doctrinal issues that influence everyday life, such
as the opportunity for women to drive, and the rules about women’s clothing. In both

77

cases, for example, the attempt is to accommodate religious precepts to the exigencies of
rather emancipated women who, besides having a family, work or pursue an advanced
education.
The novel element, and the most interesting, about the Russkie Musul’mane
Weltanschauung, is that Sidorov does not support a civilizational hybridism. He is very
careful in distancing himself from “ethnic Muslims” and points to European converts as
examples of “true” Muslims by choice, rather than by birth. Because Christianity, and the
Russian Orthodoxy in particular, is experiencing a deep crisis, Islam becomes it
substitute. It seems to be the “religion of the future”: it shows greater dynamism and
looks better equipped to face Russia’s future challenges. Against this backdrop, the
Russkie Musul’mane movement seeks to appropriate Islam for ethnic Russians. The
embracing of a “theologically correct”, “true” Islam does not at all imply the acceptance
– let alone the encouragement – of the mingling of ethnic Russians and ethnic Muslims.
Instead, it is a novel form of Russian ethnic-based, religion-determined nationalism – in
other words, an Islamic (ethnic) “Russian idea”.
Conclusion
The decade immediately following the demise of the Soviet Union saw the “renaissance”
of religions and the formation of various ethnic nationalist groups. Religious belief was
often associated with ethnic identity. Especially in regions with a high percentage of
Muslim population (the Volga region and the Caucasus), nationalist leaders had
employed religious arguments to gain consensus and reinforce their perceived loyalty to
their ethnic kin. Thus, Tatar nationalists stressed the historical role of Tatarstan’s
customary Islam, and Chechen separatists revamped Sufi tariqas. The legitimation of
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local forms of Islam was also an important weapon against the penetration of
international Islamic actors. Religious and charity organizations from Arab countries
(especially Saudi Arabia) and Turkey were often suspected to bring, along with Qur’an
books and funds for the Hajj, the meddling of their states in Russia’s Muslim affairs.
Further, Tatars and Sufis did not like the attitude of superiority with which “proper”
Muslims from abroad labelled customary Islam as “spurious”. Far from being simply a
doctrinal matter, in fact, allegations of unorthodoxy could potentially lead to the loss of
authority (and power) of traditional Russian muftis in favor of younger, Arab-educated
successors.
The already complex situation was further aggravated by the internal disputes and
personal rivalries within the religious communities. In the post-Soviet panorama of high
social instability, ideological vacuum and general insecurity, the result was a fierce
struggle for the determination of the identity of Russia’s Muslims, and of its place within
the new Russian identity. Within a still unresolved shape of the Russian Federation, in the
face of their own fragmentation and the growing assertiveness of ethnic Russian
nationalism, of the Orthodox Church, and of the Russian state, Muslims’ uneasiness was
often expressed through political and social conflicts, and even armed confrontation
(terrorism). Most of the literature about Islam in Russia, indeed, has highlighted this
conflictual condition (Dannreuther and March 2010; Malashenko 2007; Malashenko and
Filatov 2007; Laruelle and Peyrouse 2005; Hunter 2004; Yemelianova 2002).
Yet, starting from the second half of the 2000s, and increasingly accelerating at
the beginning of the new decade, the situation has deeply changed – especially in the
Russian Federation. The discourse within and about Islam in Russia has taken much more
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nuanced tones. It has generally shifted toward a more theoretically informed discussion
about the place of Muslims in Russia and their role in the construction of a new Russian
identity. In particular, the identity of Muslims of Russia is being more clearly defined by
Muslims themselves. Calls for independence tout-curt are being replaced with
discussions about how to create a social-political environment conducive to a peaceful,
multi-ethnic and multi-confessional coexistence. Proposals are even being advanced – at
least among scholars – about the possibility to inserting some general Islamic precepts
into state norms and social practices.
The probable reasons for these changes in the situation of Muslims in Russia are
multiple. First, the struggle for dominance between the major Islamic institutions has
found a winner – at least for the time being – in Mufti Ravil Gaynudtin (Gainudtin), a
Tatar, head of the Russia Mufties Council (RMC). The Council’s position is to affirm the
relevance of Islam as Russia’s second religion, and to work on par with the Orthodox
Church in matters of a social, educational, and political nature. The RMC has established
good relations with the Kremlin, and its representatives are often involved in Russia’s
events with Muslim countries (for example, state visits from leaders of Muslim
countries). At the same time, the Council is working intensely to educate the Muslim
leadership and is contributing to the shaping of Russia’s Muslims’ identity (see also
Laruelle 2008).
Indeed, in the two decades since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a
revamp of scholar activity on Islam and of Islamic sciences – no longer biased by Soviet
orientalist stances. Revived studies, in turn, have allowed for the development of an
informed discourse less influenced by doctrinal issues. Further, the possibility to come
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into contact with external forms of Islam has not only opened the doors to
fundamentalism, it has also offered Russians the opportunity to compare different forms
of Islam in the world, and provided the legitimation of Russia’s traditional
interpretations.
The state, which had already always supported customary Islam and traditional
institutions against “foreign” instances perceived as real or potential subversive threats,
took the chance to support those Islamic organizations that condemn terrorism – and
there are many. Moreover, the state is keeping its more or less balanced official position
toward Orthodoxy and Islam, stressing the necessity to build a multi-ethnic, multireligious country. As a result, the early 2010s have shown the strengthening of Muslims’
self-perception (or, as Malashenko would say, of their “subject-ness”) and, consequently,
the consolidation of Islamic organizations and of their actions. From the end of the
decade, furthermore, despite the challenges represented by various terrorist attacks and
the precarious situation in North Caucasus, it is also possible to identify a certain change
in the general attitude towards Islam and, especially, toward Muslims.
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CHAPTER IV
RUSSIA’S ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE

…it is clear that [in Russia] an absolute secularism is
out of question.
Alexey Malashenko (2011a: 38)
The efforts of Russia’s Muslims to have their contribution to Russian civilization
acknowledged are not limited to theoretical disputes. On the contrary, with the purpose of
effectively influencing state policies and social structures, Muslims are active at many
levels. Discussions about the nature of Islam and its followers’ place in Russia are held
on several platforms, through both public (e.g., mass media) and private (e.g., blogs)
outlets. Often, representatives of non-Islamic confessions, especially Orthodoxy,
contribute to the debate. Indeed, a very visible – and a most fertile – terrain of
confrontation is offered by official inter-religious relations.
Today, Islamic and Orthodox Christian institutions of Russia are weaving a
complex network of relations of cooperation and, at times, of competition. The traditional
balance of power between Orthodox Church and Islamic organizations, which in the past
had seen the undisputed predominance of the former over the latter, has changed. The
reasons are various. In a country that is experiencing an overall decrease in population,
Muslim communities in Russia have been growing steadily (Vishnevsky 2009) in
consequence of a high birthrate and of a substantial immigration from several former
Soviet republics. At the same time, the Russian state, in its tsarist past a firm ally of the
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Church, is officially – if not always substantially – relaxing its religious ties: the
Constitution of 1993 confirmed the secularity of the Russian state.
The leveling of relative power of Islam and Christianity has favored, mostly under
the pressure of the Islamic communities, a revision of their historical relationship.
Additionally, the central government is also working to (re)define the “proper” place of
religion within post-Soviet Russia’s society. Consequently, a debate is now unfolding,
both in public and behind the scenes, between Islamic and Orthodox organizations and
the government about their reciprocal positions within Russia’s socio-political system.
Further, the (re)negotiations of religious legitimacy, ensuing from such confrontation,
hint at the possibility to influence perceptions of Islam as a threat to other religions, to the
secular state, and to state security in general. The present chapter seeks to expose the
processes by which Islamic organizations, the Orthodox Church, and the state, each with
its own conceptualization of Russia’s identity, attempt to (co)determine social and
political norms.
The Russian Orthodox Church
For centuries, in common perceptions within and outside Russia, the Russian Orthodox
Church has been associated with the tsarist regime. On a conceptual-cultural level, it was
identified with the embodiment of a vaguely defined, but specifically attributed, “Russian
soul”. In truth, the close alliance of state and Church began only with the help provided
by the Church to the Romanov dynasty in the seventeenth century (Curanović 2012;
Codevilla 2008). Yet, already the conversion to Greek Christianity of Prince Vladimir
(the unifier of Kievan Rus’) in 988 CE had a mythical nature in marking the birth of the
future Russian state and of its Christianizing mission.
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With the establishment of the Muscovy reign in 17th century, the Russian
Orthodox Church became a close ally of the monarchy in the so-called symphonic
arrangement, which established the parity of religious and secular power (Curanović
2012; Codevilla 2008). Church and monarch shared the same imperial vision: the
Moscow Patriarchate claimed to be the successor to Rome and Constantinople after the
fall of the latter (“Moscow as third Rome”), and the word “tsar” allegedly derived from
“Caesar”. In particular, in the symphonic arrangement, the Church guaranteed the
spiritual legitimacy of the tsars as the last protectors of Christianity against the (mostly
Muslim) “barbarians” who were pressing at the imperial Southern and Eastern borders
(Figes 2002). The Church, thus, was the real source of the tsar’s power. The
establishment of the Holy Synod by Peter the Great in 1721, though, reversed the balance
of power, which since then has tilted more and more toward the secular arm (Codevilla
2008). At a lower level, however, the Orthodox Church, through its village pops (priests),
often of humble origins, remained deeply rooted in the social structure of the Russian
village and deeply influenced its way of life (Figes 2002).
In contrast with its powerful past, at the end of the 20th century the Church
emerged from the Soviet regime as a rather fragmented entity, and several local
Patriarchates claimed to hold the highest religious authority (Curanović 2012; Codevilla
2008). After a few years of internal rivalries, the election in January 2009 of Kirill as the
“Holy Patriarch of Moscow and of the Whole Rus’ ” sanctioned the supremacy of the
Moscow Patriarchate (Balzer 2010).
The consolidation of its ecclesiastical hierarchy undoubtedly strengthened the
Church and benefited its outreaching strategy. In post-Communist Russia, the Orthodox
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Church is re-proposing itself as a provider of spiritual values and a guarantor of social
stability, and as one of the pillars of (the “new”) Russia. Historical references to the past
are recurrent and often used as a conceptual and practice-related bridge to reinstate
traditional liturgical and social habits (Curanović 2012). Indeed, observers have
denounced the Church’s increasing assertiveness and its return to old, condemnable
habits such as an explicit xenophobia, a dismissive (if not hostile) attitude toward other
religions, and the attempt to control Russian society (Curanović 2012; Balzer 2010;
Filatov 2007). Above all, the Church has been accused to re-acquire its traditional taste
for political power and to put ambition above its religious duties (Solodovnik 2013).
Patriarch Kirill is often depicted as overly ambitious and politically cunning. His
endeavor, though, is being challenged by the rise of other actors on Russia’s religious
scene.
Islamic organizations
Today, the actual number of Muslims in Russia is highly disputed and subject to political
negotiations. The most accredited estimates range from twelve to twenty million (Hunter
2004). Islam is the second religion in the country, and it is growing. In the 1990s the
number of mosques, Muslim organizations and Islamic-oriented or -directed media, such
as newspapers, websites, and publishing houses, had increased many times (Hunter 2004;
Yemelianova 2002), although some have observed a flattening out at the end of the
decade (Dobaev 2010).
Islamic organizations in Russia have traditionally been fragmented, and often in
conflict with one another, as Roman Silant’ev, an ethnic Russian scholar of Islam and a
public figure, has clearly, and polemically, pointed out (Silant’ev 2008, 2007, 2006). In
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his numerous and popular writings, Silant’ev claims that the rivalries among Islamic
organizations stem from the competition of their leaders for authority and political power.
Yet, it must be added that these divisions also have a doctrinal basis. While Tatars in the
Volga region are Sunni belonging to the Hanafi legal school, many (non-Tatar) Muslims
in North Caucasus follow the Sufi tradition and often belong to a tariqa (Yarlykapov
2010). In addition to strictly religious norms, traditional habits and customs shape
distinctive local interpretations of Islam (“customary” or “traditional” Islam), thus further
differentiating Muslim communities. Finally, numerous groups of newly converted or
“radicalized” Muslims, in Russia generally called “Wahhabis” or “Salafis”, constitute a
third Islamic entity in Russia – a minor one, but all the more vocal.
Doctrinal differences already render the establishment of a single religious
leadership that would be accepted by all groups very difficult. A further, substantial
obstacle is constituted by the heritage of traditional local institutions (for example,
Spiritual Boards) that have historically been in charge of specific territories. Almost each
of Russia’s thousands of registered mosques is led by a local mufti (religious leader) who,
in turn, loosely reports to a provincial or regional council. Regional or provincial leaders,
who had often been appointed in Soviet times, appear reluctant to give up their power and
prestige for what they only partially feel as a common cause. Finally, the ambitions of
young leaders, or aspiring ones, to reshape Russia’s Islam along more “orthodox” lines
borrowed from Arab countries, create yet more resistance to change. As a result, the
Muslim communities in Russia still lack a unified representative body (Silant’ev 2008;
Hunter 2004; Yemelianova 2002).
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Many Islamic organizations in Russia enjoy a very small influence, territorially or
socially (Silant’ev 2008; Hunter 2004; Yemelianova 2002). Some are even very powerful
at the local level, for example the councils in Chechnya and Dagestan (International
Crisis Group 2012). Yet, only three have national relevance. These are the Russian
Mufties Council (RMC) in Moscow, led by Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, a Tatar; the Central
Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Russia (TSDUM), based in Ufa, led by Sheik-ulIslam Talgat Tadzhuddin, also a Tatar; and the Coordinating Center of Spiritual Boards
of Muslims of North Caucasus (CCSBMNC), under Ismail Berdiev. They shape the
public dialogue with the Orthodox Church and the state: their leaders sit in the most
influential councils and administrative bodies, they officially contribute to interfaith and
state-religion policies, and their statements are regularly reported by the most important
media. Since this chapter deals with the relations among official religious institutions, it
focuses on the positions of RMC, TSDUM, and CCSBMNC.
Until the late 2000s, the Islamic movements’ aspirations to exert sociopolitical
influence were hindered by their high fragmentation. The three main organizations,
though, have been able to strengthen their positions considerably in the past few years.
Although their actual representation of the majority of Russia’s Muslims is still
contested, they have consolidated their status as leading Islamic organizations in Russia.
As a further step toward harmonization, the Muslim authorities of North Caucasus, who
in the past had tended to pursue their own, distinct objectives, today appear more willing
to operate on a shared platform with the other organizations, especially the RMC
(International Crisis Group 2012; Islam Tuday 2012a).

87

Despite some positive signals of rapprochement, though, the unification of the top
three entities still seems unlikely. Especially the RMC and the CSBM, which share a
basis of Hanafi Tatars believers, are traditionally divided by constant and often harsh
hostility. Such rivalry is usually attributed to the political competition between their two
Tatar leaders, Gainudtin and Tadzhuddin, each claiming to represent their community.
The fragmentation of Islamic religious forces is perceived as a weakness, within
and outside the community (Curanović 2012; Silant’ev 2010, 2008). Moreover, it comes
at a time when a strong Islamic platform would be much needed to counter a revitalized
Church. Various attempts have been made to unify the Islamic organizations under a
central entity, with no durable results (Silant’ev 2010; Hunter 2004).
An emblematic one occurred in 2009. In his account of the facts, Silant’ev (2010)
highlights the self-contradictory behavior of Muslim top leaders. On that occasion,
Abdul-Vakhed Nyazov, president of the Islamic Culture Center (an entity associated with
the RCM) had allegedly proposed to sheik Tadzhuddin the creation of an organization to
coordinate the activities of the RCM, CSBM, and CCSBMNC – only to receive a
vehement rejection.
Silant’ev explains this failure with the decline of Ravil Gainutdin’s political
influence. The Head Mufti, Silant’ev argues, had felt too confident about his own
authority; in particular, he had bragged about his connections with the government and
the privileged “political” position that RMC had allegedly acquired over the CSBM. In
fact, his choice of the Head of the Islamic Cultural Center as his envoy to the negotiations
– a man whose controversial past is well known in Russia and whom Gainutdin himself
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had publicly criticized years before – had been the cause of a series of initiatives of the
Ministry of Justice against the Center and the RMC in general.
By reacting so assertively, Silant’ev notes, the government manifested its de facto
opposition to the unification of the Islamic organizations. The result has been the
strengthening of Tadzhuddin’s power within the Muslim community, as the preferred
partner of the state. Tadzhuddin, though, is not immune from critiques either, especially
after his much publicized – and later withdrawn – 2003 declarations in favor of terrorist
attacks (Laruelle 2008; Hunter 2004).
Within the Islamic community, the reasons for the failure of the unification were
openly acknowledged by Al’bir Krganov, at the time the Head of the Spiritual Board of
the Muslims of Chuvashia and first vice-president of the CSBM (today Head of the
CSBM’s Central Region muftiate), in an interview given to Interfax-Religion published
on February 9, 2010. Krganov started by reassuring readers (and authorities) about the
loyalty of official Islamic organizations. He confirmed the unity of the major Russian
Muslim organizations on doctrinal matters, on the condemnation of extremism, and on
their support for the central state. (These last two elements were security-related,
“routine” reassurances addressed more to the authorities than to the population). Then, he
went straight to the matter of rivalry with the RMC. He highlighted the crucial role of the
CSBM for Russia’s Muslim communities. Significantly, he enhanced the relevance of
CSBM by tying it to the overall contribution of Russia’s Muslims to the consolidation of
the Russian state:
[The CSBM] is the history of the Muslims of our country, of the
thousands of its mosques, the history of the great people who worked
under the aegis of CSBM. This is the “gold reserve” of Islamic
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spirituality, its civic sense, and its patriotism. (Krganov 2010, italics
mine)
The fact that Krganov justified the preeminence of the CSBM over the RMC for its
historical contribution and not its doctrinal propositions is a confirmation of the political
character of Russian inter-Islamic rivalries. To underscore his point, Krganov stated the
CSBM’s readiness to inter-organizational dialogue and cooperation but, at the same time,
he made it clear that it would accept the unification of the Islamic organizations only on
its own terms.
Finally, Krganov defended the right of CSBM to unite the Russian ummah
“without interferences from outside”. Here, he may have referred to those non-Muslims
who are urging the Islamic communities to find a single official “voice”. He may also
have referred, though, to certain actors in the international Islamic community that have
actively tried to establish their influence in the post-Soviet states, both doctrinally and
economically. The revival of religious activity in Russia after 1991 created many
opportunities for new organizations. Many Russian Muslims turned outward to the
international Islamic community, in search for spiritual and material assistance.
For their part, Middle Eastern Islamic organizations have been eager to support
their coreligionists in the former Soviet territories. Russian youngsters have been invited
to study in the traditional center of Islamic doctrine, and scholars have gone to Russia to
teach Arabic and other fundamentals of Islam to local religious leaders, who had a
relatively poor Islamic education. Above all, funds were provided for the building of
mosques and the development of Muslim communities in general (Yemelianova 2002).
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Most of these resources and opportunities were under the control and coordination of the
few spiritual leaders that had survived through Soviet times.
Mufties’ authority is now being challenged by those whom Krganov calls the
“young generations” of Islamic scholars, who have studied abroad and now demand a
responsible role in Russia. Significantly, Krganov strongly defends the legitimacy of the
existing leaders who, despite their lack of doctrinal and linguistic (Arabic) knowledge,
have “more experience” and are better prepared to face the specific challenges of the
Russian environment. Similar comments had been offered also by Mufti Gusman
Isxakov, the head of the spiritual board of the Muslim republics in his interview given to
Interfax-Religion of February 22, 2010.
At the turn of the decade, it would seem that Silant’ev’s prediction on the growth
of other independent Islamic organizations (Silant’ev 2010) at the expenses of alwaysquarrelling RMC and CSBM has been proved wrong. On the contrary, it appears that the
political wisdom and the charisma of Gainudtin, as well as the increasingly oddity of
Tadzhuddin’s statements, have gained RMC the leadership on the political scene (Balzer
2010) – and this, although the RMC holds a clearly Islamic position that looks more
independent from the government’s than the CSDUM’s (Curanović 2012; Laruelle
(2008), instead, assesses the relation between the two organizations as more equally
balanced).
As is exemplified by these comments, Russia’s Islamic communities often lament
the interference of external factors in their internal disputes over power and authority.
Muslims’ initial enthusiasm for the opportunities to reconnect with the international
ummah (and perhaps their hidden hopes to regain their historical role as cultural
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authorities) has been replaced by an attitude increasingly defensive of their own
traditions. Such awareness of Russia’s particularism is one of the most characteristic
traits of Russian thought. Interestingly, it belongs to both the Orthodox Church, which
distances itself very decisively from the other Christian confessions, and Muslims alike.
As will be discussed further in the next chapter, the tendency of Russia’s Islamic
leadership to affirm its uniqueness within the international ummah provides the
government with a powerful security argument to isolate Islamic fundamentalist currents
and to prevent international “subversive” co-operation.
Interfaith dialogue: institutional relations
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, and especially since the turn of the century, the
balance of the Christian-Islamic relations in Russia has changed. The growing political
and cultural assertiveness of Muslims and their organizations inevitably leads them to
cross paths with the Orthodox Church. Such encounters, though, are not necessarily
always antagonistic or even confrontational – although they often are (Curanović 2012;
Verkhovskii 2011; Balzer 2010; Filatov 2007). On the contrary, organizations on both
sides have been building a dialogue on the role of religious institutions in Russia, their
influence on social and political activity, their legitimacy as representatives of the
Russian population and, ultimately, the modalities of constructive interfaith coexistence.
The Interreligious Council of Russia (Mezhreligioznyi Sovet Rossii) was created
in 1998 to facilitate the dialogue among the adherents to four “traditional” Russian
religions: Russian Orthodoxes, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists. By far the two major
religions are Orthodoxy and Islam, which have been uninterruptedly represented in the
Council, respectively, by the Metropolitan Kirill, and by the three Muslim leaders Ravil
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Gainutdin (RMC), Talgat Tadzhuddin (CSBM), and Ismail Berdiev (CSBMNC). Initially
conceived as a council of peers where the Orthodox Metropolitan would serve as primus
inter pares, in the assembly of April 22, 2010, Kirill was nominated the council’s
president, thus becoming “really first above other religious leaders” (NG 2010).
The main mission of the Council is to re-establish the centrality of
institutionalized religion in post-Communist Russia. Indeed, one of the main
preoccupations of the representatives of the four “traditional” confessions is to confirm
their own legitimacy. They do it with two main arguments. On the one hand, “traditional”
religions leaders constantly maintain the unique validity of their doctrinal precepts, often
in juxtaposition to other currents within their own religions (for example, Old Believers
for the Orthodoxy, or Wahhabism for Islam). On the other hand, they emphasize the
value of the role that their institutions have played in Russia throughout the centuries
(Interreligious Council of Russia, 2009).
Such conceptual premises translate into two main lines of activity. The first one is
the advocacy of the centrality of the traditional confessions in defending and promoting
the traditional Russian values of family, spirituality, solidarity, and patriotism. The
Council’s repeated condemnations of the multiple minor spiritual and religious
movements, which mushroomed in Russia in the 1990s, can be interpreted in this sense.
The leaders of the four “traditional” confessions often warn against the misuse of
religious themes in fiction or pseudo-educational literature, which in their opinion
confuse the believers and misguide those who are in search of true religiosity. The second
line, which follows from the first but is not completely dependent on it, is the attempt to
increase the influence of the traditional confessions on Russian polity. Given the
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reluctance of the Russian government to share even part of its political power, however,
the action of religious institutions is necessarily more effective at the grassroots level.
For both purposes, social issues are an ideal terrain on which to develop
Christian-Islamic cooperation. Healthcare, sexually transmitted diseases, prostitution,
education, and worsening conditions of life due to economic difficulties are problems felt
by many Russians, independently from their faith. Both Muslim organizations and the
Orthodox Church promote and sustain as a fundamental value the protection of the
traditional family, which is considered central to the social structure. The role of the
family is to provide and maintain, with the help of religious institutions, the material and
spiritual wellbeing of the individual, especially of children. Occasionally challenging the
state’s authority for its social policies, the Inter-religious Council has become
increasingly vocal in condemning what it deems potentially dangerous social measures
and in advocating the reestablishment of traditional values (Russian Orthodox Church,
2010).
The Inter-confessional Conference on AIDS held in 2008 (“Cooperation of the
religious communities on HIV/AIDS”) is a good example of inter-religious joint action.
More importantly, it offered an important platform to define a common approach. The
final document, addressed to both the Russian society and the state, condemned the
younger generations’ unmoral and socially dangerous behaviors (Kruglyi Stol 2008). It
highlighted the role of education in inculcating “family values and traditions” (Point 7) in
the young generations. It stated the existence of a “social pact among religious
organizations, government and society” (Point 9) and recalled the benefits brought to the
“motherland” by its religious organizations in the course of “many centuries” (Point 8).
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Finally, Point 10 reiterated the necessity of interreligious cooperation to teach the
“national culture and [the national] tradition” to the new generations of Russians. These
recommendations were repeated two years later in the declaration of the presidium of the
Interreligious Council of Russia of April 22, 2010. Compared to 2008, the tone had
become more assertive. The Council openly criticized the role of “bureaucrats” and
advocated for the strengthening of the family “without external” (that is, governmental)
“influences” – a role for which, it argued, the religious institutions would be best
equipped.
The Council’s insistence on common values and family-oriented education does
not surprise so much as its emphasis on Russia’s traditional and historical heritage
belonging to both Christianity and Islam. The willingness of the Orthodox Church to
share with Islam its alleged credit in the formation of Russian identity is unprecedented.
In tsarist Russia, Christianity was undisputedly the “national” religion and the Patriarch
was Russians’ spiritual father. In Putin’s Russia, the Orthodox Church is striving to
regain its past position, but instead of seeing Islam as a competitor, as it usually did in the
past, it seems to be willing to accept it as an ally – at least temporarily.
It is true that some signs of impatience occasionally appear on the Church’s side.
Thus, for example, the Head of the relations with foreign Churches of the Moscow
Patriarchate, Episcope Ilarion, in a meeting with the Italian ambassador expressed his
concerns about the decrease in religious and family values among Russian Christians,
which have as direct consequence a decline in “human potential”. Commenting on
“widespread” discourse of an “Islamic threat” to Europe, Ilarion observed that it is not
Muslims’ high birthrate that is the problem, but Christians’ low fertility. He attributed the
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latter to the degeneration of family values among Christians. For him, to rectify the
situation is a task for the European Churches and states together; this “will be the reply to
the so-called Islamic threat” (Russian Orthodox Church, 2009a). Ilarion’s comments have
been reported by an ITAR-TASS note, which highlights his definition of the European
demographic challenge as a Christian issue (implicitly excluding Muslims from
European identity) and his calling for a joint counter-action of states and Churches
(ITAR-TASS, 2009).
In the light of Ilarion’s remarks, expressed to the ambassador of a European
country, some concerns might arise about the depth and pervasiveness of the Orthodox
Church’s commitment to cooperation with Islam – or at least about the authority of Kirill
in imposing this line of conduct. The official policy of the Patriarchate is clearly one of
cooperation on social issues. Six years after the establishment of the Council, the
cooperation of religious institutions at the social level is given for granted. The effects of
their activity on the ground are also acknowledged. Thus, for example, the meeting of the
Anti-narcotics Commission of Krasnogor (a town in the outskirts of Moscow) in June
2014, in which various religious representatives and government officials participated,
dealt with “The experience of the work of the religious associations in the prevention of
the abuse of narcotics and in social rehabilitation of drug addicts”. The related
communiqué reported the exact lines in the Islamic sacred texts (Qur’an and Hadiths)
that explicitly forbid not only the consumption of alcohol (and drugs), but also any
contact with those who deal with them under any circumstances (trade, exchange, etc.).
The official websites of the RMC and the related Spiritual Board of the Muslims
of the Moscow Region (DUMMO) report the integral, official version of the press
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statement (RMC 2014a; DUMMO.ru 2014, which also reports the Mufti’s speech). The
Islamic authorities take the time to explain the value of their contribution to the fight
against drug addiction, perhaps in the effort to make it more visible to the public. As to
confirm these concerns, commenting on an analogous meeting, the youth organization
Mestnye (which is linked to Putin’s party Edinaia Rossiia and promotes “patriotism” and
“defense of Russian values”) acknowledges only “the possibility of an Orthodox
influence” on the decrease of drug consumption (mestnye.ru 2014), thus revealing the
persistence of a strong bias in public perception.
In its long history, the Church of Russia has been a pivotal center of political
power. Under the leadership of Kirill, it is attempting to regain at least part of its
influence: it remains to be seen if, on political ground, its attitude toward Islam will
remain conciliatory, or the inter-confessional dialogue will turn out to be a temporary
tactics of the Church to gain an ally in its confrontation with the state.
The Russian secular state: contemporary interpretation of Catherine’s model
Partly, the political support given by Russia’s Muslims (especially Tatars) to the state
stems from the specificities of the Hanafi School, which encourages support to nonIslamic regimes when they allow free profession of the Islamic faith. Partly, though, it
may be a reflection of the historical alliance between temporal and religious powers in
Russia. Even if this alliance is generally applied to the Orthodox Church, there have been
moments when the state has recognized the political role of Islamic organizations as well.
Catherine the Great personally disliked Islam, but considered it socially useful (van der
Oye 2010; Crews 2006; Hunter 2004), and created the first Islamic Council in Russia.
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Centuries later, the Soviets tolerated certain religious structures in Central Asia in order
to better control the local population and manage USSR’s relations with the Middle East.
The intertwining of religion and politics in Russia is so deep that key historicalreligious events are now matter of re-negotiation. For example, Putin’s decision to
proclaim the conversion of Prince Vladimir to Christianity a national festivity provoked
mixed reactions among Muslims. Citizens’ comments collected by a reporter of the major
Muslim portal Islam.ru varied from worries of a Christianization of the state, to
indifference, to suggestions to address other, more pressing problems (Kanaeva 2010).
Everyone, however, seemed to devise beyond Putin’s decision an attempt to re-establish
the preeminence of Orthodoxy as Russia’s official spiritual guide, if not religion.
Open concerns about the constitutionality of Putin’s proposal were expressed
even by non-Muslim observers. They were quickly dismissed by some member of the
Duma (Interfax 2010), though, and the bill passed without opposition (dp.ru 2010).
Sensing the inevitability of such outcome and in the attempt to prepare the ground for
further negotiations, on April 23, 2010, the RMC had issued a communiqué pleading for
the revision of the proposal and the pursuit of a “balance” among the different religions.
In the view of the RMC, the approval of the bill would have meant that the state
openly supported the Church over other confessions. At the same time, Muslims
contested the very myth of Russians’ predestination to Christianity. In fact, they
reminded, the legend also says that Vladimir was considering Islam as well Christianity,
and held the former in very high esteem. (The popular notion is that he allegedly refused
because Islam forbade the consumption of alcohol.) This is a significant example of
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Russia’s Muslims various attempts5 to “straighten” the way Russian history is told, and to
reveal, instead, the important political, social, and cultural contributions of Islamic
communities to the Russian identity.
Challenged on its own terrain, the Church seems to proceed cautiously. It has
delegated a more polemical role to other organizations, which operate at different levels
from the official to the informal ones, and to which the Church shows its support in
different degrees (Curanović 2012). One of the most prominent is the World Russian
People’s Council (WRPC), an “international public organization” accredited at the
United Nations, under the direct leadership of the Moscow Metropolitan. Among the
purposes of WRPC are the “consolidation of the Russian state and the strengthening of
the role of the Orthodox Church in the social life” (point 2 of the Statute), and
cooperation with the other traditional religions of Russia.
One of the most visible WRPC initiatives, “Faith and Victory”, was a plea to then
Russian President Medvedev to reinstate the official celebrations for the 1945 victory
over Germany. The Soviets used to celebrate this event as a historical and self-laudatory
milestone that showed the unity of Russians against the enemy, under the Communist
leadership. Hearing about the intentions of the WRPC, representatives of the Muslim
community replied that the “Great Patriotic War” (as World War II is called in Russia)
was fought by all Russian citizens; members of Muslim youth organizations joined the
WRPC in its event. If Metropolitan Kirill, as it seems (Curanović 2012; Filatov 2007) is

5

Another one is the debate on the Tatar origin of the Crown of Monomakh. Prince Monomakh is considered
(especially in popular narratives) the greatest of all Kievan rulers, an example of wisdom, and of peaceful and
prosperous leadership. His crown, kept in the Kremlin, is perhaps the most venerated piece in Russia’s treasure.
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aiming to reestablish the Church’s traditional role as custodian of Russia’s identity, the
Muslim community does not intend to remain behind.
Against the backdrop of inter-religious relations, the position of the government is
complex, if not ambiguous. Under the Presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev, both he and, to a
lesser extent, his Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared their impartial support to all
“traditional” religions. These were collectively depicted as providers of a necessary
spiritual support and as true contributors to Russian national identity. A Presidential
Council for Religious Affairs was created (“Council for cooperation with religious
associations at the Presidency of the Russian Federation”), which all the three major
Islamic organizations were invited to join. Religious teaching was introduced in the new
school reform, with great satisfaction of the Orthodoxes (ROC 2010b). Medvedev often
presided to the inauguration of new mosques. (Interestingly, in a sort of unofficial
distribution of tasks, Putin would attend Orthodox events.) Conferences and meetings
between the leaders of the four major religions and top governmental officials on
specific, social topics became routine.
Apparently, the government continues to maintain a neutral position and to show
appreciation for the socially and spiritually positive influence of religion in general. In
fact, however, signs of the central authorities’ (especially Putin’s) preference hint at the
higher regard that the Orthodox Church is granted – understandably, for the sheer number
of its followers and the undoubtedly significance of its historical and cultural heritage.
For example, when Putin was Prime Minister, on the “About religion” page of his official
website, the “inspirational” quotations were only taken from his speech celebrating the
election of Metropolitan Kirill. On that occasion, Putin repeatedly highlighted the
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essential role of the Orthodox Church in the foundation of the Russian state. Most
importantly, he observed how in Russia the Church has always been “the source of the
government legitimacy” (ROC 2009b) – a role that Islam cannot claim. Another example
of uneasy relations with the Muslim institutions is the alternating support given by the
state to the one or other of them, both a cause and a consequence of their internal rivalries
(Silant’ev 2010). These details seem to indicate a bias of the government toward the
Patriarchate, at the expenses of its major competitor.
Yet, the reality is more stratified. For one thing, despite the central position that
the Church enjoys in many government statements, the alliance with Muslim leaders is
fully appreciated by the state’s high officials. In foreign policy, Russia is taking
advantage of the growing relations of its Muslim community with the international
ummah. Increasingly, Islamic organizations are used as bridgeheads into the Muslim
world, and Muslim officers are appointed to political and governmental missions. Russia
makes no secret of its renewed interest in the Middle East, where it presents itself as a
possible alternative to U.S. and Western hegemony (Islamic News 2009).
Indeed, Russian Muslims seem to reinforce the government’s message by
proposing the “Russian model” as an alternative for political action of Islamic
communities abroad. One of the most important platforms for such initiatives is the
“Russia – Islamic World Strategic Vision Group”, founded in 2006, whose members are
representatives of Russia as well as of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). In
its statute, the Group explicitly affirms how the “consolidation of [the interaction
between Russian and OIC Muslims] not only meets the interests of Russia and member
countries of OIC but also facilitates strengthening of international security in general”.
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More recently, the same opinion has been expressed by the then President of Tatarstan
Mintimer Shaimiyev (Wahab and Al-Saadi 2008) and by Medvedev himself. In
particular, Medvedev was confident that “this interaction will help create a more
equitable system of international relations, conflict situations at global and regional
levels” (Islamic News 2009). I further discuss the role of the “Russia – Islamic World
Strategic Vision Group” in Russian foreign policy in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
Russia’s Muslim leaders are willing to act in foreign policy on behalf of their
country, which increases their prestige within the ummah and provides them with some
leverage with the government. How powerful (and stable) such advantage may be is yet
to be determined, though; the reluctance of the government to see the Islamic
communities united is a sign that Putin is very careful in keeping Muslims’ political
influence under control.
In drawing a balance on the relations of power among the Orthodox Church, the
Islamic institutions, and the state, Alicija Curanović (2012) points out that, among
religious institutions, the ROC holds by far the most influence and prestige. The state is
the undisputed leader, with the power to dispense authority - and material benefits. In a
sort of virtuous circle, the ROC’s preeminence makes it the greatest beneficiary of
government funding. In turn, such material resources allow the Church to increase its
popularity through social initiatives, and to widen its influence inland and abroad
(missions). The much more limited funding received by the Islamic organizations,
although proportionate to the smaller number of Muslims in relation to Orthodoxes, also
limits their institutional reach.
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It is against this backdrop, perhaps, that the delicate issue of the external funding
to Muslims in Russia needs to be discussed. The availability of significant sums offered
by organizations and governments of states like Saudi Arabia or Turkey constitutes a
temptation. With this money, Muslims in Russia may accomplish institutional tasks that
would be otherwise difficult (for example, Islamic education, the building of new
mosques). Naturally, foreign funds bring along also possible controversies, from the
disputes on how to distribute them among the many institutions, to suspicions of illicit
influence, to the most extreme accusations of terrorism funding.
The recent attempts by the Russian government to regulate (control) foreignfunded organizations, which also hit Western NGO’s, were indeed advertised as
countermeasures to subversion and terrorism. However, in the case of Islamic
organizations in Russia, the position of the central authorities, starting from 2009/2010
and increasingly after Putin’s election in 2012, has evolved. Before, the state’s first
priority was to contain the spreading of Islamic extremism, and to regulate the growth of
registered Islamic organizations. Now, the Russian government, especially in the person
of Putin, is developing a new, systemic approach to Islam to be inserted into an organic
shaping of Russia’s polity. Within this vision6, the place of Islam is no longer at the
margins as a tolerated entity, but it has its own, specific duty to fulfill. As part of the new
Russian construction, Islam must support and encourage the adherence of its followers to
the state unity.

6

The final shape that Russia should acquire in Putin’s vision is contested. Observers’ interpretations vary
from a re-establishment of the Russian-Soviet Empire to the absence of any organic plan – and everything
in between. For the present argument, it is not essential to devise the exact traits of Putin’s vision. The only
exception would be that he has no vision at all, but I agree with the basic assumption of most of the
literature that Putin is following his plan, whatever this may be.
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The activities of Islamic organizations, like education and liturgical practices, are
no longer hindered or just tolerated. In a way that resembles Catherine’s view of state
structure and social peace, Muslims have to conform to the Russian system and
contribute to its prosperity. Apart from outright terrorist activities, which are still being
conducted by specific groups, the big confrontation between the state and Islamic
organizations is likely to take place over the adherence of Muslims’ way of life to Putin’s
vision of the new Russia.
The functional interpretation of religion and its application in Russia
The exact nature of the role of religion and of religion institutions in a socio-political
system, especially in officially secular states, is still debated (Curanović 2012, esp. 1 –
10; Schuppert 2012). In general, in Western political debate a distinction is made
between the influence of religion as system of beliefs on the shaping of a community’s
identity and its interpretation of reality, and the tasks of the institutions that embody such
Weltanschauung and that translate the religious message into practice – in short, the
normative and the functional roles of religion (Schuppert 2012).
Schuppert (2012, pp. 56 ff.) postulates for the European states the existence and
opportunity of „governance through contracts” („Governance durch Verträge“, 56). This
is because, in European secular states, religious institutions (the Church) have a status
that is only matched by the state, which is “the only one that can negotiate eye-to-eye”
(56) with them. The “un-impartial” position of the state, which is secular, prevents it
from being “objective”. Therefore, the religious element that is still present in the society
must be represented by religious organizations, which are the legitimate bearers of the
“spiritual”.
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In Russia, though, the governance through contract is not fully applicable.
Although the state is formally secular, and therefore in matters of religion should be just
an actor on par with the Church and the Islamic organizations, in practice it has the last
word on any aspect of governance. Hence, the state, more accurately Russia’s President
Putin, determines Russia’s religion policy. Indeed, every aspect of Russia’s
administration seems directed to conform harmoniously to the President’s vision. In
terms of governance, religious institutions are confined to a subordinate role. They seem
to accept the general terms of their cooperation with the state, proclaim their support to
the central authority (especially in matters of national security), and limit negotiations to
non-threatening issues. Further, they are willing to invest considerable resources in the
fulfillment of state’s expectations.
It must be noted that the state’s current conceptualization of religious institutions
stems, at least in part, from the institutions themselves. For centuries, the Orthodox
Church has constituted the blueprint of religious life in Russia, so much so that it served
as model for the institutionalization and hierarchical (re)structuring of the other religions
of the Empire (Codevilla 2008; Crews 2006). Today, many observers of Islamic religious
base their works on analytical constructs used to study the Church. Usually, this is a
convenient approach, when one deals with different religions in one country. Partially, it
is compelled by the absence of original studies of Islam with comparable analytical
sophistication. Sometimes, though, the study of Islam is presented as sub-discipline of
ecclesiastical studies, to the point that the analytical structure used to describe the latter is
used for the former (Silant’ev 2008).
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It is probably also for these reasons that the functional interpretation of religion,
which Schuppert (2012), eventually, declares inadequate for Europe, well explains the
situation in Russia. Russian authorities themselves seem to take this position. Whatever
Putin’s intentions may be, it is reasonable to assume that state unity is at least a
precondition for success. In order to coalesce a geographically, ethnically, and religiously
diverse Russia, each political and social actor must do his part, following the leader’s
directives.
Operationally, the adoption of a functional conception of religious institutions
within an all-determining state results in an efficient and straightforward way of action.
In contemporary Russia, religious organizations seem to belong (or to intend to belong)
to the state. If they want to enjoy the political and social influence that derives from this
condition of allies of the government, they must support the central authorities not only in
their words, but also with their deeds. They must take over those functions for which the
state is ill equipped.
Church and Spiritual Boards can reach their own followers with a capillary
efficiency that central authorities do not have. They can also bridge to those groups that
are hostile to or wary of the state but recognize religious authority. Finally, and
increasingly strategically, they can and must take charge of the new immigrants and their
children, and instruct them how to become acceptable residents/citizens of Russia.
The necessity of a governance of religion
After more than a decade of booming, but confused, growth of religions and their
institutions in post-Soviet Russia, the twenty-first century opened onto a somewhat
quieter scene (Yarlikapov 2010). The first decade was characterized by two fundamental
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processes. On one hand, the second Chechen war dominated the public discourse about
Islam. Both in its fought phase (1999-2001) and in the subsequent years of unrest
(terrorist attacks), it reinforced pre-existent discriminatory attitudes among the Russian
population. A rift was cracking between Muslims and the other citizens (especially ethnic
Russians), which opened along lines of religious as well as ethnic divides that were often
interpreted interchangeably (Verkhovskii 2011).
The excesses of Islamic separatists, though, – the most impactful being the assault
on the school in Beslan in 2004 – gradually cost them the sympathies of most Muslims
too. The rejection of Islamic extremism by moderate Muslims was also strongly
encouraged by the official Islamic organizations. Terrorism challenged the roles of
traditional organizations and moderate Muslims as positive members of society. Forced
to justify themselves and to prove their civic loyalty, Islamic leaders scrambled to
sharpen their doctrinal arguments. They provided some more accurate definitions of
(traditional) Islam in Russia, especially its foundations and purposes. Finally, they
elaborated their positions on state-religion relations.
On the other hand, Muslim leaders were able to focus on substantial reasoning
also thanks to the second process that was occurring toward the end of the 2000s decade.
By then, most of the sharpest contrasts internal to many religious communities were
gradually settling. The election of Kirill to lead the Orthodox Church and the unofficial,
but de facto agreement reached by Muslim leaders on their respective zones of influence
created a relatively stable environment, conducive to internal reorganization and
strengthening. At the same time, the state was urging moderate Muslims to devise an
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effective counter-discourse to terrorism and separatism. All these elements concurred to
create a new space in the political debate around Islam.
The State must take the lead
The evolution of the self-consciousness of Islamic organizations, their reconceptualizations of their own place within Russia, and the confirmation of their own
legitimacy made Islamic organizations evolve. Pressed by the government to (contribute
to) counter the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, but at the same time constrained within
the power limits imposed by the state, they reacted in two ways. The immediate response
was internal restructuring, as discussed above. Subsequent to it, Muslims began to call on
the state to contribute to the establishment of an effective governance of religion.
The state, according to many Muslims, was responsible for the design and
regulation of state-religious relations. Of course, the main Islamic organizations would
have to participate to this process. Rafik Mukhametshin already in 2004 had lamented the
absence of a coherent religious policy, which in his opinion lay at the basis of much
disorder. He accused both the state and Muslim Spiritual Boards of inefficiency and
inability. In his model for Tatarstan, he envisioned the necessary participation of local
clergy and Muslim common citizens, along with Tatarstan’s Board and governmental
bodies, to the shaping of a meaningful religious policy.
A similar observation was made by Leonid Siukiianen, a major expert on Islamic
law at the prestigious Moscow High School of Economics. He, too, notes that Russia is
lacking a proper conceptualization of Islam, intended as system of (political) values,
within the secular state (Siukiianen 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2006). His elaboration on the
issue is much more theoretical than Mukhametshin’s, although both draw from the Tatar
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tradition of jadidism. For Siukiianen, the matter is not only how to “place” or “regulate”
Islam. Much more broadly (and innovatively), he proclaims the necessity to acknowledge
the positive message of Islam as political system, and to adopt its core constituents into
Russia’s secular system.
As Siukiianen argues in his works, such an embedment of Islamic values would
have positive, desirable implications in Russia’s policies of religion, security, and foreign
relations. The latter two issues will be discussed in the next chapters. Here, it is important
to note how Siukiianen’s argument fits into the tradition of Islamic modernism, and in
particular into the Russian tradition of Hanafi Islam and Tatar jadidism. Although he
harshly criticizes existent projects of applying Islamic political values in Russia
(including what he, derogatorily, calls the “Islamic oppositional movement” of Geidar
Dzhemal’), he praises the RMC for offering a “rational” model of cooperation with the
state (Siukiianen 2007b: 37).
Putin’s new approach to religious policy
The government has also developed its concept of religious policy. An article published
in October 2013 by the government-aligned newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta illustrates
such process (NG 2013). The occasion was the meeting of the Council on the Relations
among Nationalities (Sovet po mezhnatsional’nym otnosheniami), which is presided by
Vladimir Putin. The location, the city of Ufa, was already a symbol of inter-ethnic and
inter-confessional unity. It was here that Catherine the Great founded the Central
Spiritual Board of Muslims (Tsentral’nyi dukhovnyi upravlenie musul’man – TSDUM).
The place and time of the meeting were even more significant, because of the concurrent
celebration of the 225th anniversary of the TSDUM.
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The fact that Putin himself had decided venue and time of the meeting had been
read by many as a signal of particular significance. As the Nezavisimaya Gazeta’s
journalist notes, Muslims had expected Putin to nominate a “national” leader of the
Islamic communities. Many were hoping for such an outcome, as a way to put an end to
the still persisting rivalries internal to Islamic organizations.
Interestingly, what a few years before seemed to play into the hands of the central
government, namely, the internal divisions of Islamic organizations, has revealed itself an
obstacle to state’s objectives. Poorly coordinated actions of Muslim institutions have
negatively affected efforts to prevent extremism. Lack of standard Islamic education have
allowed for “deviant” teaching, and local clergy was often outside the control of central
Islamic authorities. Finally, the absence of a sole counterpart has further burdened
cooperation with state offices, especially at the local level. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(NG), slightly polemically, adds that Russian bureaucrats (“chinoviki”) would have
expected President Putin to appoint the leader of the Muslim communities, „so that the
authorities would have someone to take accountable for extremist events” (NG 2013). To
the bureaucrats’ great surprise, instead, not only did Putin not nominate a Muslim leader,
but he also let a new law enter into force in those same days of October 2013, which held
local authorities responsible for any inter-ethnic conflict that might break out in their
jurisdictions.
At face value, the new norms may seem a much-needed response to authorities’
abuses against Muslims, especially frequent in the provinces. The banning of allegedly
seditious mainstream Islamic books and of translations of the Qur’an, or the closure of
Islamic religious and cultural centers accused of fostering extremism had provoked
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vehement protests not only among Muslims, in Russia and abroad. The state showed its
willingness to regulate religious affairs – and demonstrated to have the power to do it.
Concessions to Muslims did not come only in reaction to protests, though. The
Nezavisimaya article openly admits that the number of inter-religious and internationalities conflicts among Russian citizens have surged. Somewhat surprisingly, it also
highlights the general weakness of the state on this matter: “before, it was enough that the
authorities would [officially] protect the holders of truth from offence and violence.
Today, the country is already too divided along religious signs.” The remark turns out to
be a preparatory comment to support Putin’s new course.
Instead of advocating stronger policing forces, the author invokes the
establishment of an efficient system of governance of Islam. He laments that Islamic
extremist and subversive forces divert attention and resources from this constructive
initiative toward security measures. In doing so, it attributes the responsibility of social
unrest simultaneously to local, abusive officers, and to religious extremists – shifting it
away from the central government and Putin.
The Nezavisimaya Gazeta article reveals itself as a shorter, but analytically more
sophisticated, version of Putin’s performance at the meeting of the Council on Interethnic
Relations (President of Russia 2013). Acting in a way that is rather typical for him in
official sessions, Putin first scolds his ministers and officers for their failures in grasping
the situation, in sensing the urgency of the measures to be adopted, and in applying them.
He, then, requires that all local governments expedite the application of the norms
promulgated from the center.
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The meeting transcripts confirm that the association of religious and ethnic
identity still underlies the positions of many state officers. Yet, they also show that some
participants, particularly Putin, are developing a much more sophisticated vision of statereligious dynamics. They seem to be elaborating a new conceptualization of the role of
religious organizations in the social order. Compatibly with a functional interpretation of
religion, the common purpose of state and religious institutions (even as representatives
of distinct ethnic identities) is social stability – which in turn reinforces the state. That
such role must follow the directives from the center appears evident in the urge expressed
by the influential Muslim journalist Maksim Shevchenko (also a deputy in the Duma and
a member of the Council) to counter subversive instances and to consolidate Russian
patriotism through mass media “propaganda” (President of Russia, 2013).
Is Putin in search for Muslims’ support?
As if following these suggestions, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta article supports Putin’s
decisions in religious policy. The abstention from appointing a single Muslim leader, in
the journalist’s opinion, is a proof that Putin understands that Islam is not Christianity,
that mosques cannot be structured like monasteries, and that Islamic organizations cannot
be dealt with like the Church. Such a sensible perception, it is implicit, makes Putin the
appropriate leader to counter religious-based social deviances.
Although the author acknowledges the fundamental differences between Islam
and Orthodoxy, he also emphasizes that they are facing similar challenges. Not only
Islam is at risk of fundamentalism. The Church, too, must deal with its own score of
extremists, many of whom slip from its control. However, the journalist adds, not all
extremists may be unwelcome to the ROC. He openly denounces how the Church does

112

indeed take advantage of the rough actions of some groups unofficially affiliated with it.
These groups conduct protests, or worse (typically, the NG notes, against the construction
of a mosque), and while the Church officially condemns them, it later reaps the fruit of
their deeds (no mosque is built). A remarkable ambiguity in the relations between
Orthodox activists and the Church has been observed also by other commentators (Goble
2015).

In this scenario, proper to the contemporary Russian situation, is the attempt to
balance the influence of Church and Islam, and to keep them under government control.
It is not the purpose of the present chapter to discuss the reaction of the Church to the
state’s strategy. Islamic organizations seem to be accepting, and even encouraging, the
fact that the state is taking the initiative in matters of religious policy – on the condition
that Muslim representatives participate in negotiations. It is difficult to understand
whether they do it based on a conscious doctrinal position (the “rationalism” advocated
by the RMC), or because they lack the necessary capabilities. What can be affirmed is
that, in general, the willingness of the state to take the lead and to involve Muslim leaders
enhances the political (policy) influence of official organizations. As a result, the latter
may acquire a significant, competitive advantage toward non-official organizations and
younger, less connected Muslim leaders who are challenging Russia’s traditional Islamic
establishment.
Without having to attribute an imperial purpose to Putin’s actions, it is certainly
possible to argue that, in his Islamic policy, Putin may be attempting a similar scheme to
acquire Muslims’ support. To be sure, the state has introduced several norms to control
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Muslims’ and others’ organizations, especially those (allegedly) funded by foreigners.
Yet, Moscow is also facing growing preoccupations: a demographic scenario favorable to
Muslims (within a generally negative growth); the sharpening of unrests involving
Muslim immigrants; the unsettled situation at Russia’s southern borders. The resolution
of all these issues would benefit from a cooperation with Russia’s Muslim citizens.
The anonymous journalist of the NG chooses her cases from Orthodoxy and
Islam, apparently to sustain the plea for a governance of religion. Yet, the whole article
treats both religions with equality. Such statements are unprecedented in the official
positions of Moscow, and perhaps it is not by chance that they appear first in form of
journalistic analysis, as an anticipation of official policies and/or to test public reception.
Conclusion
Inter-religious relations in 21st-century Russia present peculiar characteristics. These are
determined by a combination of historical-traditional heritage and deliberate strategies of
the religious organizations and the state.
With the partial exclusion of the Northern Caucasus, in Russia “official” Islamic
organizations and the Orthodox Church are working in close cooperation to address
social issues of common concern: the consolidation of family values; the diffusion of
religious ethics (broadly interpreted); the safeguard of children; and the establishment of
religious education in schools.
At the same time, religious leaders are very careful in avoiding inter-faith
doctrinal disputes; on the contrary, they strongly advocate religious coexistence and
mutual tolerance. In this context, the same concept of “tolerance” is being explained as a
traditional Russian attitude of peaceful coexistence toward the Empire and Soviet multi-

114

ethnic and multi-religious character – for certain Muslims in Russia, it also implies the
acceptance of the Orthodox Slavic historical dominance (Gavrilov and Shevchenko 2010;
see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation).
Such a cautious stance does not surprise, since both sides are benefiting from their
present alliance. The Church is trying to limit the current erosion of its own membership
due to the Slavic population’s secularization, disaffection, and demographic crisis. In the
face of such difficulties, it also intends to prevent future clashes with a growing potential
rival. The joint lobbying action with Muslims on religious teaching and family policies is
a good opportunity to make the Church’s voice heard by the government, which is not as
sensible to the Church’s authority as in pre-Soviet times.
The Islamic community, although highly fragmented, is working to achieve a
higher political status and full social acceptance. It is also striving to counter the harmful
propaganda of Islamic terrorism. Muslims’ cooperation with the Church is meant to
demonstrate that they feel part of Russian society. Such a behavior may be reassuring for
both the majority of Russia’s population and for the government itself.
In the middle, the Russian government accords to Christianity and Islam almost
equal nominal weight in their contribution to state decision-making. Putin’s latest
declarations in term of religious policy tend to balance even more the preference given to
either religion. While this encourages the interreligious dialogue at the political level, it
also ensures that both major confessions are kept in constant rivalry for political
preeminence. By periodically shifting its support to each side, the government can foment
or soothe such rivalries at its convenience, thus ensuring that neither force becomes too
powerful.
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It is at the social level, though, that the religious organizations are strongest. Here,
they have demonstrated the effectiveness of their cooperation, to the point of carefully
avoiding deep confrontations. They have felt strong enough to challenge state policies
and influence some of its decisions (for example, in education). Whether their strength on
social issues will lead to political power and, further, to open rivalry between Islam and
the Church is a possibility that may only be proved in the long term.
The policy of the Russian government resembles in part that of some of its
predecessors in that it co-opts the Islamic community to certain power sharing, while
keeping it under its control. It is different from other similar policies in the past for its
stronger “containment” of the Orthodox Church. While still alluding at it as its
“naturally” preferred ally, the government de facto has limited the political influence of
the Patriarchate. At the same time, it tolerates and even encourages inter-religious
cooperation – under its own supervision and limited to the social sphere.
From the beginning of the second decade of the tweny-first century, the
government and the religious organizations alike have showed a growing concern for a
proper governance of religion. Without challenging the secular state, Islamic
organizations encourage the establishment of an efficient policy of religion. Some
Muslim leaders advocate for the state to take the initiative and determine, top-down, the
rules. Others hope that secular power acknowledges the benefit of a doctrinally correct
and politically clever embedment of Islamic political values into the Russian state.
Common to all parties involved is the need to establish an official framework of
organized religion, one that would supplement and complete the concept of “traditional”
confessions. The political advantages of such specific definition seem clear. For the
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religious organizations, it would be a way to consolidate their official status and benefit
from a privileged position. The state would have the double advantage of controlling the
dispensing of political favor to religious leaders, and to justify on legal terms its actions
against extremism (on all religions).
From the discussion conducted so far, it emerges that the dynamics of interreligious and state-religious relations have an immediate and deep influence on security
issues. Some of these effects, like the direct prevention of terrorist acts, are predictable.
Others are achieved through indirect measures (Islamic teaching). Finally, a few are
unexpected, but may bear the fruit of desecuritization. The discussion of some of the
most significant issues of Islam and security in contemporary Russia will be conducted in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
ISLAM AND SECURITY IN RUSSIA

The topics of the following three chapters: Security, Terrorism, and Geopolitics could
have been placed at the beginning of this dissertation, so crucial are they in the treatment
of Islam in Russia. Indeed, most literature on Russia and Islam, both academic and
political, generally focuses on, and is limited to, these three issues. As will be discussed
in the following pages, however, although this approach has historical and analytical
bases, it provides only a partial, rigid interpretation of various phenomena related to
Russia’s Islam. It is based on a Western conceptualization of Islam in a non-Muslim
state, which presupposes an oppositional stance of Muslims on cultural and ethnic, more
than religious, grounds. This “standard” perspective is increasingly unable to account for
the significant changes in Russia’s unique relationship with Islam, and subsequently to
provide satisfactory explanations for apparently contradictory phenomena.
Although ethnic-based confrontations and transnational threats play a significant
role in Russian security, Russia’s most sophisticated observers of Islam refrain from
displaying “easy” dichotomies. Reflections on Muslim and Russian identity, on the
nature of the current (and future) Russian state, and on the role of its citizens heavily
influence conceptualization of the place of Islam and Muslims in Russia. The complex,
and sometimes contradictory, character of these reflections reverberate in the public
discourse, including in the definitions of security threats, geopolitical priorities, and in
the means to address them.
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The premises of such conceptualizations have been examined in the first three
chapters of this dissertation, which have identified the philosophical, cultural, and
historical bases of Russia’s discourse on Islam. It has been shown that both old and new
conceptualizations, like the “Russian idea”, are coming together to build a new Russian
identity. Elements that have been marginalized, like the “Tatar” elements of the “Russian
civilization” or, in the Soviet period, the institutional role of religion, have now come to
the foreground of discussions among the state, religious institutions, and political and
ideological leaders. The following chapters follow this same methodological approach of
discourse analysis. They identify the specific traits of Russia’s discourse on the relation
of Islam with security and geopolitical issues, its main spokespersons, and its recurring
themes. Drawing from the insights of the early sections of this dissertation, the final
chapters offer a novel explanatory framework to understand Russia’s security and
geopolitical concepts, which distance themselves from models based on Western
parameters.
Compared to other states, in Russia domestic and foreign issues of security and
politics are more closely interconnected, with a clear priority given to the internal
dimension (de Haas 2010; Tsygankov 2006; Herman 1996). Further, Russia’s
conceptualizations of security threats are elaborated in a geopolitical perspective that
takes into consideration at least the Eurasian regional level and the United States (Buzan
and Wæver 2003). This is even more so in the case of Islam, due to the international
character of the ummah, the global reach of separatist groups, and the overwhelmingly
Muslim emigration to Russia from the former Soviet Union, among other factors.

119

Despite their unquestionable interdependence, though, some issues are more
markedly domestic, while others originate outside of Russia’s borders. For this reason,
the chapters’ topics have been organized along a domestic/foreign line. Chapter 5 is
dedicated to the comparison of different approaches to Islam and security in Russia; it
outlines the process of re-definition of Russia’s Islam and its effects of the subsequent,
partial desecuritization of “good” Islam; and it highlights the recent changes in the
Russian preventive approach to Islamic extremism. Chapter 6, starting from the official
definition of Islam, discusses more in detail the issue of Islamic terrorism. Adopting a
novel perspective, it frames Islamic terrorism within Russia’s history and discusses the
way terrorist threats act on popular fears of unrest and revolution. Finally, Chapter 7
examines the actual influence of an “Islamic factor” on Russia’s geopolitical choices.
Islam and security in Russia: conventional interpretations
The identification of Islam as a threat to the state has been a constant, albeit not always
equally relevant, element in Russian history. Several factors have contributed to this
perception, diffused especially among the Orthodox Slavic population, but also in many
elite circles. First, virtually all Muslims of the Empire were ethnically non-Slavs, whose
territories were forcefully annexed to Russia; they were considered second-rank imperial
subjects, unless they converted to Christianity. Second, the Orthodox Church made no
mystery of its disdain for other religions, and of its firm intention to proselytize all the
populations of the Empire. Taking advantage of its political and spiritual influence, the
Church worked to spread the same diffidence among its followers and at the Court. In
turn – third – the combination of ethnic and religious oppositions, paired with an often
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unequal social status, generated in the Muslims of Russia a general diffidence for their
Slavic rulers.
As a result of all these elements, the Slavic majority came to consider Muslims
unreliable and, through their connections to the international ummah, also potential
agents of Russia’s enemies. In fact, Russia’s political elite (the tsars) often showed a
more positive attitude toward their Muslim subjects, if only for the sake of social
stability. Yet, despite recent research that has evidenced a significant cooperation of
Muslim communities and their leaders with the tsarist regime, especially in the nineteenth
century (Yemelianova 2010b, 2002; Crews 2006; Werth 2002), the stereotype of the
“untrustworthy Muslim” has proved hard to eradicate.
Historically, Muslims’ reluctance to be second-rank subjects (or just subjects) of
the Empire has been expressed in different ways. The most radical one was armed
rebellion or resistance against Russian power, for example in the Caucasus. Less
belligerently, some exponents of pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements developed in
nineteenth-century Russia advocated the emancipation of Muslims without necessarily
calling for uprising. The modernist movement of jadidism, too, was principally focused
on the development of Russia’s Islamic community, in order to match the achievements
of the Slavic and, especially, European cultures (Khalid 1998).
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Russia’s Muslim elites had reached
unprecedented levels of self-confidence. Many Tatars still consider it a “golden age”.
Bennigsen and Wimbush (1979) argue that, in pre-Revolution Russia, Muslims decided
to join the Bolshevik movement for strategic, not ideological, reasons. Elaborating on
those elements of the Communist ideology that stressed its liberating effects and its
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international character, Muslims, in fact, had hoped to free themselves from Russian
dominance and, in perspective, to lead a Socialist liberation movement throughout the
colonized Asian world. At the very minimum, they wanted to share state leadership with
ethnic Russians. None of these expectations went fulfilled.
The Soviet regime revealed itself even more Russo-centric than the tsarist Empire
(Bennigsen and Wimbush 1979), so that what many Muslims had feared, the replacement
of a Slavic Russian tsarist colonizer with a Slavic Russian Soviet colonizer, was indeed
occurring. Muslims in the USSR had to experience the harshness of Soviet Orientalism,
which despised their traditional customs as backward and their local economy as
inefficient. The Soviet regime decided to make an example of the benefits of
Communism for the modernization of “its own” Muslims, and it violently imposed on
them a series of changes that went from forced secularization to the disruption of
traditional social and economic structures, to the imposed emancipation of women
(Kemper 2009; Khalid 1998; Ro’i 1984).
Throughout their works, Bennigsen and his co-authors (Wimbush, Broxup, and
Quelquejay) have argued that the antagonism of Muslims and ethnic Russians was strong
throughout Russia’s history, although it could be expressed in different ways. Bennigsen
and Wimbush (1979) noted how Islamic opposition continued to exist, albeit secretly, in
the Soviet Union and predicted that a confrontation of some sort was due to take place by
the end of the twentieth century. Due to lack of other available sources, Bennigsen had to
rely on official Soviet documents. From them, he inferred the significance of Islam
mainly as a security threat that informs his analysis. At the same time, Bennigsen had
been able to read through the lines and had the great merit to scratch under the surface of
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Soviet propaganda. Today’s scholars of Islam in Russia, who have access to a much more
extensive material, point to Bennigsen’s somewhat constrained analysis, even if they
fully acknowledge his fundamental contribution to the study of Islam in the Soviet Union
(Kemper and Conermann 2011; Bobrovnikov 2007).
Bennigsen’s predictions seemed to prove right when the Soviet Union collapsed
in 1991. Many minority groups proclaimed their (actual or desired) political autonomy
from the USSR successor states, in particular from the Russian Federation. After decades
of Soviet social engineering, these ethnic-nationalist enterprises, to be successful,
required the reconstruction of peoples’ identities and their own stories, which had been
lost in the all-encompassing Soviet narrative. Among Russian Muslims, both national
narratives (Khurmatullin 2010; Chabutdinov 2003) and transnational ideas such as panTurkism and pan-Islamism were re-discovered (Zenkovski 2008). In this process, Islam
proved to be a powerful tool to unite groups often very different from each other in
language, ethnicity, and history.
Many Muslim leaders, albeit in effect secular, used the “Islamic factor” as an
additional element to raise support from the masses. In traditionally Muslim areas of the
post-Soviet space, especially Central Asia, Tatarstan, and the Caucasus, thus, Islam soon
became a necessary attribute of all political leaders, and not only of those belonging to
Islamic parties (Azamatov 2005; Laruelle 2005; Mukhametchin 2005; Yuzeev 2005;
Hunter 2004). The association of Islam and ethnicity with instrumental purposes proved
useful to explain the success of political actors in these areas. The neglect or even denial
of the religious dimension of Islam was encouraged by an overestimate of the effects of
secularization on Soviet Muslims.
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It was generally accepted that the inadequacy of the Islamic teaching imparted
during Soviet times, and the force of the Soviet repression had virtually annihilated the
relevance of Islam as a religious faith. The numerous signs of a “renaissance” of Islam
among Soviet Muslim communities, evident already under Gorbachev’s “glasnost’”,
were interpreted as elements of ethnic separatist (national) movements. Although the
success of Islamic political parties proved volatile (most of them disappeared after 2004),
the consideration of Islam as a marker of ethnic identity within an increasingly
secularized Muslim community – instrumental in an opposition to the Slavic majority –
constitutes the basis of conventional analyses of Islam in post-Soviet Russia.
Several elements have sustained this view: the attempts to revive the national
languages, first and foremost Tatar (Wertheim 2005), the proposal to substitute the
ethnic-based “Tatarism” with the territorial-based “Tatarstanism” as a unifying factor for
Tatarstan’s citizens (Yuzeev 2005), the requests to introduce the teaching of Islam in
schools, and the anti-Russian movements in the Caucasus – to name a few. Surveys
conducted in the first two decades after the Soviet demise showed the disaffection of
professed Russian Muslims (as well as Christians: Johnson 2005) for actually practiced
religion (Mosque visits, etc.). Islam thus appeared to be a sign of cultural, rather than
religious, identity (Stepaniants 2003; Lehmann 1997).
Scholarly visions on Islam and security in Russia
Most works on Islam in Russia start from the implicit or explicit premise that the
secularization process, which had begun with the Soviet anti-religious campaigns, would
continue even after the demise of the USSR. Under Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, in the
1990s, the Russian government and much of Russia’s population had the declared intent
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to transition from a Communist, semi-dictatorial regime to a liberal democracy on the
Western model. The heritage of Soviet modernization, with its heavy industrialization
and its rigid, inefficient organization of labor, was listed as a major hindrance to Russia’s
further economic development (Åslund 2007). However, Soviet imposition of official
atheism was considered a positive element that would help Russia catch up with Western
societies.
Although a so-called “renaissance” of religion and spirituality in 1990s Russia
was observed and highlighted, it was interpreted as a re-appropriation of cultural stances
that had been repressed by Soviet homogenization, rather than a resurgence of traditional
religious values and practices. Despite signs that a crisis of the traditional,
Enlightenment-inspired secularization was appearing even in the West (Taylor 2007) –
precipitated by the encounter with Muslim immigration – the possibility that a similar
crisis might happen in semi-liberal, post-Soviet atheist Russia was not considered.
Western observers maintained their assumption that Russia was following (at least in its
intentions) a path to Westernization. While it lagged behind on economic and structural
terms, it was on track in the conceptualization of religion as a cultural element belonging
to the individual’s private sphere. Several surveys supported such an interpretation. Some
more specific studies were dedicated to the resurgence of the Orthodox Christian Church,
which was experiencing a staggering comeback on the social and even political scene.
Yet, even this was often interpreted as an attempt by the clergy to reacquire political
power. In any case, if religion was to become again a relevant force in Russian society, it
was thought to be, once again, Orthodoxy.
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The interpretation of secularization tendencies within the established framework
of Russia as follower of the West has induced observers to exclude or minimize the signs
of religious renaissance in Russia. Especially in the case of Russia’s Islam, also given its
instrumental role in political processes (discussed above), observers have limited its
relevance to issues of ethnic confrontation and therefore of security – especially terrorism
and separatism threats. Yet, such perspective, albeit important, does not capture the
extension of the discourse on Islam, nor the nature of Russia’s Islam itself.
As has been shown earlier in this dissertation, in the post-Soviet years the vision
of Islam in Russia has developed along a unique path. In fact, Russian society as a whole
has changed its approach to religion in the opposite direction from what was expected in
the early years after the Soviet demise. The most recent polls by the Levada-Center
(2013), the most authoritative – and independent – survey institute in Russia, show a
significant increase of religiosity, both among Orthodoxes and Muslims. As has been
shown in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, some Russian analysts had already
captured this trend. Several scholars, in local research centers, had drawn parallels
between the consequences of Muslim immigration in Europe and similar effects in
Russia. Even Aleksey Malashenko, one of the most vocal of those alleging a potential
subversive role of Islam in Russia (Malashenko and Filatov 2007), recently observed that
Russia will never be a completely secular state (Malashenko 2010).
The foundational themes about the place of Islam in Russia and its role in the
formation of Russian identity have been examined in Chapters 2-4. They constitute the
premises also for our discussion on security and will be specifically recalled, whenever
relevant. However, there is a fundamental debate on the nature of Islam that is crucial to
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understanding the evolution of the conceptualization of Islam as a (non)threat: the
identification, and definition, of Russia’s “traditional” Islam. Formulated in the mid1990s, it has been considered by many observers (especially outside of Russia) mostly as
a tool of foreign policy, or as a formal, ineffective expedient to deal with some security
issues (Kanet and Piet 2014; Tsygankov 2006; Herman 1996). In fact, the concept of
traditional Islam has deeper roots, and its introduction more ambitious objectives, than a
simple policy expedient. In the course of almost twenty years, this argument has been at
work in the official discourse and in popular discussions. Today, it has come to determine
diffused perceptions of security, securitization, and geopolitics, as the following
discussion will show.
Primakov’s fundamental differentiation of Islam in Russia
Bennigsen called “parallel Islam” the form of Islam that had survived in the Soviet
Union. He explained how the underground Sufi tariqas in the Caucasus had ensured the
preservation of Islamic practices and their transmission to believers. Through their
network of brotherhoods, which covered the whole country, they also sheltered Muslims
outside the Caucasus, in the Volga and Ural regions. In this way, the Sunni Hanafi
traditions, typical of Tatars and Central Asian populations encountered the more
“extremist” stances of Caucasian Muslims – “extremist” because historically antiRussian/Soviet. In the analysis of Bennigsen (and of his Soviet sources), it was the
coexistence, in the Sufi tariqas, of nationalist and religious ideas, and their propagation to
quiescent Tatar areas, that made Sufism a major threat to the Soviet regime.
The “renaissance” of Islam in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR,
accompanied by the resurgence of nationalist separatist movements, challenged the – by
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then Russian – authorities. The two most relevant issues were the Tatar nationalist
movement and the violent separatist groups in the North Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Georgia being now independent, sovereign states). In many ways, the issues were
different: doctrinally (Sufis and Hanafi Islam), ethnically (Tatars, Chechens, Dagestanis,
and a myriad of other groups); and culturally (modernist Tatars and tribal Caucasians). In
common, though, these movements had an open hostility toward the Soviet (Russian)
dominance, perceived as colonialist, and the use of religion as a tool to gain support from
the Muslim population (Laruelle 2005).
Although almost all groups claimed Islam as their motivational force, they
referred to different forms of it. Following a rather sharp generational rift, the Muslim
youth generally appeared more antagonistic toward the Russian regime and more open to
Islamic influences from abroad. The older generations, instead, seemed more interested in
recovering the traditional forms of Islam that combined pre-Islamic habits (adat) and
Islamic precepts. They were also more inclined to find an arrangement with Moscow.
Many factors acted simultaneously on Muslim communities. The ideational disarray after
the collapse of communism left a vacuum that needed to be filled, or replenished; the
economic depression into which Russia had fallen, and the failure of the governments
much-advertised, Western-sponsored liberal reforms; and finally, the penetration into the
formerly Soviet space of the major Islamic powers in the region. Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Iran, and the Gulf Emirates – all, in different measures and with different success,
flooded Muslims in Russia with money, educators, instructional materials. Often, they
offered to have young Russian Muslims trained in the most prestigious Islamic centers in
the Middle East.
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Of course, such generosity from foreign states could not go unnoticed by Russian
authorities and in general by Russian society. Soon, old suspicions about Muslims’
loyalty arose again. Foreign educators were soon attacked as subversive agents, Russians
who had studied in Egypt or Saudi Arabia encountered resistance to their subsequent
attempts, once back in Russia, to rectify what they thought to be a misguided form of
Islam. Indeed, Saudi versions of Islam, more rigid and less tolerant of pre-Islamic
traditions, began to spread in Russia and especially in the North Caucasus. The most
(in)famous of them was Wahhabism, the diffusion and aggressive character of which led
to the popular use of “Wahhabism” to indicate any kind of Islamic extremism in Russia.
The Russian government, preoccupied with pressing problems of economic crisis
and regime transition, initially paid little attention to the ferment in the Caucasus, to the
point that an allegedly independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria could be
(self)proclaimed in 1991 (Russia never recognized it). Toward the middle of the 1990s,
several elements induced the Russian government to turn its attention to its Muslim
regions and to the “Muslim question”. The proclamation of the Republic of Ichkeria, and
in general the increase of separatist and terrorist attacks, were the most immediate ones.
At the same time, Russia was disappointed by the West, which had relegated Russia to a
minor role in the international system. Western (especially U.S.) advisers had persuaded
Yeltsin and its team of liberals to initiate a drastic process of economic reforms that had
brought the country to its knees, with little or no benefits. The nomination of Evgenii
Primakov as Foreign Minister first (1996-1998) and Prime Minister shortly after (19981999) marked a turn in Russian foreign and security policies (Kanet and Piet 2014;
Tsygankov 2006).
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Primakov was a trained Orientalist, familiar with Russia’s historical diplomatic
relations with the Middle East, and a former Soviet diplomat in that region. As Foreign
Minister, he decided to re-orient Russia’s sphere of interest from the unreliable West to a
region where it had more chances to play a determinant role. The question of Russia’s
Muslims became, then, a primary concern. Aware of both the Islamic heritage and the
strategic importance of Russia’s Muslims in the relations with Muslim countries,
Primakov accentuated the Russian historical distinction between authorized and
unauthorized Islam. The versions of Islam, Sunni Hanafi and Sufi, traditionally followed
in Russia include a strong component of pre-Islamic customs and habits (adit).
Additionally, the Soviet repression, by preventing the proper transmission of religious
knowledge between generations and across state borders, had caused the emergence of
further changes like, for example, a strong cult of shrines and formal irregularities in the
completion of rituals. Therefore, Russia’s Islam has assumed a peculiar shape, and may
be formally very different from Islam as it is practiced in Arab countries (Yemelianova
2010b; Tsygankov 2006; Hunter 2004; Herman 1996).
Primakov appreciated the opportunities opened by the establishment of a “Russian
version” of Islam. He inaugurated a doctrine that accentuates the juxtaposition of
Russia’s customary Islam to “foreign” religious schools. The former was declared the
only version of Islam legally authorized in Russia. Foreign Islam, on the contrary, was
condemned as intrinsically hostile and suspected of working toward the social and
political disintegration of Russia (separatism). Since the mid-1990s, the fight against
foreign influence on domestic faith became one of the leitmotifs in Russia anti-terrorism
policy – and of Russian foreign policy in general.
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The effects of Primakov’s conceptualization of Russia’s Islam
Primakov’s conceptual model was successful for several reasons. First, it provided a way
to frame the objective security threat represented by Islamic terrorism, without blaming
Russia’s Muslim substantial minority. Second, and related to this, it offered the
possibility to the “official” Islamic organizations to participate to public life by siding
with the government. Their growing authority allowed Muslim leaders to provide an
umbrella under which moderate Muslims could safely practice their religion. At the same
time the government, which had kept control over the legitimizing criteria for all
authorized religions, could secure the loyalty of official Islamic institutions (see Chapter
4 of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of this matter).
Finally, another explanation for Primakov’s success is less immediate, but
perhaps more powerful. The identification of a peculiar Russian trait in customary
Islam’s nature inserted itself in the debate on the identity of Russia and the components
of its unique civilization. The stress on “Russia’s” Islam not only served to dispel
ordinary citizens’ mutual diffidence. Equally importantly, it could contribute to support
the idea of a Eurasian, Russian civilization. The latter was unique in respect to Islam, just
as it was in respect to Christianity. Further, on the authority of its century-long history of
coexistence, Russia could claim a leading role as an example of successful multireligious society. Philosophically, Russia’s Islam could mirror Orthodox Messianism and
present itself as a paragon for moderate Muslims in non-Islamic states, with the objective
of achieving world peace. As will be further discussed, there are contributors to the
discourse about Islam that hope of this outcome.
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Primakov himself had envisioned the further developments of his
conceptualization. As a foreign policy expert, he had well in mind the potential benefits
of attracting the international moderate Muslim community, while being able to isolate
and fight extremisms. Many observers have interpreted his policy as a move to reach out
to Russia’s Muslim neighbors, in the attempt for Russia to acquire influence in the
(Middle) East and compensate for its loss of political weight in the West. As will be
further discussed in Chapter 7, the effects of this geopolitical framing are still visible
today.
Mohiaddin Mesbahi has been one of the first (and very few) scholars who noticed
the formation of the Primakov doctrine and correctly placed it within a broader process of
identity formation of Russia, ensuing the disillusionment of the (failed) pro-Western
policy adopted by Yeltsin and the Westernizer elites. As Mesbahi (1997) observes,
Primakov’s conceptualization of Islam both reflected and reinforced the then-emerging
neo-Eurasianist movement, which strongly advocated the existence – and the power – of
a unique Russian civilization that had developed across the two continents and was bound
to dominate them. Although the neo-Eurasianist movement has increasingly bent to
extreme right positions with a strong Orthodox component (Laruelle 2008; Wiederkehr
2007), some of its leaders (first of all, Aleksandr Prokhanov) continue to envision a role
for Islam in the past and future of Russia (see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation). Indeed
– and somewhat surprisingly – in the course of two decades, the ties of extreme rightwing activists with exponents of Russia’s political Islam have become ever closer and
more explicit. This is a fundamental element in Russia’s political panorama, and it will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
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Gradually, the “new” definition of customary Islam was applied to all forms of
Islam practiced in Russia. Because of the role played by Sufi tariqas in the opposition to
the tsarist and Soviet regimes – a role that they maintained for more than a decade after
1991 (Malashenko and Trenin 2004) – initially Sufism was considered intrinsically
antagonistic to the Russian state. Yet, as Malashenko and Trenin, among others, also
acknowledge, Russia soon found itself in a position of exception with respect to the
broader Muslim world. In general, in the Sunni community outside of Russia, Sufism is
often considered with suspicion as a form of mysticism bordering on heresy.
Accordingly, those Muslims from Russia (especially the Caucasus) who had gone abroad
to receive their religious education after 1991, or who had been exposed to other forms of
Sunni Islam in the Afghan war, upon their return harshly condemned local Islamic
practices, in particular Sufism.
Local communities reacted to such criticism, and a rift began to open between
Muslims educated abroad and Muslims who followed the traditional practices,
characterized by a great influence of Sufi and/or pre-Islamic (adat) elements. This
division usually mirrored a generational distance, with the youth following the “foreign”
and the elderly the “traditional” forms of Islam. Far from being important only in
religious matters, the change, in North Caucasus, of the character of Sufism from
subversive to conservative, has determined a fundamental change in governmental
policies. It also favored the rise of a new “enemy”: Wahhabism.
Wahhabism and Russia’s contemporary discourse on Islam
The shift of Sufism from being “parallel Islam” to official Islam occurred gradually in the
1990s and was accomplished with the second Chechen conflict in the mid-2000s.
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Terrorist and separatist organizations have distanced themselves from Sufi tariqas.
Instead, they look for affiliations in the broader extremist Islamic scene, most notably
with Al-Qaeda. Today, separatist organizations like Imarat Kavkaz openly challenge the
traditional establishment of Sufi leaders, who in turn are becoming more reliable allies of
the government (Kavkaz Uzel/Caucasian Knot 2013; International Crisis Group 2012; see
also Chapter 4 of this dissertation). In Russian discourse, the term “Wahhabism” has
replaced Sufism as the standard label for extremist Islam. At first, in the 1990s, it was
rather inaccurately applied to any practice of Islam unfamiliar to Russian believers. In
particular, it indicated those forms of cult that had come to Russia through Islamic
teachers sent by Arab countries to help the local communities, or through veterans of the
Afghan war, who had come into contact with radical movements abroad (Yemelianova
2010a).
The opposition between “traditionalists” and “fundamentalists” or “radicals”
found a favorable terrain in the reluctance of many Muslims of Russia to accept the new
“Arab” customs, which intransigent Islamic extremists intended to forcefully impose on
them. The rejection of “foreign” interpretations of Islam was to be expected in the VolgaUral region, where the Tatar community had a strong sense of its Islamic heritage, and
was more willing to cooperate with the Russian regime. However, it played a crucial role
even in the conduct of the war in Chechnya, in which Sufi leaders openly condemned
separatists (Vecheganski 2005; Malashenko and Trenin 2004).
The necessity of discerning among various Islamic practices and of establishing
the degree of their “extremism” fostered the appearance of more accurate descriptions of
Wahhabism, which appeared in Russian in political and scholarly works, as well as in the

134

media (Shevchenko 2012; Bobrovnikov 2007; Malashenko 2007; Ignatenko 2005).
Russians are now much better informed about the history, purposes, and contemporary
manifestations of Wahhabism and its affiliated doctrines. Also the distinction between
Wahhabism and Salafism, which is equally diffused in the North Caucasus, is clearly
made in public discourse – although, in the end, they are again lumped together as
“extremist”.
Today, historical accounts stress the local, unique character of the Islamic
practices in the Caucasus. They extensively report on the contributions to Islamic and
Russian cultures made throughout the centuries by Caucasian communities, and praise
the high level of doctrinal competencies boasted by the Dagestani communities
(Bobrovnikov 2002). Russian studies of local communities claim that Islamic traditions
are effective in creating social cohesiveness, and describe how they adjust to local
contexts (Michaleva 2011; Nazukina 2011).
The attention given to Wahhabism, to its history, and to its ties to other forms of
fundamentalist Islam such as Salafism was both a consequence and a cause of the
strengthening of the association of Islam and security. Differently from the past, though,
when such association was indistinct, the simultaneous presence of traditional and nontraditional narratives has circumscribed the security discussion to “Wahhabism” and
other extremist interpretations of Islam. The vehement remarks of the Russian state and
of Islamic official organizations about the incompatibility of “Wahhabism” with Russian
traditions, have subsequently made it possible to gradually deprive traditional Islam of
any intrinsically negative, subversive trait.
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Thus isolated from mainstream practice, extremist Islam could be easily
securitized – and it has been, both domestically and internationally (Malashenko and
Filatov 2007). The “Islamic factor” is evoked, now, only in conjunction with subversive
activities, with specific extremist groups, and within a certain frame of geopolitical
relations, as will be further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. An important consequence of
this process of distinction of traditional/non-traditional Islam is that, now, extremist Islam
can be safely rejected not only by Russian state authorities, but first and foremost by the
whole Muslim community, Hanafi and Sufi alike.
The division of traditional and foreign, of good and bad Islam, however, does not
dispel the shadows of ambiguity in the treatment of Muslim individuals and communities.
In the political and policing practice, the boundaries of what is subversive are rather
blurred. Russian law is very harsh against extremists and potential terrorists, including
propaganda activists. A “black list” of forbidden books and other materials is regularly
updated by the Ministry of Interiors, and any kind of public organization, including
religious ones, must meet very strict criteria. The power of judgment lies in the hand of
local authorities, whose frequent incompetence causes the ban of mainstream books, or
the imprisonment of religious activists. In the most outrageous cases, public opinion has
requested, and often obtained, a revision of the sentence, but many other instances,
especially in the provinces, go unnoticed or unresolved (the non-profit organization
Forum 18 provides a useful, constantly updated list of such cases at www.forum18.org).
The (partial) desecuritization of Russia’s “traditional Islam”
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have marked a fundamental watershed in the
approach of many states to Islamic terrorism. Although Russia had experienced terrorist
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attacks on its territory before that date, the government led by President Putin took the
opportunity to declare a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005) – a condition of extreme
danger for national security, in which state top leaders act beyond the limits of their legal
mandate. Under the flag of the fight against international terrorism, Moscow adopted a
series of legislative and especially military measures to crush the opposition in Chechnya.
In the case of Russia, it has been established (Mesbahi 2013; Omelicheva 2009;
Tsygankov 2006; Malashenko and Trenin 2004) that Putin has exploited the necessity to
counter international counter-terrorism to justify extreme violent interventions of Russian
forces and numerous military actions that went beyond international conventions on war.
Further, in order to justify its harsh military policy in North Caucasus, Moscow directly
associated the Chechen revolt with (Islamic) terrorism, thus coating the originally ethnicnationalistic causes of the conflict with a political “extremist” motive.
In its approach to separatism and the conflict in Chechnya, Moscow acted within
a framework of securitization of Islam. The process of securitization, as theorized by
Buzan and Wade (1998), occurs when an issue is declared a matter of national security.
Securitization is successful when the security threat is identified by an actor legitimate to
do so (for example the President) and the audience of the message (for example, the
citizens) accept such identification. As a consequence, the issue is taken away from the
realm of ordinary political negotiations and discussions, and receives special treatment
(politically, militarily, and/or socially). The state and the organs legitimated to tackle the
issue are allowed to take extraordinary measures to defeat the threat. Like Russia, many
countries, first of all the United States, have adopted a similar securitization policy of
Islamic terrorism after the September 11 attacks.
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In Russia, though, the previous introduction of the Primakov’s doctrine on Islam
had created the premises for a different development of the discourse on Islam. The “state
of exception”, while harshly affecting “extremist” strains, at the same time allowed
“traditional” Muslims to take the initiative in the discourse on moderate Islam and its
place in contemporary Russia. Protected by their non-threatening status, Muslims found
some openings for suggestions that, in normal conditions, would have sounded audacious
or utopic. Further, they found that they could become influential in Russian society. The
first to take advantage of this opportunity were the official religious organizations.
As has been observed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, the cooperation
between the Orthodox Church and Islamic organizations in Russia was unexpected, and
relatively new. Although contingent factors, like the necessity to counter secularization,
the increasing threat posed by competing religions and spiritual movements, or the joint
efforts to acquire power vis-à-vis the state, have played a significant triggering role, some
effects of such cooperation are unexpected. One of them is the desecuritization of
traditional Islam.
Securitization requires that the speaker be legitimized to do so, and be recognized
as authoritative by her audience. In Russia, the government is a powerful actor, yet it is
not the only one that possesses a strong authority in matter of religion-state relations. For
centuries, the Orthodox Church has provided the foundational legitimacy to the tsar by
delegating to him the right to exercise political power, as executor of the Church’s
mission to preserve Christianity after the fall of Constantinople. This symphonic
arrangement of Church and Tsar, originally, tilted in the Church’s favor (Codevilla
2008). Despite the progressive shift of power from the Church to the state, culminating in
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the persecution of religion by the Soviets, the Church still retains (or claims to retain) its
fundamental ontological role in the legitimation of any Russian state. The Church feels
entitled to participate to the political debate – and expects to be listened to.
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox Church has attempted to
regain what it deems to be its rightful place in the new state, but its success has only been
partial. The mostly secular character of Russia is not only expressed in the Constitution
but is also evident in the government’s political decision-making process and, albeit
somewhat confusedly, in the population’s orientations. At the same time, Putin has been
the only politician whose approval rate among Russians is higher than the Church’s
(Curanović 2012), and who can thus rival the Metropolitan. All this constitutes a
powerful hindrance to the Church’s political role.
The lack of adequate (in the view of the Church) support by the state has induced
the Church to seek the cooperation of some Islamic organizations, on their part interested
in acquiring social acceptance and political influence. The constant positive messages
expressed by the Church on this subject (which have been examined in detail in Chapter
4), and in particular the insistence on the essential, albeit smaller, contribution of Islam to
the constitution of Russia’s identity – and thereby on the right of official Islam to
participate to state building processes – represent a novelty in the Church’s selfpositioning in the public sphere. Reassured by the Muslims’ proclamations of loyalty to
Russia, Orthodoxy can safely acknowledge the importance of Islam in Russia, as a
religion and as a sociopolitical force. Together with the Islamic organizations, the Church
can constitute a stronger “religious front” to counter the power of the secular state.
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Given the legitimacy that the Church still enjoys inside and outside Russia as the
depositary of Russian identity and closest ally of the state (Curanović 2012; Bennett
2011), its affirmations hold a high level of authority – sufficient to utter a
(de)securitization speech. Equally strong may be its appeal to the referent audience – that
is, to the Russian population – which is the same audience of the state as securitizing
actor. Dismayed by the state’s downplaying of its historical and especially political
weight, the Orthodox Church is creating a new public space for itself (Curanović 2012;
Solodovnik 2013; Balzer 2010). In doing so, among other things, it is reaching out to
Islam and instituting a public inter-religious dialogue that appears overwhelmingly
veered to the positive. Of course, the authority of Muslim organizations is more limited.
Nevertheless, they reciprocate by confirming the importance of the Church’s position in
Russia and by granting their cooperation. The association of Orthodox and Islamic
authorities in public view (for example, during state ceremonies) also broadens the
latter’s audience, and possibly confers them more respectability among the public at
large.
Considered from a securitization theory’s perspective, Islam in Russia represents
three issues (referent objects): religion as a cult, religion as a way-of-life (political role),
and identity. In respect to each object, and also to the interactions of all three, Islamic
organizations, the state, and the Church contribute to processes of securitization and
desecuritization of Islam. The distinction of traditional and non-traditional Islam creates
two environments in which these discourses develop. In one environment, Islam is
securitized; in the other, it is not. The state’s influence is heavier in the former, where
extremist Islam is part of an overarching conceptualization of terrorism as an ideology.
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The details of this process will be examined in the next chapter. Conversely, in the sphere
of non-securitized or desecuritized Islam, the official religious institutions cooperate with
the state in constructing the discourse in which debates on Russia’s identity and “the
Russian idea” are conducted.
Although still partial and imperfectly applied, the desecuritization of traditional
Islam may be an attempt by the state to prevent the spreading of extremist religious
movements. By seconding the ambitions of Russian Islamic organizations, the
government has ensured that a moderate, non-threatening interpretation of religious-state
relations be developed and supported, and that it be offered a political outlet. This process
has been possible, among other factors, also thanks to the long history of Islam first in
tsarist Russia and then, under more difficult conditions, in the Soviet Union. The state has
taken advantage of non-confrontational and even cooperative positions already existing in
the Muslim community, especially among Tatars. State support to selected “official”
organizations has further tighten the latter’s relations with the central authority.
The Russian state and Russia’s Muslim leaders are being increasingly criticized
for their instrumental use of Islam for political purposes (Curanović 2012; Solodovnik
2013; Filatov 2007). To a certain degree, these observations are justified: Those Islamic
organizations that have accepted the official doctrine on religion – just like the Orthodox
Church – have also benefited from economic, social and even political advantages.
However, several Islamic institutions have managed to maintain a certain degree of selfdetermination. In fact, after two decades of internal rivalries and mutual dissent among
Muslim groups, it seems that the Moscow-based Russian Mufties Council has acquired
the status of leading Islamic organization – the one, among official Islamic organizations,
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that more assertively advocates a distinct identity of Russia’s Muslims as rightful
members of Russia’s society (Curanović 2012; see also Chapter 4 of this dissertation).
Gradually, traditional Islam has become part of Russia’s religious panorama
(much more than Judaism or Buddhism), and Islamic organizations have established
themselves as fully legitimate. As such, in accordance to the state’s functional
interpretation of religion (Schuppert 2012; see also Chapter 4 of this dissertation), they
are required to contribute to the official vision of Russian society, especially in those
areas in which the state does not want to, or cannot, take the initiative. For Muslims, two
issues are central: Islamic education and the immigration of Muslims from the former
Soviet space. In particular, Islamic education is directly correlated to the process of
desecuritization of traditional Islam and to the prevention of Islamic extremism. As such,
it offers a good introduction to the more specific treatment of terrorism that will be
conducted in Chapter 6. For this reason, it is discussed here.
Islam, education, and state-building
Until the late 2000s, the teaching of religious subjects in Russian schools was
controversial. Education is one of the fields in which Soviet atheism has left an heritage
of pervasive secularism. Even the Orthodox Church has encountered significant obstacles
to its efforts to reintroduce Christian education in public schools. In order to pursue its
objective, the Church had introduced it at the regional level school by school, until in
2007 Vladimir Putin curtailed the autonomy of local administrations in matter of school
curriculum (Fagan 2014). A similar pattern was visible in Russia’s Muslim regions,
although they seem to have enjoyed a broader autonomy and for a longer time if, as
denounced by Roman Silant’ev in 2010, Muslim communities in Russia (especially in the
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Caucasus) had established de facto Islamic enclaves with Shari’a-inspired, unofficial
(“illegal”) rules, such as polygamist marriages and Islamic religious education in schools.
The question of religious teaching, for a long time lingering in public discourse,
has been then extensively discussed within the broader debate about the reform of the
Russian school system, which has occupied most of the decade of the 2000s. Contrary to
the official position of the early years after 1991, when the secular Russian state was
reluctant to support religious teaching, now the government is in favor of the
reintroduction of religion as a school subject. Vladimir Putin, in particular, has supported
the teaching of Christian Orthodoxy as part of a more general “Russian patriotism”. For
Putin, it was not religiosity that needed to be revamped, but religion as one element of
Russian “civilization”. Because patriotism pertains to the state, in Putin’s vision it is the
state’s duty to ensure that it is correctly taught. As such, the leadership of the Church as
primary source of religious education was threatened and, in fact, the school reform
finally approved in 2012 assigns the teaching of religion in school to staff appointed by
the state, and not by the Church (Fagan 2014).
The Church’s calls for the reintroduction of religion in school has been widely
criticized as an attempt to take advantage of Putin’s personal support for Orthodoxy and
(re)impose the religious and cultural supremacy of Orthodoxy on Russia’s society. These
fears, at least in most public schools, have turned out to be unfounded; not only are
teachers dependent on the secular state, but the learning materials have been classified by
Western organizations as “even-handed”. Further, the majority of students (or their
parents) opt for “secular ethics” instead of religion classes (Fagan 2014).
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Nevertheless, as the July meeting of the Presidential Council on Interethnic
Relations (PCIR) once again confirms, Putin insists on the fundamental role of education
in the formation of a patriotic conscience in Russian youth. Further, he holds a very
inclusive vision of Russian identity, when he emphasizes
the irreplaceable role of literature, history, the Russian language and
the languages of other peoples of Russia in educating the younger
generation (President of Russia 2014e).
On the same occasion, the Russian President himself makes the connection
between education, patriotism, and security:
I find it necessary to also consider improving the implementation of the
state program for patriotic education. […] our priorities in the state
youth policy […] should be directed at the overall development of a
harmonious personality, at bringing up Russian citizens as mature and
responsible people who combine love for their country and their home,
their national and ethnic identity, and respect the culture and traditions
of the people who live around them.
I would like to ask [the Education Ministry] to speed up their work and
to give special attention to the prevention of extremism among students.
A single system of monitoring interethnic relations and preventing
possible ethnic conflicts should be of great help here. The Government
is to launch it before the end of the year. (President of Russia 2014e;
the italics are mine)
Islamic teaching, as part of the school curriculum, is also part of this project. However, as
will become clear in the following sections, it is not religion per se that is at stake here.
Islamic teaching and Russia’s security
In the years immediately following the demise of the Soviet Union, Islamic religious
education in Russia was viewed with suspicion by both public opinion and the state.
Against the backdrop of the ethnic-nationalist conflicts of the 1990s that were assuming
an increasingly religious extremist character, the teaching of Islam was considered a
dangerous attempt by Muslims to substitute their all-Russian (rossiiskii) identity with an
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Islamic, hostile one. At a minimum, it threatened to isolate Muslims from, rather than
integrate them in, Russian society. The confused relations among Muslim groups, Islamic
organizations and Muslim leaders, whose religious affiliation was often unclear,
contributed to generate diffidence. The construction of mosques and Islamic schools,
especially in traditionally non-Muslim areas and in Moscow and S. Petersburg, was often
opposed, at times violently.
Gradually, a correlation between certain Islamic teachings imparted to young
Russian Muslims by “foreign” actors, abroad or at home, and security threats was made.
This subsequently sparked a reflection, by government and Muslim leaders alike, on the
actual educational needs of the Muslim community. Such process was also favored by the
level of sophistication on doctrinal knowledge that many Muslims, in particular Tatars,
had achieved. The “safe haven” of traditional Islam and the concurrent re-organization of
the institutional environment, with the establishment of the leadership of the Russian
Mufties Council (as it has been discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation), had allowed
more energy to be devoted to the development of theological and doctrinal arguments.
Russia’s Muslim leaders have become more aware of their place in the Islamic world.
The necessity to counter the lure of Arabic “orthodox” Islam sparked an intense
discussion of the characteristics, instead, of Russia’s “true” Islam (in particular, Hanafi
Sunni and Sufism). Within this lively doctrinal debate among Muslim and non-Muslim
thinkers, the role of Islamic education as it was imparted in the official madrasah
acquired great relevance. In determining their curriculum, religious leaders became less
and less obliging to public expectations.
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Thus for example, Rafik Mukhametshin, the Director of the prestigious Russian
Islamic University in Kazan’, when asked directly about the necessity to modify the
madrasah curriculum in order to prevent the formation of extremists (a frequent question
from the public), denied such need (Mukhametshin 2012). In his opinion, Tatar religious
institutions were correctly imparting a thorough knowledge of Hanafi Sunni Islam,
adequately framed within the general Islamic traditions of legal schools. Instead, he
pointed at the necessity of forming a proper layer of religious teachers, who could
correctly follow the official institutional guidelines. Such teachers had to come from the
Tatar community, because they had to be able to harmonize the practices of Russia’s
traditional Islam with the general precepts of the sacred texts.
On this point, Mukhametshin is very clear. One important cause of social conflict
among Muslims and of the insurgence of extremist stances, in his opinion, is the failure
of foreign-educated young Muslims (including teachers) to grasp the specific character of
Russia’s Islamic traditions. Unable to understand and accept the “spurious” (in their eyes)
faith of the elderly, Mukhametshin notes, many young believers reject their family ties.
Without proper guidance in a “very delicate” phase of their lives, when “they want to put
their ideals into practice”, these young Muslims will find an outlet for their aspirations
outside of their traditional community – in religious extremism.
The role of educators in inculcating the “correct” version of Islam is underscored
also by Mukaddas-khazrat Bibarsov, mufti of the oblast’ of Saratov, “one of the most
active spiritual leaders of the country” according to a journalist of Islam Evrazii. In a
2014 interview given to that portal, also reported on the RMC website (RMC 2014d),
Bibarsov concedes that, often, members of the religious establishment are not adequately
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trained. Further, they need to be more proactive and “reach out” to young people. Like
Mukhametshin, Bibarsov believes that young Muslims like all young people are good,
idealistic, and want to change the world for the better. Unfortunately, he continues, often
they do not possess the right knowledge to pursue this objective in a proper, positive
manner and can be easily misguided by false masters. In Bibarsov’s opinion, a proper and
correct Islamic education is a necessity, and to provide for it is a task not (only) of
Islamic organizations, but first and foremost of the state.
Russia’s government and Islamic education
It is not by chance that Bibarsov calls Islamic education a duty of the government. His
interview appears to be referring to a specific discussion held at the Presidential Council
for Interethnic Relations (PCIR) a few months earlier, in October 2013. On that occasion,
Vladimir Putin had confirmed his belief that a proper religious teaching is one of the
most effective tools to prevent extremisms – of any sort. Through education, Putin
envisions the formation of a new generation of Russian citizens, united under the patriotic
flag. Accordingly, the school curriculum must be so designed as to foster the allegiance
of pupils to a “multi-ethnic”, “multi-religious” motherland. In the October 2013 session
of the PCIR, Putin reproached many of its members for their inadequate zeal in
accomplishing the plan he has explained in many occasions. He specifically indicated the
necessity of improving the quality of the teaching of Russian language and history – but
without neglecting the other “core” cultures, which all contributed to the Russian
civilization (a concept that he repeated, again, in the Council’s meeting in July 2014).
The October 2013 session of the PCIR has proved very significant for Islamic
education, and Putin’s observations have been promptly welcomed by Muslim official
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institutions. In an interview to the online newspaper Vsglyad.ru (2014), also reported by
the RMC official website (RMC 2014e), the rector of the Moscow Islamic University,
Damir-khazrat Khairetdinov, comments positively on Putin’s willingness to create an
official standard of Islamic teaching. He observes how a faulty, uncontrolled teaching is
deleterious for the development of young Muslims into extremist activists. He also
sharply criticizes foreign education, even in prestigious institutions like Al-Azhar, when
it is conducted under unfavorable conditions – for example, when Russian pupils are sent
without the supervision of the Spiritual Boards. In those cases, Khairetdinov notes, often
the students do not qualify for the official classes and are easy prey of ambiguous
“spiritual masters”. The only way to prevent these dangerous situations, in
Khairedtinov’s opinion, is to develop an adequate educational system at home.
The risks of a foreign-controlled educational system appeared clear after the
treatment of the Gülen schools that were mushrooming in the post-Soviet Muslim space
(including Russia) in the 1990s. Gülen was long considered a strategic ally of Turkish
Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom he shared the vision
of a Turkish renaissance. In his schools, he was heavily inspired by his own master, Said
Nursi, a moderate Islamic thinker, whose books, though, are (controversially) banned in
Russia as extremist. Gülen’s schools were suspected on the double account of serving the
purposes of Turkey and propagating a dangerous religious stance. In fact, it is also
probable that they did not conform to the government’s project of “patriotic education”.
On charges of conducting foreign intelligence operations, the Gülen schools were closed
in 2002, and the Movement definitely banned from Russia in 2008.
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With time, Gülen’s relations with Erdogan badly deteriorated, allegedly over
political rivalry. The Russian authoritative commentator on Islam and university
professor Vitaly (Vitalii) Naumkin points out how this change in alliance has
strengthened the relations between Turkey and Russia, also over a potentially
controversial issue like Crimea (Naumkin 2014b). In fact, the long-term developments of
Russo-Turkish relations are yet to be fully assessed, as for example, Turkish Muslim
leaders are being expelled by Crimea (Corley 2014b, 2014c). This element pertains to a
broader geopolitical strategy in which Islam and Muslims play a significant role in
Russia’s foreign policy. For the present discussion, it is relevant to note that the role of
foreign schools as potential security breach intertwines with Russia’s vision of education
as fundamental to building a new national identity.
Religious authorities and security threats
The October 2013 session of the Presidential Committee on Interethnic Relations has
been commented on also by the Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG), a newspaper generally
supporting the government. An editorial published soon after the meeting (NG 2013) not
only provides a nice summary of the official (Putin’s) position but – most noteworthy –
places it into a broader context. The article starts from the coming into force of a law that
makes local bureaucrats directly responsible for any inter-religious clashes that may burst
out in their jurisdictions (a reminder that Putin also makes during his introductory speech
to the PCIR session). It, then, continues by criticizing the indecisiveness of Russian
central authorities in deciding what strategy to adopt to prevent such conflicts.
To contrast to this administrative inadequacy, the author praises President Putin’s
firm belief that a proper Islamic education is essential in preventing any deviant influence

149

on Muslim youth of extremist groups (“Wahhabis”). However, she continues, not only
bureaucrats are to blame; religious authorities are responsible as well. This is a recurring
argument between administration and religious powers, in which each side is willing to
take a part of the blame, but attributes the greater fault to the other side (admittedly, the
Islamic authorities are more willing to denounce their own shortcomings).
Unsurprisingly, the first half of the article is a mere repetition of Putin’s much-heard
vision. Then, the discussion takes an unexpected turn.
On the one hand, the article notes, it is unacceptable for an imam – and his
supervisors – to neglect his responsibility to oversee the activity of mosque-goers, let
alone to take “subversive” initiatives. On the other hand, it continues, it is unreasonable
to expect that the much-praised unification of all Islamic organizations under one
umbrella would maim their extremist fringes. After all, not even the, much better
structured, Orthodox Church can claim control over Christian fundamentalists
“entrenched in the taiga [surrounding] Perm’”. The association of Orthodox Church and
Islamic organizations in terms that are negative for both is a relatively rare image,
especially when discussing Islamic education. In part, it is a recognition of the level of
legitimacy and authority achieved by official Islam, which is now on par with
Christianity.
Additionally, however, it is not unreasonable to assume that the article, written by
an anonymous author and published on a pro-governmental, national newspaper, was
anticipating or disclosing the conceptual bases of Vladimir Putin’s reasoning on
extremism and religion. In this conceptualization, extremism is a form of opposition to
the model of Russia that is envisioned by the state. Since religion is an essential element
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of this model, all “deviant” forms of religious doctrine that do not conform to the
characteristics of Russia’s “official” identity are potentially subversive. It is, therefore, a
duty and a necessity of the state, and not of religious bodies, to make sure that only those
religious principles and practices that support the “motherland”, as it is envisioned by the
state, are allowed and encouraged. One of the primary means to achieve this result is the
strengthening of state allegiance through the construction of a shared sense of common
history, mutual cultural influence, and ethnic equality – what Putin calls “patriotic
education” (also a common practice in many nationally composite countries, including
the United States of America).
Implicitly following this path, the Nezavisimaya’s article drew the necessary
conclusion that there is a fundamental connection between security threats and not only
religious teaching but also religious authorities – including the Church. Vladimir Putin
himself officially made the same connection in the conclusion of the 2014 meeting of the
PCIR, where he noted how patriotic education must be a primary tool to counter also “the
revival of Nazi ideology and the glorification of Nazi criminals” (often professing
Christian faith, see Mitrofanova 2005).
The teaching of traditional Islam must be seen within Putin’s attempt to build a
unified civilizational model for Russia. Each element that, historically, concurred with
the formation of Russia’s identity, including Islam, must be framed and sustained within
this model. The role of education in the formation of a specific, “desired type” of citizen
is not new, nor necessarily negative. Certainly, it is not unusual for much of Russian
society, which had experienced the Soviet attempts at social engineering. Whether Putin
intends to re-create a similarly highly codified society is unclear, even in view of his
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alleged nostalgic glance at the Soviet Union as the “true” version of Russian power. What
can be observed, instead, is the progressive standardization of educational institutions and
programs. In 2014, for example, the major Islamic institutes of higher education (Islamic
universities) have obtained the same legal status as state universities, meaning that their
graduates hold the same-level academic title as their counterparts in secular institutions.
Islam as a counter-ideology to terrorism
It appears clear that the central authority holds religious institutions accountable for
taking their part in neutralizing security threats, both in form of religious education and
of direct control over their associates. Therefore, the article in the Nezavisimaya publicly
condemns the behavior of the Church, which would not reveal whether some extremist
nationalists are active within its hierarchy. It goes even further by publicly exposing the
Church’s ambiguous position toward Christian (right wing) extremists. The journalist
notes that, while the Patriarchate criticizes “uncontrolled” extremists for their actions,
such as protests against the construction of a mosque in Moscow, it is undeniable that –
in the end – the Church profits from them.
The equation of the functional roles of Church and Islamic institutions has been
possible thanks to the distinction of “traditional” and “foreign” Islam. Initially rejected as
“unfamiliar”, in the official discourse non-traditional Islam has been later labeled as
“inappropriate” and, finally, as doctrinally “wrong” – even in respect to non-Russian
forms of Islam. By this conceptual shift, extremist Islam has been gradually deprived of
its religious element and, instead, classified within the broader, ideology-based
phenomenon of “terrorism”. This re-positioning of extremist Islam is perhaps one of the
most significant shifts in Russia’s conceptualization of security, with direct policy
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consequences. Its main implication is that, if extremist Islam is an ideology, its origins
are intellectual, and, consequently, it is best fought with intellectual weapons.
In the past, in Russia and the Soviet Union, Islam was considered a religious or a
cultural attribute of certain groups of subjects (or citizens), and was in the best case just
tolerated. In twenty-first century Russia, instead, traditional Islam occupies a legitimate
place in the political, cultural, and social spheres (see Chapters 2-4). Islamic official
institutions propagate the moderate, “positive” forms of traditional Islam. This positive
“ideology”, in the government’s vision, can represent an effective counter-ideology to
extremism that can and must be inculcated in the Muslim youth to counter the spread of
“wrong” knowledge.
Leading educational figures like the aforementioned Mukhametshin, Bibarsov,
and Khairetdinov point at the necessity to integrate Russian traditional Islamic practices
with Arabic-based teachings. This, in their opinion, is essential to prevent the formation
of false knowledge and oppositional tendencies, and can be best accomplished in Russian
institutions. However, Khairedtinov’s explanation of the causes of terrorist behavior
presents a novel element. Elaborating on the responsibility of teachers, Khairetdinov
confirms the necessity of adequate training. Yet, he also admits that there might be
another cause of extremist behavior:
It is difficult to say what is in the heads of those people [terrorists]... If
one is crazy, then he might be studying even at the MGU [Moscow
State University, the most prestigious in Russia], and then go try to
demonstrate that the faculty taught him correctly! The moment is very
delicate, we cannot blame school programs and teachers, if from the
beginning [this person] was sick in his mind [sic], how can we track
this? We cannot certainly ask a psychiatric certificate of every student.
(Vsglyad.ru 2014)
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By suggesting that there might be a pathological cause for terrorist behavior,
Khairetdinov may just want to discharge Russian educators from an excessive
responsibility for the acts of their pupils. This is a demonstration of confidence by an
Islamic leader, and testifies of the institutional status achieved by official Muslim
organizations.
However, his observation may also involuntarily expose a more subtle, but no less
pervasive, Russian thought about terrorism – namely, that it may not be at all connected
with a specific religious motive, but coming from elsewhere in Russian history. The
study of Russia’s most recent discourse about Islamic extremism, terrorism, and state
security indeed shows increasingly significant signs that old fears of violence are being
revamped. This is an important element that has been so far neglected in the literature
about Russia’s Islam (and about contemporary Russia in general, for that matter).
Therefore, the whole Chapter 6 will be dedicated to its discussion.
Conclusion
The desecuritization of Islam in Russia that ensues from the differentiation of traditional
and non-traditional Islam is a relatively understudied phenomenon. Most commentators
prefer to highlight the challenges that the Muslim community, like almost all other
components of civil society in Russia, faces under Putin’s semi-democratic regime. As I
have mentioned several times throughout this dissertation, a skeptical, if not hostile,
attitude toward Islam and Muslims in Russia does persist. State authorities (especially at
the local level) as well as the media and common citizens express concern about religious
extremism and its violent consequences – the more so after an attack has been conducted.
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However, the purpose of this dissertation is not to repeat or update these analyses.
On the contrary, this work intends to compensate for the often too narrow focus of
conventional views on Islam, especially in its relation to state security. Perhaps
constrained by their traditional analytical frames, in which Islam in Russia always
represents a potential threat, observers often limit themselves to discussions of conflictual
events and do not include in their discussion areas of cooperation and potential
rapprochement. Because of this oversight, they miss an important part of the discourse
about Islam that may offer a useful interpretative key to the evolution of Russia’s polity.
Further, the study of Russia’s attempts at finding an inclusive solution to potential interethnic and inter-religious conflicts – as ideologically drivenkas they may be – may offer
valuable insights for the understanding of similarly composite societies.
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CHAPTER VI
ISLAM, TERRORISM, AND REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

The distinction of “traditional” and “extremist” Islam, conceptualized in the 1990s by
then-Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov to counter Russia’s excessive and frustrating
submissiveness to the West, was often dismissed as a superficial expedient serving
contingent purposes. In fact, twenty years later, it seems to have become the normative
approach of both the state and institutionalized Islam. In Russia, from the point of view
of security, “traditional”, official Islam no longer represents a threat and has been
desecuritized. The treatment of “extremist” Islam, instead, has followed a different path.
The concept of Russia’s traditional Islam designates the Islamic practices
followed by Russia’s Muslim communities, which entail pre-Islamic customs (adat). The
cultural stagnation of tsarist times and, especially, the complete severance, during Soviet
times, of contacts with external Muslim communities fostered the development of
peculiar religious practices among Russia’s Muslim communities. Although based on the
teaching of the Hanafi School, Russian “traditional” Islam resulted in a unique
combination of pre-Islamic, “classic” Arabic, and “underground” (in Soviet times)
religious practices.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations with Muslims outside
Russia were quickly restored. The compliance of Russia’s Muslims with the Islamic
precepts, though, was contested by members of the international ummah, especially
followers of Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia. Many Saudi religious organizations
helped the much needy Russian Islamic institutions and communities by providing
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financial, educational, and personnel support, and foreign teachers were highly critical of
local habits and dismissed the religious authority of Russian mufties. Because foreign
scholars were often backed by official organizations from the donor countries, they were
soon questioned about their “real” purposes. They were accused to pit the younger
generations against their fathers and great-fathers in the attempt to gain intellectual and,
ultimately, political influence over Russian Muslim communities.
As discussed in Chapter 5, gradually all forms of Islamic teachings and practices
that had been introduced in Russia after 1991 were derogatorily lumped under the name
of “Wahhabism”, to identify any form of Islam of foreign origin and, therefore, alien to
Russia’s civilization. As such, “Wahhabism” is considered intrinsically antagonistic not
only to Russian traditional Islam, but also – and most importantly – to the Russian
culture, society, and state. In Primakov’s definition, this is the “extremist” Islam that
represents a threat to Russia and that must be eradicated.
Most of the literature on Russia’s Islam, especially outside of Russia, shares the
assumption that oppositional Islam is the expression of deeply antagonistic, separatist,
and nationalist stances developed historically under the Russian and Soviet colonial
regimes. The ensuing conflicts, therefore, are almost exclusively attributed to ethnicreligious nationalist contrasts. Yet, in Russian history, violent opposition has not always
come from those who wanted to exit the Russian system. On the contrary, several groups
adopted terrorist techniques to achieve political objectives. It is noteworthy that historybased explanations of contemporary Islamic terrorism in Russia have overlooked a
significant practice in Russia’s political struggle that was employed by Orthodox Slavs
against the tsars. The possibility that violent opposition to the Russian state may come
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from within society, from individuals who feel an affiliation with Russia as fatherland,
but not with its government, is seldom considered by political analysts.
It is possible, in fact, to consider contemporary Islamic terrorism as an element of
continuity with a pre-existent, and historically significant, practice of political fight. This
perspective integrates the interpretations of conflicts as essentially nationalist advanced
by the literature. As an at least partially endogenous phenomenon, Islamic terrorism both
follows pre-existing routes and, thus, induces counter-terrorism agents to recur to
historical models and expertise. The accurate study of the interplay of old and new
conceptualizations and methods, both in terrorist and counter-terrorist strategies, adds a
further layer of analytical complexity to the study of Russia’s Islamic terrorism and
prospects a more effective explanation of Russia’s security dynamics.
Among the few scholars in the West who have sensed the relevance of historical
continuity in Russia’s approach to terrorism is Marya Omelicheva (2009). In her view,
Western observers, who find it difficult to explain why Russian authorities heavily recur
to almost exclusively military counterterrorism strategies that prove ineffective, overlook
an important element of Russian history. Omelicheva notes that, in fact, the Russian
government’s reaction to Islamic extremism mirrors that of the tsarist empire against
nineteenth-century-terrorism. In both cases, terrorism is perceived as a fundamental threat
to the same existence of the state and must be annihilated by any means – especially by
force.
Omelicheva’s argument, expressed in a short academic article, is limited to the
critique of counterterrorism methods and does not question the assumption that Russia’s
Muslims would prefer to be outside the Russian state. Yet, the author rightly suggests
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that, in order to understand Russia’s approach to Islamic terrorism, commentators must
broaden their historical span. A more comprehensive analytical perspective is necessary.
The continuity between past and present concerns not only the permanence, or
reappearance, of ethnic-nationalist oppositions.
It is my contention that, in fact, the conceptual roots of Russia’s approach to
Islamic terrorism can and must be searched for in Russia’s political and ideological
history. The heritage of both the tsarist and the Soviet past strongly influences Russia’s
interpretation of the contemporary “Islamic threat” in its territory. Although it is not
always openly acknowledged, reminiscences of the past are shared by large strata of
Russian society, from state and religious authorities to common citizens and, most
significantly, to regime opponents and even terrorists themselves. A thread connects
different political, religious, and intellectual circles, and creates unexpected networks.
These connections reveal that at stake is not only the future religious status of Russia, but
the definition of its identity, the accomplishment of it historical mission and, ultimately,
its own survival.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to trace the conceptual
trajectory of the Russian discourse on post-Soviet Islamic terrorism, from the notion of
religious terrorism to that of terrorist ideology, and to discuss its far-reaching
consequences. Going beyond the most apparent traits of Russia’s approach to terrorism, I
will examine the deep conceptual roots of Russia’s policy on security and on Islamic
terrorism as a political act. Further, I will discuss the ideological debate around political
Islam – which in Russia is acquiring a meaning distinct from “extremist” Islam – through
the analysis of two opposite arguments. Throughout the debate, a common threat seems
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to linger underneath the discursive surface: Revolution. Its subtle, but pervasive,
influence on authors and audience alike will also be discussed.
Conceptual roots of Russia’s vision of terrorism
It is often overlooked by political analysts that Russia’s relationship with terrorism did
not begin with the actions of Islamic extremists after September 11, 2001, or with the
1990s attacks on Russian soil, mainly related to the Caucasus conflict. In fact, as one
scholar has noted,
[…] throughout Russian history, violence has been acknowledged and
articulated as a central problem, whether in the realm of theology,
ethics, or politics. (Levitt 2007: 5, italics mine)
Although a similar statement may probably apply to many pre-modern states and
their societies, in the words of another historian
Russia can claim pride of place as the first in a long line of countries
where terror became a recognized, and feared, expression of political
opposition. (Brower 2007: 91-92, italics mine)
Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that most analyses of Russian terrorism
look to history only to explore the ethnic-nationalist roots of today’s opposition. It is
generally acknowledged that the reminiscence, and rejection, of the historical colonial
domination of the Orthodox Slavic Russian Empire is one of the major causes of the
conflict in North Caucasus and of nationalism elsewhere, for example in Tatarstan. In
view of the active participation of Chechen and Dagestani groups in international terrorist
operations, significant research efforts have been conducted to identify the commonalities
between Russian and Arab Islamic extremism. Thus, similarities have been found in
activists’ motivational claims (the conduction of jihad) and fighting methods (the use of
terrorist attacks, the establishment of networks of small groups or “cells”).
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In fact, all this had already existed in Russia. In the absence of political analysts’
interest, it was scholars outside security studies who searched in the Russian past, in
particular the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for striking similarities with the
contemporary situation. Specialists in Russian history and Russian social movements
have drawn detailed comparisons of contemporary terrorist groups with the major
terrorist movements that succeeded one another on imperial Russia’s underground scene:
first, the Decembrists; then, the Populists; the Nihilists; the members of Land and Liberty
movement; and, eventually, the Bolsheviks (Brower 2007; Geifman 2007, 1993; Levitt
2007; Trigos 2007).
Today, the inspirational character of such figures is widely visible among
Orthodox right extremists and ultra-nationalists. Particularly noteworthy, therefore, is the
fact that influential Muslim activists as well seem to draw from this all-Russian
framework. Even the popular, if controversial, Muslim philosopher and exponent of
political Islam Geidar Dzhemal’ identifies “Fyodor” (calling Dostoyevsky by his first
name) as one of his fundamental spiritual mentors (Shevchenko 2012)7.
Scholars of nineteenth-century terrorism, in various degrees, suggest that the
political terrorism in Russia of that era may well be the precursor of contemporary
terrorist movements, including the Islamic ones – if not in all their ideological contents,

7

Indeed, Dostoevsky is considered a key figure to understand the political and human motives of Russian
terrorists of the Empire. Both his works and his characters have been read, alternatively, as keen analytical
studies or inspirational figures. The literary critic Nora Straus (2006) finds many similarities in the
personality traits and mutual social relations of Dostoyevsky’s conspirators from his novel Demons and alQaeda male-dominated structure.
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certainly in their methods and in their iconography8. Russian terrorism of the 19th
century, although undoubtedly a secular phenomenon and often critical of the Church, in
fact presented distinctive religious traits. The first “official” Russian terrorists, the
Decembrists9, acquired a mystic aura because of their sufferings, which resembled those
of martyrs. A “model” for a “generation of revolutionaries”, as Trigos (2007) defines
them, their influence was felt throughout the century and into the following one, when
[the Decembrists entered] the Bolshevik revolutionary martyrology, as
part and parcel of the new regime’s creation of its own saints. (Trigos
2007: 43)
Their wives, who followed them into exile to Siberia, were also revered
as high examples of dedication and feminine spirit. (Trigos 2007: 47)
Even the practice of suicide attacks, the modern codification of which is
commonly associated to the Japanese Kamikaze in World War II or to Tamil rebels in the
1980s, had already been theorized and sporadically, but increasingly, put in practice by
Russian conspirators, in particular those active after 1880: Nihilists and members of the

8

It is interesting to note that, while most authors acknowledge the unsurpassed value of the Italian scholar
Franco Venturi’s work on Russian populism and terrorism, he himself warns against the diffused tendency
to interpret such movements through literature: “There is very little to learn from Dostoevsky for those who
want to understand Nechaev”. (Venturi, 1952, Vol. 1: xiv, translation mine). Serghey Nechaev, a ruthless
terrorist, is the symbol of 19th-century Russian terrorism and a morbid, almost devilish, figure of Russian
imagery.
9

“The Decembrists (Russian Dekabristy) [were] the Russian revolutionaries who led an unsuccessful
uprising on Dec. 14 (Dec. 26, New Style), 1825, and through their martyrdom provided a source of
inspiration to succeeding generations of Russian dissidents. The Decembrists were primarily members of
the upper classes who had military backgrounds. [T]aking advantage of the brief but confusing interregnum
following the death of Tsar Alexander I, they staged an uprising, convincing some of the troops in St.
Petersburg to refuse to take a loyalty oath to Nicholas I and to demand instead the accession of his brother
Constantine. The rebellion, however, was poorly organized and easily suppressed. […] An extensive
investigation in which Nicholas personally participated ensued; it resulted in the trial of 289 Decembrists,
the execution of 5 of them [...] the imprisonment of 31, and the banishment of the rest to Siberia.” (adapted
from Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Decembrist," accessed August 27, 2014,
http://www.britannica.com/Ebchecked/topic/155016/Decembrist). The case shocked the Russian society –
and many foreigners – for the severity of the punishments. Additionally, the executions were conducted in
semi-secrecy, which contributed to the creation of a “mythical” aura around the event.
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Land and Liberty movement. They, too, supported and venerated as martyrs those who
would sacrifice themselves to free the people from tsarist tyranny. To legitimate their
empathy, the ideologists of terrorism strove to elaborate an effective ethical-philosophical
justification and a code of conduct for lethal and suicide attacks. Although free of the
God-sanctioned messianism of religious extremists, terrorists and their supporters
recurred to similar arguments. Thus, the ethical dilemma of killing innocents (family
members of aristocrats and officers, bystanders, etc.) was resolved with the invocation of
the superiority of their motives: “A noble cause justified ugly deeds” (Bower 2007).
Russia’s conceptualization of Islamic terrorism: from religion to ideology
The victory of former-terrorists Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution did not put an end
to the practice of terrorism in the newly created Soviet Union. On the contrary, the
incumbent regime employed terrorist practices on a large scale to combat its (real or
alleged) internal enemies (Geifmann 2007). It is likely that, under these circumstances,
the conceptualization of terrorism as an instrument of political struggle in Soviet, and
then Russian, socio-political perceptions has been further reinforced. Against this
backdrop, a connection could be made, in some Russian intellectual circles, between
contemporary Islamic terrorism and other forms of violent political opposition that had
occurred throughout Russia’s past.
Evgeny Primakov, formerly Russian Foreign and Prime Minister, then personal
advisor to Vladimir Putin, and now a political commentator, exemplifies this
interpretative process. He begins his discussion (Primakov 2004) of contemporary
international Islamic terrorism by placing it in a world historical perspective, with
particular reference to the past two centuries:
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[Terrorism] has occurred since ancient times. But this book will focus
on terrorism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as an aid to
understanding contemporary terrorism in its most virulent
form...(Primakov 2007: 2)
Most importantly, Primakov clearly conceptualizes Islamic terrorism within a political
framework:
In reality, terrorism is a specific form of political activity that seeks to
achieve its ends by assassinating political figures or targeting a civilian
population. (Primakov 2007: 2)
Primakov was intellectually justified in writing of terrorism without even
mentioning its religious component, in force of the differentiation of “true” and “false”
Islam that he himself had introduced in Russia in the mid-1990s. At the time of his
writing in 2007, the shaping of the consequent official perspective was being effectively
completed. As discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the definition of Russian
traditional Islam that has allowed the desecuritization of official religious practices, at the
same time has consented to cut off Islamic extremism from the realm of religion and
relocate it into that of ideology.
Within this framework, Russian authorities may picture today’s Islamic terrorism
in Russia as yet another episode in a recurring conflict between the state and its political
opponents. As such, it may be treated as a political, ideological phenomenon – the
manifestation of an “ideology of terrorism”. Accordingly, the religious principles invoked
by the extremists are considered not doctrinal precepts but ideological tenets that qualify
and distinguish this type of terrorism, much the same as class struggle did with
Bolshevism. For the state, to counter this ideology is methodologically still challenging,
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but conceptually much easier, for example through “correct” Islamic education (see
Chapter 5 for a longer discussion on this topic).
From this conceptualization derives also the interpretation of Islamic extremism
not as oppositional to Russia’s religious condition (Christian Orthodoxy), not even to its
Slavic component (at least, not per se), but as a reaction to socio-political and economic
inadequacies. This perspective is confirmed – and partially supported – by different
observers (Vestnik Kavkaza 2013; International Crisis Group 2012; Malashenko 2011b;
Malashenko and Trenin 2004), who point to diffused corruption and economic
inefficiency as fuel of terrorist acts in the North Caucasus. The central government
supports the socio-economic explanation of the causes of terrorism and dissent in general.
Several programs have been implemented to improve the general conditions of the
region, especially to foster the creation of jobs for young adults. Despite the great
publicity given to these programs by Moscow and local authorities, very small results
have been obtained so far, and the region continues to depend on direct funding from the
center (International Crisis Group 2012).
The reasons for failure are almost unanimously identified in the very high level of
corruption of local authorities that, by considerably reducing state capitals eventually
available for their intended uses, hinders the effective implementation of any economic
initiative. As a result, it is noted, jobless young Muslims, disappointed by the state, join
extremist and “bandit” groups, often harming moderate Muslims in the area (International
Crisis Group 2012).
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This interpretation has become the official narrative of the Russian central state as
well10. Aurélie Campana, in her recent analysis of Russia’s official discourse on terrorism
(Campana 2013), has found that the “cultural-religious” context is considered the least
significant of four identified causes for terrorist activity. The essay shows that economic
malaise – mostly due to authorities’ corruption – is presented as the major cause of
resistance and armed opposition. Additionally, Campana notes the attempt of the Russian
government to associate Islamic extremists with organized crime and, thus, present them
as common “bandits”, more interested in robbery that in religion. Indeed, to depict
Islamic extremists as dangerous criminals is a strategy that Moscow had already
employed during the Chechen conflict (Malashenko and Trenin 2004).
The association of separatists with bandits is another way to deprive the conflict
of its religious components and to shift it on the level of criminal behavior. It also carries
the advantage, for Moscow, of classifying counter-terrorism raids as “policing missions”,
which are subject to less regulation than military actions – and can be presented on the
international scene as domestic routine initiatives. However, the evident ambiguity of this
approach has provoked many protests among Russian and foreign observers. The ensuing
need for more sophisticated counter-terrorism doctrine and practices, the already existing
imagery of historical terrorist movements, and Primakov’s definition of extremist Islam
concurred to the elaboration, in Russia, of the concept of “terrorist ideology”. As the next
sections will evidence, the labeling of Islamic terrorism as an ideology has borne farreaching consequences in Russian domestic and foreign policies.
10

Under Putin’s and Medvedev’s presidencies, corruption, and the fight against it, has become a central
theme in government discourse concerning all Russia. It is, therefore, a narrative that associates, rather than
separates, the North Caucasus to the rest of the country, although here it is considered particularly vicious.
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State policies and Islamic terrorism
According to the Russian official view, Muslim terrorists are not terrorists because of
their religious belonging – indeed, they are not even “true” Muslims. Instead, they are
considered exponents of a specific “ideology of terrorism” that may or may not be
accompanied by religious instances. Once detached from traditional religion, extremist
Islam has been heavily charged with issues of security: terrorism, subversion, separatism
and, ultimately, sheer violence.
Gradually, the wider official discourse on Islamic terrorism has conformed to this
posture. The documents of the Institute for Counterterrorism (IC) of the CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States), which was created in 2005 and is now based in
Moscow, consistently refer to an “ideology of terrorism” (Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh
Gosudarstv 2013). The detailed list of counterterrorism measures that should be
implemented on the Russian territory does not contain any open reference to Islam.
Instead, it seems that the IC has been preoccupied with devising a framework broad
enough to accommodate the struggle against any kind of terrorist activity – including that
of right-wing extremist nationalism. In the opening speech at a recent CIS meeting, the
Head of the IC, the Colonel-General of the Police Andreii Novikov (ATTS SNG 2014)
warned against a “broadening of the spectrum of the terrorist threat”. Although he clearly
referred to the ISIS as a newly ensuing “theocratic state”, he qualifies it as “totalitarian”,
and not Islamic, and highlights as a novel, serious security concern the risk that terrorists
may acquire, and use, nuclear and other radioactive materials.
Novikov notes that terrorism is now a “global geopolitical threat”, characterized
by the “involvement of mercenaries in local conflicts”. Confirming Russia’s concerns on
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the consequences of American troops’ departure from Afghanistan, he observes that
nuclear materials may be smuggled through Central Asia to conflict zones, along the
already established routes of drug and narcotics traffic. Novikov’s reference is an
indicator that, in Russian discourse, terrorism is acquiring an overwhelmingly
international character, as will be more extensively discussed in the next chapter.
Analogously, the websites Zhurnalisty i bloggery protiv terrorizma (Journalists
and Bloggers against terrorism) publishes articles, news, analyses, and blog entries that
deal with terrorism in its various manifestations, from Islamic jihadists, to Irish IRA, to
Hamas. A recent article significantly entitled “Terrorism and neo-Fascism” (JBAT 2014)
offers a definition of terrorism as a violent tool of political action. The article
distinguishes between the definitions of terrorism in Russia and in the USA:
In Russian law, terrorism is defined as an ideology of violence and as a
practice of influence on the social consciousness, on the decisionmaking of the organs of state authority, of the organs of local autonomy
or of international organizations, combined with the frightening of the
population and/or with other forms of violent illegal activity.
In the law of the USA [terrorism is defined] as a deliberate, politically
motivated violence, perpetrated against the civilian population or
objects by sub-national groups or by agents acting underground,
usually with the purpose of influencing the sentiment of society. (JBAT
2014)
Four possible purposes of “individual” or “organized” terrorism are then indicated
and briefly described: nationalistic, religious (with examples of intra- and inter-religious
conflicts), ideological, and simply “terror”. Finally, the article makes a veiled reference to
Ukraine, where by popular protest the elected President has been overturned and a new
government has been formed by some members of the Parliament. Russian authorities
consistently denounced the activity of Ukrainian “fascists” in the 2013-2014 so-called
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Maidan revolt and, after that, elsewhere on Ukrainian territory. Hence, Russia categorizes
the fall of former President Yanukovitch’s government as a right-wing-inspired,
undemocratic coup. It also supports Crimea’s secession as the expression of its ethnic
Russian majority’s will to escape persecutions by Ukrainians. This position is in open
contrast with that of European countries and of the U.S., which consider Ukraine’s new
government legitimate, condemn what they define Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and
accuse Russia to covertly send military support to Ukrainians secessionists.
By associating terrorism and neo-Fascism, the article seems to have been
published ad hoc, possibly to support Russia’s official rejection of the accusation of
Western countries that Ukrainian pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region would be
“terrorists”. On the contrary, the article seems to suggest, the real terrorists are the
“fascist” promoters of the Maidan violent revolt, and the illegitimate, non-elected
Ukrainian new government. The interpretation of international terrorism and the
implications that the fight against it entails are key elements of Russian foreign policy
and will be discussed thoroughly in the next chapter of this dissertation. Here, it suffices
to note that, once again, the (geo)political relevance of terrorism, rather than its religious
contents, is highlighted.
The use of mass media to counter terrorist propaganda (or, like in this case, antiRussian propaganda on terrorism) is a strategy that, in Russia, has been both theorized
and implemented with increasing sophistication. The already mentioned 2013 session of
the Presidential Council of Interethnic Relations (President of Russia 2013, see also
Chapter 5 of this dissertation) had affirmed the willingness at the highest (presidential)
level to effectively monitor, steer and, if necessary, censor the activity of mass media in
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Russia. At the very same time, the IV All-Russian Theoretical-Practical Scientific
Conference on the “Role of the media of mass information and Internet in the prevention
of terrorism” was organized.
It is noteworthy that, while the general documents on terrorism do not identify it
solely with Islamic extremism, at the practice level the discourse becomes more targeted.
Sometimes, the two levels are very close and only a fine line separates them. This is
evident in the materials of the Conference. For example, only Islamic extremist
organizations are mentioned in the speech of E. P. Il’in (2013), first vice-director of the
organization of the Russian National Committee for Counter-terrorism. However, very
little is said about Islam as a religion, except that it is a “religion of peace”. On the
contrary, it is explicitly maintained that so-called Islamic extremists have nothing to do
with the true Islam.
As is to be expected, the lines of the discourse get more blurred the closer
observers are to the front line. One such commentator is the Russian blogger with the
nickname “Hard Ingush” (now active under the pseudonym of “Molonlabe”). A selfidentified member of the Russian Special Forces active in North Caucasus, he posts his
popular notes on Russia’s major blog portal, Live Journal, every day except when he is
(allegedly) on a mission. His entries offer first-hand accounts of active engagement on
the ground. There, “terrorists” are always “Muslims”11. Yet, even he acknowledges that,
in North Caucasus, the majority of the population does not have subversive intentions.

11

Generalizations of the enemy into an us-versus-them, simplified categorization are not uncommon in
combat operations. For example, in the account of his experience in the Russian special forces in
Chechnya, the Ukrainian-Siberian writer (who uses Italian as his literary language) Nicolai Lilin explains
that all enemies – independently of their nationality or ethnicity – were called “Arabs” by the Russian
soldiers (Lilin 2010).

170

Further, he reports on his encounters with moderate Muslims, thanks to which, he writes,
he has learned to appreciate Islam as a religion of peace (Molonlabe 2014, 2013).
Interestingly, in his speech at the already mentioned Conference on the role of
mass media, V. A. Fronin, editor-in-chief of Rossiiskaia Gazeta, highly praises Hard
Ingush’s blog but not, as it could be expected, because he offers a fair assessment “on the
territory” of Islam and Muslims. Instead, Fronin sees in the hard-core Russian elite
soldier a winning role model for young Russians, an example of a patriotic public
servant. Fronin even declares “not to care” whether Hard Ingush is a real person or, like
some claim, an invention of the secret service. In Fronin’s view, Hard Ingush’s mission,
to counter the terrorist propaganda of a violent, oppressive Russia, is what counts, and it
is being highly successful (Fronin 2013: 41).
The government’s pressure on the mass media to spread the notion of a united
Russian culture, in which traditional Islam is also a part, shows some results. In
particular, the sensationalist tones about the aggressive character of Islam as a religion
seem to have been dimmed. At the same time, the official approach to terrorism as a
political, social, but not strictly religious phenomenon is being adopted also by the major
media. To speak of an “ideology of terrorism” is no longer a characteristic of government
specialists, and the terminology has entered the major mass media. For example, an
article published by the agency Ria in 2014, in commenting a security issue related to
mufti Tajuddin, applies the “ideology” frame to Islamic terrorism, without feeling the
necessity to explain it to the reader.
However, the popular perception is still often skeptical of Islam and Muslims,
including those communities who have been present in Russia for centuries (Verkhovskii

171

2011, see also Chapters 2-3 of this dissertation). Uncertainties about the “true” nature of
Islam and the “real” purposes of Russia’s Muslims were still widespread in 2012, if a
debate conducted by Maksim Shevchenko (2012) on First Channel, Russia’s
government-controlled public network, focused on these fundamental questions, is any
indication.
Russian visions of political Islam
The ideological character of extremist Islam, in Russia, carries an absolute negative
connotation, is associated with violent political opposition and, as such, is deprived of its
religious content. Yet, Islam as a religion does offer a political view. Most importantly,
such view must not be necessarily antagonist to a non-Muslim, even secular state. Several
examples in history (Piscatori 1986) confirm the possibility of envisioning and
successfully implementing a political regime that is supported by all its religious
constituencies (including Muslims). Conversely, the examples of Islamic theocratic
regimes, both actual (contemporary Iran) and theorized (for example, in the works of
Qutb (Euben 1999)), present an intransigent, autocratic character. In Russia’s history,
opposite phenomena such as jadidism and the Basmachi revolution have proved that
either arrangement is possible.
Today, political Islam constitutes a complex political project that aims to
integrate, modify, or radically change the existing polity and, as such, expresses a
political theory (Euben 1999; see also Tripp 2006). Despite the contradictory and often
controversial nature of ‘such theory , in post-Soviet Russia the clear attribution of
extremist Islam to the realm of terrorism, which is defined as a violent tool for political
action, has opened up a space for discussions on Islam-inspired, non-violent change. The
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notion of political Islam in Russia has developed alongside that of extremist Islam but,
due to the precedents of political involvement by Russian Muslim communities (Crews
2006), it has followed a distinct path.
In Russia, exponents of political Islam have advanced proposals that vary from a
full integration in the existing system, to a full rejection of it. The following section
examines two of the most authoritative voices on this matter. Their views are at the
opposite extremes of the integration-revolution spectrum. By the mid-2010s, it seems that
the most radical projects have gained in visibility and popularity. This is not by chance,
as will be discussed in the second half of the chapter.
Islamic doctrine as guarantor of security: a normative proposal
Taking advantage of the relative freedom accorded to official Islam, some Russian
Muslim leaders offer sophisticated arguments to demonstrate the positive role that Islam
can have for Russia. In particular, the introduction, in Russian legislation and policies, of
selected Islamic principles would contribute to the strengthening of social cohesiveness,
thus reducing social friction, especially between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ultimately,
it would improve the general security situation.
The novel element in such conceptualizations is the claim that a similar strategy
would be beneficial to Russian society as a whole. It differentiates itself from flexibility
measures already implemented at the local level, where authorities often accept or
tolerate Islamic-specific behaviors or practices (Silant’ev 2008). Based on the extensive
examination of Islamic legal principles and sophisticated argumentative structures, these
proposals have a strong theoretical component. They mostly circulate among the Muslim
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elites (especially in Tatarstan, where the jadidist tradition is still very strong) and in the
academic world.
Some of the most respected and articulated thinkers, though, have the power to
reach the mainstream media. One of them is Leonid Siukiianen. Professor of Islamic law
at the prestigious Moscow High Institute of Economics, he has repeatedly (2010, 2008,
and 2006) explained that Islam is not just a religion, but also the carrier of a sociopolitical model. An expert on Shari’a, Siiukiianen, while agreeing that the secular state
should remain “neutral” in terms of theological precepts, explicitly encourages the
Russian government to take active note of Islamic conceptualizations of politics. In fact,
Siukiianen argues, Islam’s fundamental approach to the state is of cooperation and
support, and not of opposition. In his view, it is therefore possible, and even desirable, to
introduce some fundamental principles of Islam into a democratic system.
The core of Siukiianen’s argument lies in the Shari’a “crucial” concept of
“moderateness” (umerennost’). In his words, it must be understood as “prudence,
temperance, equidistance” and, as such, it expresses Islam’s true vision of politics
(Siukiianen 2006). Indeed, Siukiianen notes, umerennost’ is already embedded in
Tatarstan’s jadidism and Northern Caucasus’s tariqat system. The immediate
consequence of umerennost’, he claims, is to render Islam perfectly compatible with
democracy, which is not an enemy of Muslims but, in fact, a desirable regime in the
contemporary world. Here, Siukiianen follows the classical modernist discourse on Islam
and, in particular Russian jadidism.
Siukiianen reminds his audience that Islam is inextricably bound to Russian
history and culture. A correct comprehension of Islamic fundamental political precepts is,
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for him, necessary for the prosperity of Russia. Moreover, he adds, the concept of
umerennost’ is being progressively adopted by the Islamic world in general and, in
particular, in Kuwait. As these examples show, Siukiianen explains, a series of benefits
would come from the adoption of umerennost’ by both Russia’s Muslims and the Russian
state.
The immediate effect would be the enhancement of security, which would benefit
from the general inclination to moderation and the subsequent rejection of any form of
extremism. The second advantage would be the enrichment of Russia’s internal
civilizational dialogue and civic coexistence. Finally, the empathy with the Islamic
doctrine would upgrade the nature of Russia’s relations with the Muslim world outside of
its territory (including Muslim states). Such relations would improve from the current
level of “dialogue” to that of full “understanding” – a much more promising scenario.
Siukiianen’s argument is very dense, often legally very specific, and its detailed
analysis exceeds the scope of this work. For the purposes of my discussion, two elements
are particularly noteworthy. The first, and most provocative, one is the claim that an
Islamic fundamental legal concept may be equally important for the legislation of a
secular state. Additionally, the acceptance of Islamic principles is supposed to benefit
significantly the whole population, not only its Muslim component. This argument not
only supports the multi-confessional character of the Russian state, which is advanced by
state and Muslim authorities as well, but it also seems to support the idea of a unique
Russian civilization. According to this view, Russia’s identity is the result of many,
heterogeneous cultural, ethnic, and religious components that in the course of the
centuries have given their original contribution to create a common Russian civilization.

175

As extensively discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, this interpretation of the
“Russian idea” is shared by many Muslims and non-Muslims, even in the state
leadership.
The second element to be highlighted in Siukiianen’s proposal is the connection
that he makes between conceptualizations of political Islam in Russia and in the rest of
the Islamic world. In particular, Kuwait is identified as a successful model, and, as such,
it frequently appears in similar comparisons with the Russian system. These arguments
show that Russia’s Muslims have restored their historical relations of exchange with the
international ummah. In their renewed position, they do not limit themselves to doctrinal
confrontations on the legitimacy of their traditional practices. They show interest in “best
practices” of governance and are willing to offer their original solutions (RMC 2006).
With his scholarly accurate and legally grounded argument, Siukiianen makes a
strong pledge for Islam’s positive contribution to Russian polity. His explanation of the
concept of umerennost’ represents an authoritative, and appropriate, counter-argument to
the alleged theological stances of Islamic extremists. As such, it offers a strong doctrinal
basis to counter-terrorism and security policies. Yet, the deprivation, by the official
doctrine of the religious character of extremist Islam may have weakened Siukiianen’s
doctrine-based contribution. Further, his proposal may have been too complex to be
immediately translated into an effective legislative or practical measure. As a result, his
influence seems to have faded. Instead, at the turn of the 2010s another interpretation of
political Islam is receiving growing attention on the Russian scene — one that is far
more belligerent.
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Political Islam, Revolution, and the Geopolitical Order
Since the shock of the Soviet demise in 1991, contemporary Russia has intensively
elaborated on its own past. The idea that today Russia could, or should, embody a new
version of the Empire has soon spread among certain social and political circles – and has
generated a series of anti-imperialistic reactions. This it is not the place for a discussion
of these tendencies, to which an extensive literature has been dedicated12. Here, it is
important to note that, for both supporters and opponents of historical nostalgia, the turn
of the nineteenth into the twentieth century constitutes a crucial period. Those were the
times when some timid attempts to create a liberal regime within the tsarist empire were
made and then crushed, and when popular dissatisfaction reached its peak. They were
also times of uncertainties and diffused violence, which only soared with the outburst, in
sequence, of World War I, the October Revolution, and finally the Civil War. Many
Russians still look at that period with unease, to say the least, and would never wish it to
repeat itself. Some, however, notice fundamental resemblances with the situation in the
country one century later. They see in potential similar unrests, including revolution, an
opportunity for the new Russia. Geidar Dzhemal’ is one of them.
The founder and president of the Islamic Committee of Russia, in his early
political career Dzhemal’ had joined the extreme right circles and was close to Aleksandr
Dugin and the Eurasianist movement13. In particular, he seemed to share Dugin’s
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A good place to start for a review of the arguments in favor and against the idea of a post-Soviet Russian
Empire is Trenin 2001.

13

Dugin is an influential philosopher and thinker – in his own words, “the discoverer of Geopolitics [as a
doctrine] under Soviet Communist Russia” (Dugin 2013). Starting from the study of Mackinder’s theory of
heartland, Dugin, by his own admission, elaborated its implications for the Soviet Union, and later for
Russia. According to this theory, by its nature Russia was the “pivot” of the world order (Dugin 2013;

177

attention to geopolitics. Even if he distanced himself from the Eurasianist movement in
the late 1990s, Dzhemal’ continued to further elaborate his own position on Russia’s
geopolitical status in the Middle East and in the Islamic world.
Far from being penalized for leaving Dugin’s patronage, Dzhemal’ has been able
to create a space for himself in Russia’s intellectual scene. His visibility to the great
public has been particularly enhanced by his closeness to the popular journalist Maksim
Shevchenko. Today, Dzhemal’ regularly appears on the most important Russian mass
media, television or radio programs, often in polemical opposition with other prominent
political actors or commentators. His arguments have a deep, if eclectic, theoretical
foundation, and focus on the interconnection of (Islamic) religious and political factors.
Dzhemal’’s intellectual framework
Dzhemal’’s theoretical structure reveals a variety of intellectual influences. Accordingly,
his network of connections spans across the intellectual and political scene, both public
and underground, in Russia and abroad (especially in Iran14). After leaving the
Eurasianist circle, with which he had formed the Islamic Party “Resurgence”
(Vozhrozhdenie), Dzhemal’ has elaborated an even more articulated doctrine of
politically engaged Islam. With the extreme right nationalism, among other elements, he
shares the highly evocative language. His constant use of ambiguous, often obscure terms
like “spirit”, “meaning”, “God-man connection”, and the like, strongly reminds of the
2007; 1996). As a result, Dugin conceptualized the neo-Eurasianist intellectual and political movement,
especially active on the Russian scene of the 1990s (see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation and related
bibliography). Later, Dugin became an unofficial advisor to Vladimir Putin, and now he is a popular
professor of geopolitics at Moscow State University.
14

Dzhemal’ (whose father is Azeri), by his own admission, visits Iran regularly and is familiar with the
political situation there, and so his loyalty to Russia is denounced as at least ambiguous by his political
opponents (NTV 2013; Solov’ev 2011).
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analogously “mystic” language of neo-Eurasianist leaders, like Dugin and Alexander
(Aleksander) Prokhanov. It also clearly resembles the imagery of the Russian terrorist
movements of the nineteenth century examined earlier in this chapter.
Like many other public commentators in Russia, Dzhemal’ divides his work into
two fields. On one side, there is an accessible, mostly geopolitically-oriented analysis of
Russia’s place in the international scene, which he exposes on popular media outlets. On
the other side, his work is made of heavily theoretical, complex discussions about Islamic
ideology, civilizational interactions, and international political dynamics. These
discussions are less immediately visible to the general audience, but for those interested,
they are widely available on the World Wide Web. In particular, Dzhemal’ directly
manages several websites, especially Poistine (In truth – www.poistine.com15) and his
most recent portal, Kontrudar (Counterstrike – www.kontrudar.com). On these sites,
Dzhemal’ publishes his theoretical and geopolitical articles as well as texts by other
commentators (usually, on geopolitical issues), and videos available on YouTube.
Through the analysis of such materials, it is possible to follow the evolution of
Dzhemal’’s theoretical construct. Initially, the core of Dzhemal’’s arguments was a
central interest in Russia’s geopolitical condition, which made his positions close to
Dugin’s and neo-Eurasianism. Increasingly, though, in a series of articles, speeches, and
videos, he appears to have progressively sharpened his original philosophical thought, or
at least his exposition of it. These had probably always been the theoretical premises of
his analysis, which he now constructs in what may be defined an ontology of Russian
15

In the course of 2014, the availability of Poistine.ru has changed from time to time. At the time of last
check, on November 25, the website had been shut. Most probably, it is due to the opening of the new
website, Kontrudar, although the reasons for the move of location are not known to me.
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political Islam. His position combines Islamic, revolutionary, and Soviet communist
elements in a conceptually original, and rhetorically suggestive, way.
Like Siukiianen, Dzhemal’ too identifies a concept in Islamic doctrine that holds a
universal meaning, the application of which would solve the tensions of contemporary
societies. For Siukiianen, this concept was umerennost’ – “moderateness”. For Dzhemal’,
it is spravledivo – “justice” (Dzhemal’ 2013). To reveal the function of spravledivo,
Dzhemal’ leads his interlocutors through a complex theological-philosophical discussion,
the details of which go beyond the scope of this work. However, it is important to
identify and retrieve its main tenets, as they form the bases of Dzhemal’’s entire
conceptual construct, including his political project.
According to Dzhemal’, after the collapse of the Soviet Communist ideal, world
societies share a condition of “enslavement” to economic forces. “Those who
understand” how the new financial and economic mechanisms of “exploitation” work at
global level, sit at the apex of an international socioeconomic “pyramid”. They sustain
the perception that in the liberal system, as has been “proclaimed by Fukuyama” and
others, conflicts are over. In fact, Dzhemal’ notes, 90% of humanity is “mere
biomaterial” - a condition, he adds, quantitatively and qualitatively worse than at the time
of the Soviet Union.
Today, Marxism is no longer adequate to play the same role as it did a century
ago; it “does not constitute a tool for protest” Dzhemal’ claims (2014: 6:29), because the
issues it deals with (class relations and economy) are not the crucial ones – today, “the
most essential protest is the protest about the religious [po religiozami]” (Dzhemal’ 2014:
7:47). For Dzhemal’, civil movements that criticize capitalism and liberalism are not
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adequate either: They merely pursue a “better life”, intended as better economic
standards of living (Dzheaml’ 2014: 10:04).
Equally unfit to counter the dominance of the mainstream are the other religions
“of the Book” (Judaism and Christianity). Drawing from Islamic doctrine, Dzhemal’
argues that Christianity and Judaism modify the message of God through their
interpretation. By precluding humanity a direct knowledge of the Divine, they have
actively aimed at preserving the “pyramidal” structure that has been imposed on world
society since the times of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, they still work to preserve the
“pyramid”, or “matrix”, in place (Dzhemal’ 2014, 2013).
Islam’s fundamental characteristic, instead, according to Dzhemal’ is to “open a
break” into the “mainstream” conceptualization of social structure. Dzhemal’ juxtaposes
the systemic “matrix” (which regulates social coexistence through a strong normative
system) to a “spirit” (dukh) that is free from the matrix – and always against it. The spirit
represents the essence of religion, it “belongs to God” (2014: 27:00) and, as such, is
“meaning” (smisl’, 34:35): Islam provides the channel through which human beings can
connect to God, and therefore discover the meaning of their own existence.
Dzhemal’ denies that the golden age of Islam had been the Middle Ages, or the
Caliphate. The cultural and economic flourishing of those centuries, in fact, were only
intended to benefit a “secular Caliphate”. For him “Islam is not about the good life, it is
about simplicity” (2014). To achieve the purpose of Islam, that is, the revelation of the
connection between the spirit and human existence, a complex “matrix” is not necessary.
Dzhemal’ notes how the Shari’a is enough to regulate the relations among people.
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Subsequently, he juxtaposes community (which abides by the Shari’a) to society (which,
instead, constitutes the “matrix”).
Because Islam preserves today the same characteristics of its origins, when
Muhammad and his companions were alive and “fought against Byzantium and Iran”
(Dzhemal’ 2014: 37-38), it is the only force that can free humankind from its new form
of enslavement.
The meaning is the basis of justice. This is the core message of the
Revelation of the prophets. They speak of this. And this is the
fundamental significance of political Islam. (Dzhemal’ 2013)
Most importantly, Islam is a revolutionary force:
[i]n these conditions of widening [social] gap, the struggle between the
top and the bottom trespasses the borders of class (as Marx intended it)
– the class struggle for the redistribution of the means of production of
a society – and moves to the level of an eschatological struggle, where
the flag of the oppressed can only be the solidarity in the name of a
sacral and metaphysical understanding of justice. But justice lies only
in Islam. (Dzhemal’ 2013)
In Dzhemal’’s analysis, every religious protest is about the formation and nature
of the system – not about external formalities such as obtaining legal permission to
interrupt daily activities to pray five times a day. In truth, Dzhemal’ explains, “the whole
European history” until Marx has been the history of a “religious struggle” against the
matrix. Even the initial concerns of Marx were in an “undisclosed, implicit” way
religious in nature (Dzhemal’ 2014: 24:00). Only later did he turn to economic matters.
This, in Dzhemal’’s view, is the reason why politicians avoid defining protests
“religious”, and label them “extremism, terrorism”: they fear the formidably subversive
nature of the protest. Dzhemal’ openly rejects the official security position, which
deprives Islamic terrorism of its religious character. Instead, Dzhemal’ insists on the deep
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Islamic nature of the upcoming revolution – although his vision of political Islam is much
more comprehensive than the crude jihadism of al-Qaeda.
Dzhemal’ (2014) claims that, like in the early twentieth century, one hundred
years later the situation in Russia is both universal and unique. He notes that, at the end
of the nineteenth century, Russian theorists moved away from Social Revolutionary and
populist movements to embrace Marxism, because the latter “gave access to a much
larger reservoir of revolutionary ideas”. The international Marxist movement, especially
as it was spreading in Europe, allowed Russian revolutionaries to share a common
intellectual ground with their Western counterparts. Yet, in the end, the situation of
Russia was too specific to allow real cooperation, he observes.
Today, Dzhemal’ announces, through Islam Russia can — again — be connected
to the global forces that stir the “mainstream”. Indeed, he claims, independently from the
level of self-awareness, every individual who is somehow “against the matrix” has “his or
her heart beating with a religious beat”. More importantly, this individual “sooner or later
takes to revolutionary struggle” (Dzhemal’ 2014: 1:00). Islam, Dzhemal’ concludes, will
rule the political process that, he notes, sooner or later will unfold in London, Paris, and
all over Europe “the same way it did in the former Yugoslavia. […] Tomorrow, Muslims
will be the organizers of the political process. The Westerners will be fined for their
hindering of the truth” (Dzhemal’ 2014: 1:10).
Intellectual roots of Dzhemal’’s thought
Dzhemal’’s praise of the “true” Islam of Muhammad’s times, and the condemnation of
the “corrupted” Islam of the legal tradition, is the same of Islamic fundamentalists
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(Salafis) and of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda or, in Southern Russia, Imarat Kavkaz16.
The simultaneous presence of political-economic requests and of a religious-based
ontology is another trait common to most Islamic “fundamentalist” and “extremist”
movements. Yet, it would be too simplistic to dismiss Dzhemal’’s conceptualization of
political Islam as yet another version of international jihadism, like the U.S. political
analyst Gordon Hahn is inclined to do (NTV 2013).
In fact, Dzhemal’’s conceptualization of political Islam reveals a composite,
sophisticated intellectual background. The definition of Islam as the instrument both to
reveal the existence of the divine and to enable the connection of humankind with God,
and thus to justify political action has been, in the twentieth century, exhaustively
expounded by the influential Egyptian jihadist and activist Qutb. As Euben (1999)
argues, Qutb’s Mileposts, in which he claims to hear God speak to him, is in fact the
frame of a complete political theory, constructed on different foundations than Western
ones. Similarly, Dzhemal’ identifies in Islam’s doctrinal, religious nature the source of its
political strength.
Another core element of Dzhemal’’s concept, the “matrix” or “pyramid”, as the
expression of the connivance of sacerdotal and political great powers had been indicated
– and condemned – by the Iranian Islamic intellectual Ali Shar’iati, prior to the Iranian
revolution (Shar’iati 1981: 15 and following). Similarly to Shar’iati, Dzhemal’ associates
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Islamic “fundamentalists”, or Salafis, like jihadists, advocate the application of Qur’anic and early Hadith
precepts as they were followed by Islamic early communities, when Mohammed was still alive. One of the
biggest difference between fundamentalist and jihadists is that the former do not necessarily call for an
armed struggle. Also because of this important difference, Evgenii Primakov invited to distinguish between
fundamentalist and extremist Islam.

184

the critique of the Bible with constant references to Western philosophy, starting from the
ancient Greeks.
However, the truly interesting characteristic in Dzhemal’’s position is the explicit,
direct connection to Russia’s past and present. The association of Marxism and Islam had
already been made, again, by Ali Shar’iati, among others. However, Shar’iati was
discussing Marxism in its intellectual formulation, rather than in its empirical
implementation. Dzhemal’, instead, specifically refers to the Soviet regime – even when
it does not mention it. In his analysis, although no longer adequate, Soviet Communism
has been a positive element for Russia. For him, like for many others, the Soviet regime
has had the great merit to affirm Russia’s value on the international scene.
By praising the Bolshevik and Social Revolutionary movements, Dzhemal’
suggests that he adheres to a tradition of political opposition, of subversive methods of
“resistance” - ultimately, to classic Russian terrorism. As noted, his mystic, often
obscure, and evocative language simultaneously reminds one of religious thinkers, of
nineteenth-century terrorists, and of certain Russian extreme right, for example the neoEurasianists Prokhanov and Dugin. The intellectual bedrock of Dzhemal’’s thought is the
conceptualization of a strong, unique, Russia, destined to play a pivotal role in world
history. To have such mission acknowledged and to provide a theoretical-philosophical
basis for its implementation seems to be Dzhemal’’s purpose.
The “patriotic” emphasis on Russia’s geopolitical prominence also constitutes a
practical – if not always ideological – platform on which Dzhemal’ builds his alliances:
When specifically asked why, in the early years of his political activity (around 1997), he
had joined Aleksandr Dugin and others in the Pamiat’ extreme-right nationalist
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movement, Dzhemal’ replies that he “saw the possibility of a political union” with “true
patriots”. Even if, by his own admission, some people in Pamiat’ were “excessive” and
“on the far right”, Dzhemal’ observes that “they were all true patriots” (Shevchenko
2012b: 23:46).
The resonance of Dzhemal’’s ideas in the public sphere
The polyhedric character of Dzhemal’’s activity as public commentator and engaged
philosopher, combined with the intellectual qualities of his works, allow him to address
different audiences with equally strong impact (both in positive and negative terms). In
general, his calm posture, his intellectual skills, and his vast knowledge – united to a
sharp mind – render him an appealing, seemingly non-threatening figure, and a welcome
guest in television and radio programs. An American journalist so commented on his
meeting with Dzhemal’:
Interviewing Geidar Dzhemal [sic] is no easy task – enjoyable, yes, but
not easy. He is a national treasury of knowledge and information and
produces names, dates and figures faster than Google. His knowledge
of history seems almost boundless and beyond the capabilities of a
single Dictaphone battery supply. (Bridge, without date)
The French scholar Marlène Laruelle had already defined him “one of the most original
post-Soviet Russian Islamic thinkers” (Laruelle 2008:146).
The openness of Dzhemal’ in exposing his vision about Russia and the role of
political Islam, together with his numerous, increasingly visible, public appearances have
made him object of criticism and of skepticism about his real allegiance. In particular, a
television program on the NTV network, which suggested that Dzhemal’ supports
Chechen separatism (NTV 2013), has provoked the reaction of Dzhemal’ and,
interestingly, of Maksim Shevchenko. In one video, Shevchenko (2013) feels it necessary
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to reassure his audience about Dzhemal’’s patriotism. The latter’s statements, in which he
allegedly supported Islamic fighters in Chechnya, had, in fact, generated an outrage in
public opinion. His personal contacts with many Muslim leaders in the North Caucasus
and beyond were seen as a proof of his secret subversive plans. Shevchenko, instead,
claims that in 1990s many Russians, now eminent political analysts and politicians, had
contacts with separatists everywhere. Additionally, he assures about Dzhemal’’s antiliberal, anti-American, and pro-Russia position – for him, and increasingly for many
Russians, is a sure sign of patriotism.
The fear of any revolution
How powerfully Dzhemal’’s evocation of revolution resonates in Russia’s collective
sentiment was evident in the debate between Geidar Dzhemal’ and Gennadii
Zhirinovskii17. The debate was moderated by popular TV host Vladimir Solov’ev in his
successful program Poedinok (“Duel”) (Solov’ev 2011)18. Guests of the program were
not only the two “duelists”, but also a series of experts on Islam and the Middle East,
who commented on the topic at hand – the Arab Spring and its possible effects in Russia.
Dzhemal’ starts by claiming, “the Arab revolutions are bad for the regimes, but
are good for the people [narod]”, including the Russian one. In Dzhemal’’s opinion,
“Russia in the last decades has been cut off from international politics” and the Islamic
revolution would allow it to reconnect with the rest of the world, in particular with
Europe and, of course, the Middle East. By this reference, it appears evident how, already
17

Zhirinovskii, a very famous politician, former member of the Soviet Communist Party, is now President
of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and speaker of the Duma.
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A Jew from an intellectual family, Vladimir Solov’ev is an equally popular, strong public figure. He
authoritatively moderates several programs on major TV channels, in which he tackles the most pressing
domestic and foreign issues.
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in 2011, Dzhemal’ considers Islam the successor of Bolshevik-Marxism. His struggle
with his terminology, although signaling a yet incomplete elaboration, fully reveals his
intention to espouse Islamic thought and Russian tradition: when asked by Solov’ev to
clarify what is the “meaning” of life that should be unveiled by an Islamic revolution, he
replies: “it’s Islamic Marxism under the name of jihad” (Solov’ev 2011: 16:25)19.
Dzhemal’’s admission to jihad, albeit in a qualified form, puts him on the edge of
political Islam and on the border with extremism. What Dzhemal’ proposes is no longer a
cooperative intellectual stance, similar to Siukiianen’s position, but an openly subversive
idea. However, he distances himself from jihadist movements like al-Qaeda by refraining
from harsh tones against Russian non-Muslims. Instead, he uses a persuasive argument
that, in his intention, should enlighten people about their existential condition and make
them aware that Islam is their best option. It is this mixture of disruptive scenarios
(revolution) and compassionate tones that characterizes Dzhemal’’s discourse, especially
on public media. It allows the unrolling of an articulate dialogue with his counterparts
and enables Dzhemal’’s most radical arguments to enter mainstream discourse.
On his part Zhirinovskii, a renowned populist with a powerful rhetoric that
effectively appeals to the masses, also interprets public sentiment toward revolution. He
takes on his opponent’s reference to Russia to evoke a disastrous scenario:
We [Russians] know what a revolution is, we know how it ended up.
We do not need another one!” (Solov’ev 2011: 5:22, italics mine)
Later in the debate, after a lengthy discussion about the “Islamic factor” in
Russia’s geopolitical position, Zhirinovskii repeats the official – and by now established
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It is noteworthy that one of the fundamental accusations against Ali Shar’iati was to be a “Marxist”.
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– distinction between foreign and domestic Islam. He notes that to be against the spread
of revolution does not mean to be against Islam tout court. Yet, he adds, we must pay
attention to the fact that “in the twenty-first century” revolutions are conducted under the
Islamic flag.
Zhirinovskii’s argument seems to strike a chord in Russian public opinion, whose
concern is immediately summarized by the program host, Solov’ev: “How to forget the
whole of the 1990s?” (when the conflict in the North Caucasus caused several terrorist
attacks and dominated public concern). Dzhemal’ attempts to dispel fears of chaos by
assuring that a proper Islamic regime will not allow “bandits” to act violently “under the
green flag”. Pressed by the Solov’ev, he also denies that the main Chechen separatist
leaders, including Shamil Basaev, were “actual Muslims”. Instead, he claims, they were
“Soviet kids”, ignorant of Islam and driven by secular, ethnic-based motives. Finally, in
surprising contradiction with one of the most characterizing claims of Islamic extremists,
he declares that suicide terrorists are not true Muslims. Rather, he affirms, they are being
“maneuvered” by not better identified “anti-Islamic forces”.
Noteworthy, in Dzhemal’’s comments, is his dismissal of Chechen separatists as
either “bandits” or “false” Muslims. There are clear doctrinal and theoretical
justifications for these assessments; however, they also reflect the government’s official
position. As I will discuss later in this chapter, this affinity may not be casual and is one
of the reasons why Dzhemal’, despite his incendiary scenarios, continues to be a public
figure, not only tolerated but an integral part of Russian politically engaged intellectual
scene.
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Counterterrorism, Fascism, and (Soviet) Communism
In the 2011 debate with Dzhemal’, Zhirinovskii’s words remain unspecific; they are
meant to be evocative and not analytical. His argument becomes more precise, although
paradoxically more ambiguous, a few years later, when he advance his proposal to end
the “plague” of terrorism. In 2013, new suicide attacks have revamped the preoccupations
for what has become, again, a major security threat. Zhirinovskii takes the occasion of
another Poedinok debate, still hosted by Vladimir Solov’ev (2013), to advocate the
introduction of a “limited citizenship” for the inhabitants of North Caucasus. According
to his proposal, every North Caucasian would have to demonstrate his or her nonadherence to any terrorist ideology, in particular Islamic extremism. Additionally, the
families of extremists will be held responsible for their actions. Zhirinovskii cites Israel
as the model for his vision.
The reaction of his opposing “duelist”, Maksim Shevchenko, is equally radical. A
member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation and of the Presidential Council
on the Relations among Nationalities, Shevchenko ever more often appears to share, and
support, the “patriotic” vision consistently outlined by Putin. This commonality of
intention, together with Shevchenko’s own popularity, is probably the reason why he
enjoys relative freedom of speech on Russian media, including the governmentcontrolled main television outlets, despite his critics accuse him of being a
“fundamentalist”, an anti-liberal, and an “enemy” of Israel (he acknowledges both the last
two definitions).
In the debate with Zhirinovskii, Shevchenko labels his opponent’s proposal as
“fascist” and compares its treatment of Muslims to Nazi Germany’s approach to Jews. He
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also moves the critique away from Islam, which Zhirinovskii had associated with
terrorism. Shevchenko notes that, in fact, the same factors that in North Caucasus foster
Islamic fundamentalism – especially corruption – at the same time generate other forms
of extremism (fascism) in other parts of the country “and in Western Europe”. As it
appears clear, also in this regards Shevchenko shares the government’s interpretation:
Extremist Islam is the local version of a social, political, and economic protest.
Zhirinovskii’s proposal is harshly criticized also by the political analyst Leonid
Polianov, present as commentator, who reminds how it closely resembles “Soviet terror”.
A few minutes earlier Zhirinovskii had just associated today’s Islamic extremists to
Russian political terrorists in history: “they have killed tsars, ministers, and all [...].
Today, they are Muslims”. His ambiguous references to Soviet practices may indicate
that, also for him, today’s terrorism has deep roots into Russian history, and that the
measures to counter it may equally be found in the past.
Interestingly, Zhirinovskii seems to find the support of the audience at home
(viewers can vote for either duelist) and of some commentators in the theater, including a
young member of the Duma. Although controversial, Zhirinovskii’s evocation of Soviet
times proves to be, more than twenty years later, a powerful tactic. Former General
Anatoly Kulikov, formerly active in North Caucasus and an expert of terrorism, is asked
by Solov’ev to comment the whole debate. The General criticizes both duelists, but then
proposes what he defines a “third way”, which, in truth, corresponds to Zhirinovskii’s
proposition: to restore the Soviet system of managing the demographic distribution of the
country.
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The materials examined above confirm the close, if not always evident, relation
that, in Russia’s popular perception, the fundamental security threat of Islamic extremism
has with the broader, historically loaded concepts of terrorism and revolution. They show
that, for example, the Arab Spring, in the immediate popular sentiment, may not identify
fully with an Islamic threat. Nor does it associate only to the possible loss of territorial
integrity, as much as this concerns many. Rather, it is the fear of general instability, of
diffused violence, and of the uncertainty (despite Dzhemal’’s claims) of its outcome that
dominate popular perception.
“All good patriots”: elective affinities of ultra-nationalist and Islamic groups
Despite its sophisticated theoretical construction, Dzhemal’’s argument undoubtedly
presents an aggressive character. Nevertheless, Dzhemal’ is not only allowed to speak in
public (with a few, isolated exceptions), but in the last few years he has gained in
visibility and popularity. In a state like Russia, where central control over public
communication is very strong, it may appear surprising that a potentially subversive
figure enjoys virtual freedom of speech. Paradoxically, the explanation may be that
Dzhemal’, with all his revolutionary élan, in fact operates with the central authority, and
not against it.
Since his first presidency, but especially in recent years, Vladimir Putin has been
working hard to codify his idea of post-Soviet Russian identity into a “patriotic ideology”
that comprises the preservation of the Russian multi-ethnic, multi-religious civilization,
the international acknowledgment of its pivotal role, and the preservation (possibly, the
restoration to Soviet borders) of its territorial integrity (PCIR 2014). Dugin and Dzhemal’
have even admitted having attempted to save the Soviet Union “as an idea”. With this
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statement, they show to agree with Putin when he talks about the Soviet Union in
nostalgic terms, recalling the “great power status” that it enjoyed, and which he belies is
the rightful embodiment of Russia’s historical role (President of Russia 2014; PCIR
2014).
Whereas Putin has been already attributed a tendency to impose his own vision of
history (Lipman 2014), since his third mandate he seems to have both sharpened his
conceptual framework and accelerated its implementation (President of Russia 2014;
PCIR 2014, 2013; see also Chapter 5 of this dissertation). A general diffusion of Putin’s
ideas, in different form, for different audiences can only play in his hand.
It is true that Dzhemal’ does not represent Russia’s Muslim mainstream – the
official Islamic organizations advocate this role for themselves. Instead, he shares with
Russia’s mainstream a strong patriotic stance. In the already mentioned interview to
Maksim Shevchenko (Shevchenko 2012b), Dzhemal’ explains to have worked politically
with the nationalists because they were patriots like himself. Dzhemal’’s patriotism,
though, is not simply the support of present-day Russian state. Like that of many ultranationalists, it looks back into history and evokes an image that is half worshiped, for the
power that Russia and the Soviet Union could project, and half feared, for the numerous
dark sides of both regimes – from authoritarianism to secret police. Dzhemal’ is well
aware of this. He also knows that he must clarify his position for the larger public. Thus,
he reveals that the Islamic party Vozrozhdenie, which he co-founded in the 1990s, was a
“party to keep the Union”, at what point an astonished Shevchenko asks “the Soviet
Union?”, “Yes”, replies Dzhemal’, who immediately specifies, “not its political form – its
territory!” (Shevchenko 2012b : 24:07).
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By mentioning the territorial integrity of Russia, Dzhemal’ knows to be striking a
sensitive chord. Concerns for Russia’s borders are widespread among the Russian
population. The already mentioned NTV’s program “Who wants to divide Russia?” (NTV
2013), through a series of interviews to public figures, listed all Russian territories that, in
popular view, may be at risk of detachment: North Caucasus, Karelia, East Siberia, the
Arctic, and Tatarstan. It does not matter that most of these fear are rather unlikely to
come true. Many Russians still struggle to accept the present territorial downsize from the
Soviet Union borders. Indeed, according to Western and Russian commentators (Kanet
and Piet 2014; Trenin 2011), territorial disaggregation is the main preoccupation of the
Russian government too.
Significantly, like Dzhemal’ other public figures enjoy high visibility, despite
current (or past) controversial positions, thanks to their casual or purposeful alignment
with state patriotism. The journalist Maksim Shevchenko is one of them20.
As member of the Duma and of the Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations,
Shevchenko now supports the government’s initiative to strengthen patriotism and social
cohesiveness through the mass media (President of Russia 2013). He also intervened in
support of Dzhemal’ to confirm his patriotism. Indeed, Shevchenko and Dzhemal’ share
many intellectual affinities. Dzhemal’ started his political activity in the company of
Dugin. Today, Shevchenko is a member of the neo-Eurasianist and nationalist Izborskii
Klub, led by Aleksander Prokhanov. According to Andreas Umland, the Izborskii Klub
20

Maksim Shevchenko was one of the first commentators to focus, in the 1990s, his public activity on
Islam, on both domestic and foreign issues. He was the founder of the religion section of the Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, in the late 1990s, thus spreading the public debate on the place of religion in Russia. He was often
contested as a supporter of Palestinians against Israel, and allegedly close to Islamic extremist groups.
Later, he expanded his analytical perspective to geopolitical questions, in particular on Russia’s relations
with the West and, from 2013, on the Ukraine-Crimean issue (part of his family is originally from Ukraine)
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presents several extreme nationalist traits. Additionally, both Dzhemal’ and Shevchenko
belong to another intellectual club, the “Florian Geyer”, that Umland decisively
denounces as a barely disguised neo-fascist intellectual group (Umland 2013)21.
Not only formal affiliations, but also content references reveal the affinity
between Dzhemal’’s political Islam and Russian nationalists. Thus, Dzhemal’ in one of
his essays (Islamnews 2014) quotes (positively) the famous nationalist, former right-wing
activist Eduard Limonov, who had founded the National Bolshevik Party, now illegal but
still existing22. He had also had close relations with Dugin23. Here, it seems to be a
common idea of equality and justice that unites Dzhemal’ and Limonov. Most important,
though, is the fact that Dzhemal’ quotes Limonov as an authoritative intellectual, without
any additional, qualifying comment.
Naturally, Dzhemal’’s arguments also resonate among Muslims. Particularly
interesting is that his view of Islam as a vehicle to successfully project Russia into the
world recalls the comments made by Vadim Sidorov (Kharun ar-Rusi). Sidorov is the
21

In 2013, Umland was not sure about the state of activity of the Florian Geyer. In the summer of 2014, its
website was active and new videos of Dzhemal’’s lectures under the organization’s flag were uploaded. In
November 2014, the website homepage announced its closure due to unpaid hosting rights to the internet
provider. This may reveal a substantial lack of support for the club, as well as a decision by its members to
(temporarily?) abandon it.
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Dzhemal’ article contested the affirmation of Valerii Zor’kin, Head of the Russian Constitutional Court,
who had praised the practice of slavery as having been beneficial for Russia’s development in history
(Zor’kin 2014). In particular, it would have provided security to the imperial subjects (including the
slaves). Dzhemal’ (Islamnews 2014) quotes a “booklet” by Limonov in which he describes the miserable
conditions of aluminum workers in the “oligarch-capitalist epoch”.
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Today, Eduard Limonov is still a public figure, although his direct ascendance is on a very small
audience. Nevertheless, throughout his life and political path, he has come into contact with much of the
ultra-nationalist guard – with mutual influence and, at times, contrasts. His biography by Eduard Carrère
(2012), although not always reliable on single events, provides a good introduction to the Russian
nationalist scene, and shows the network of relations among many of its exponents, from Dugin, to
Dzhemal’, to Prokhanov, to the writer and journalist (also for Anna Politkovskaya’s Novaya Gazeta)
journalist Zakhar Prilepin. Prilepin is a member of Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party and an admirer of
Prokhanov as a writer. He has published a collection of essays by various Russian intellectuals, including
Prokhanov, about their idea of Russian “nation” (Prilepin 2009).
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leader of the Russkie Musul’mane organization, whose members are ethnic Russians
converted to Islam. As noted in Chapter 3, Sidorov, also a former ultra-nationalist from
Dugin’s circle, had converted to Islam after meeting Dzhemal’. With his former mentor,
Sidorov shares the belief that Islam is destined to become the future “universal” social
and religious force.
All these ideologues, from the extreme right-wing nationalists to ethnic Russian
Muslims, support the belief that Russia is destined to exit from its dormant, humiliating
condition following the demise of the Soviet Union. They advocate the geopolitical
centrality of Russia, and the necessity to preserve (or restore) its “imperial” territorial
integrity. Although they hold different notions about what force will provide the
necessary impulse to shake Russia from its present impasse and project it in a brilliant
future, they seem willing to supersede their divergences and support each other in the
name of Russia’s “greatness”. Dugin is a popular professor, Shevchenko a prestigious
journalist-commentator, Prokhanov an appreciated writer, and Dzhemal’ a very welcome
guest on the mass media: They all contribute to the strengthening of Putin’s patriotic
“Russian idea”.
Conclusion
In Russia, extremist Islam, once expelled from traditional, official forms of cult, has
undergone a further conceptual elaboration. This has allowed state authorities to
operationalize Islamic terrorism into the much more manageable frame of “ideology”.
Several elements have contributes to this result. With the doctrinal contribution of
religious organizations, “proper” religious traits have been progressively sifted away
from extremist theoretical and methodological tenets. At the same time, the international
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approach to the war on terror has contributed, at least for a certain period, to isolate the
political-military character of Islamic extremism. Finally, Russian history provided the
backdrop against which an ideological, secular conceptualization of terrorism could be
elaborated into a theoretical and methodological framework.
The juxtaposition of traditional versus foreign Islam has found immediate support
by Tatars, who have a long tradition of cooperation with the central state (Bennigsen
1983; Crews 2006). In addition, Sufi brotherhoods in the Caucasus have gradually
become more cooperative with Moscow and more hostile to extremist separatist groups
like Imarat Kavkaz. The possession by Russia’s Muslims of a “Russian identity” that has
emerged throughout the present dissertation legitimates the question whether Russia’s
Islamic terrorism may fall into a “Russian” pattern of political action. Not only Russian
authorities, but even many exponents of political opposition, and the general public, seem
to have answered positively, with different degrees of awareness. The frequent references
to nineteenth-century terrorist movements and to Dostoyevsky’s work testify of this.
For its part, the government has increasingly modified its discourse about Islamic
opposition: The key definition is now “terrorist ideology”, and terrorists are the enemies
to combat – be they Muslims or not. In this way, it is possible to (announce) restrict state
harshness to a definite circle of criminals, whose common denominator is not religion but
ideology. To be sure, such a new conceptualization still presents blurred lines, but it also
offers the double advantage of isolating extremists from the Muslim community at large.
Further, it provides a universal methodological basis to counter other, non-Islamic
“extremists”, such as right-wing nationalistic and/or Orthodox activists, whose numbers
are increasing.

197

Within Russia’s official Islam, Islamic political theory is not an immediate
security concern when it deals with the constructive adoption into the Russian legal
system of Islamic principles that would contribute to its stability (indeed, it could be a desecuritizing item). It is, instead, a security threat when it replaces, in the contemporary
setting, pre-Revolution Communism and its terrorist mold. At this moment, it is difficult
to assess the real impact of such underground and often obscure arguments. Yet, the
popularity of some of its proponents, the delicate historical moment that Russia is living,
constantly pulled between the West and, increasingly, a Russian civilization, and the
particular appeal of certain “romantic” ideas reverberating throughout Russian history
suggest that they will be an important part of public discourse, at least in the immediate
future.
The ambiguity about Dzhemal’’s and others’ positions and the debate that ensues
from popular and political reactions to them are directly linked to the other fundamental
issue of Islam and security in Russia: the international reach of terrorism, its connections
within the Russian territory, and the present and potential consequences for Russia’s
stability and territorial and social integrity. They also relate to the possible spread of
revolutions in the Russian South following the Arab Spring. Further, as Muslim
immigration from the former Soviet states contributes to social unrest and economic
disarray, Russia’s response takes an increasingly international perspective.
The presence of a significant Muslim community on its territory causes the central
government some headaches, like social unrest and terrorist acts. It also provides
invaluable connections with the Muslim world outside its borders, though.
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In times of wobbling relations with the West, and of dramatic events in the
neighboring Middle East, Russia holds a singular geopolitical position, which it feels
exceptional for the privileges it may bring, and dangerous for the infiltrations it favors.
Finally, the specter of the Revolution may remain, as now, just a ghost of the past. Yet, in
Russia’s public discourse, it colors much of the debate about terrorism, about extremist
Islam, about the Arab Spring and the possibility that it spreads to Russia, and about a
diffused rise of extremist (religious, fascist) movements, in Russia and elsewhere.
All these preoccupations combine to determine Russia’s geopolitical selfpositioning, and guide many of its actions in the international arena. In turn, external
factors also affect the treatment of domestic issues. Together, internal and external
elements about and around Islam influence Russia in defining itself on the international
scene “a Muslim state” (Crews 2006).
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CHAPTER VII
THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL VIEW

It is widely acknowledged, by scholars and practitioners alike, that Russia’s foreign
policy is very much dependent on domestic issues, in particular security concerns (Kanet
and Piet 2014; Haas 2008; Tsygankov 2006; Hopf 2002; Hermann 1998; Rieber 1993).
Kanet and Piet (2014) express a diffused view when they observe:
[various scholars demonstrated that] at the core of Russian foreign
policy is a sense of national inadequacy and a concern about honor that
virtually demand that others recognize Russia as a major world power
and can result in in policy choices that, from the perspective of others,
especially in the West, may seem “irrational” or counterproductive.
(Kanet and Pier 2014: 2, italics mine).
I have already noted, throughout this dissertation, how Western analytical
categories often prove themselves inadequate to provide a satisfactory explanation of
Russia’s behavior. On the contrary, my approach has taken Russian conceptualizations of
its own identity as interpretive key to Russia’s policies. By maintaining the same
openness in regard to international, as well as domestic, issues, it is possible to find the
“consequent” and the “necessary” where others see the “irrational” and the
“counterproductive”.
In the previous chapters, I have shown how Russia’s search for its own identity
has involved the re-elaboration of the place of Islam and Muslims, significantly affecting
the broader public discourse and, in the end, domestic policies. Analogously, Russian
self-representation directly affects its self-perception on the international scene and,
ultimately, its choices.
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Under Putin’s presidency, and especially since his third mandate, geopolitics has
increasingly provided the overarching guidance to Russia’s international and domestic
behavior. Russia’s foreign policy has acquired a historical-messianic character, which
mirrors a similar development on the domestic front (Trenin 2014). As discussed in
Chapter 6, such course has been often attributed to the growing influence of Aleksandr
Dugin and other nationalist intellectuals24.
As I have noted elsewhere in this dissertation (Chapters 2, 3, and 6), as
philosophical concept, Dugin’s geopolitics sets Russia as a Eurasian power. As such, the
doctrine claims, Russia’s historical mission is to play the pivotal role of bridge among
civilizations. Imbued with Russian religious-based messianism, in its several elaborations
neo-Eurasianist geopolitics does, however, accommodate for a Muslim component of
Russian civilization. Thus, some neo-Eurasianists, some nationalists (Muslim and not),
most Muslim official leaders and, above all, Russian President Vladimir Putin strongly
support the “multi-ethnic, multi-religious” national model for Russia.
The employment of Russia’s alleged civilizational-messianic drive as explanatory
category is not new, and has been employed with controversial results (Legvold 2007;
McDonald 2007; Rieber 2007, 1993). In particular, Alfred Rieber (1993) exposes it as
“myth”, at the basis of an enduring, but “ahistorical” theory of Russian foreign policy.
Rieber considers, instead, that the “geocultural” dimension of Russian history is the
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Trenin (2014) highlights Putin’s closeness with Father Tikhon Shevkunov, an Orthodox Archimandrite
(abbot) who is allegedly his confessor. Trenin notes that Putin has befriended Tikhon in the time between
his second and third mandate, although the two men had reportedly already met at the end of the 1990s
(Clover 2013). Apart from Tikhon’s role in Putin’s private life, he may have made him acquainted with
Christian philosophy. It is useful, here, to recall the influence of a major Orthodox theologian and political
thinker, Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin, on contemporary discourse on Russian identity – as discussed
throughout Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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source of the “continuities” that observers note – but are unable to fully explain– in
Russian foreign policy25.
I have already discussed the ontological character of civilizational and national
myths, which in a sense renders their veracity secondary (Chapter 2). However, I agree
with Rieber that a mere messianic impulse does not suffice to explain Russia’s foreign
policy. Following Mesbahi (1997,1992) I contend that geocultural and geopolitical
considerations are necessary to provide a multi-layered analytical approach that responds
to the complexity of the issue at hand. As this chapter will show, in view of the influence,
in Russia, of domestic preoccupations on foreign relations, of the new place of Islam and
Muslims in Russia’s polity, and of the developments on the international scenes, the
“Islamic factor” has grown into a key element of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet, in
mainstream analyses, references to Islam are limited to issues of extremism and
separatism – with the limits that I have highlighted in the previous chapters.
In the present (and final) chapter, I intend to fill the research gap on some of the
most compelling aspects of the “Islamic factor” in Russia’s geopolitical perspectives. To
do so, I will build on the novel key analytical findings that I have identified and
elaborated in the previous chapters: the place of Muslims in Russia’s conceptualizations
of its own identity; the official role of Islamic organizations; the fundamental separation
of traditional and extremist Islam; and the definition of an ideology of terror that evokes
fears of a never-forgotten revolution.
25

Rieber identifies four “persistent conditions” that “share a set of characteristics that can best be defined
as geocultural, that is, they relate to those aspects of human activity – the environment and clusters of
attitudes and beliefs – that change slowly over time and cannot be easily transformed by political authority
no matter how omnipotent its claims.” (Rieber 1993: 322). Three of Rieber’s conditions: “permeable
frontiers”, “multicultural state and society”, and “cultural marginality” are particularly relevant for our
discourse on Russia’s Islam.
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Islam and Russia’s conceptualizations of geopolitics
Aleksandr Dugin consistently claims to have been heavily influenced by classical
geopolitics (Dugin 2014; 1997). However, his and his followers’ theories add a strong
geocultural element to Mackinder’s vision. In Russian contemporary geopolitical
discourse, conceptualizations of Islam appear to both contribute to and result from
geopolitical-geocultural postures (see Chapters 2 and 6). The key influence of Russian
assessments of the international Islamic threat had been exposed by Mesbahi in several
analyses of Russia’s policy in Central Asia, and of Russia-Iran relations (1997, 1993, and
1992). In particular, Mesbahi (1997) highlighted the emergence of a conceptual, and
therefore political, differentiation among Russian elites.
As shown in his account, “Euroatlanticists” (Yeltsin and his presidential circle)
shared the Western identification of political Islam as security threat, and supported
Western-led strategies. They dominated Russian decision-making processes until toward
the end of 1990s, which is reflected, for example, in Russian position in the Tajik civil
war (Mesbahi 1997). At the same time, an emerging current of “Neo-Eurasianists”, a
major exponent of which was Yevgeny Primakov, started elaborating a more nuanced
interpretation of political Islam and its implications for Russia. The growth of Primakov’s
political weight, and then the fall of Yeltsin and the rise to power of Putin, much more
skeptical of (and today antagonistic to) Western influences, caused a major shift in
Russia’s self-positioning internationally – including toward Islam (as discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6).
Analogously to the domestic context, also in Russia’s foreign policy the
separation of traditional and extremist Islam is fundamental. This distinction is often
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underplayed or even ignored by most Western commentators of Russian foreign policy –
similar to what I have emphasized about domestic mechanisms. Analysts, instead, explain
Russian behavior toward Islam and Muslims within a general framework of imperialism,
revanchism, loss of honor, or simple (selfish) pragmatism. This approach causes
uncertainties and even puzzlement in front of Russia’s inexplicable behaviors (Kanet and
Piet 2014, quoted above).
In fact, mainstream comments neglect the important fact that Russia’s
conceptualizations of Islam affect at both the ontological and epistemological levels
Russia’s actions and reactions on the international scene. As Mesbahi (2013) notes, after
the initial, possibly opportunistic acceptance of the Western “masternarrative” on Islamic
terrorism26, upon the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003, Russia soon (re)adopted its
“historically more nuanced narrative of differentiation, flexibility and duality” (Mesbahi
2013: 6), that better conformed to its historical experience with Islam and Muslims – and
reflected the adoption of Primakov’s definitions of traditional vs. extremist Islam. The
reaction to the invasion of Iraq is probably the first major occurrence in which Russia
openly elaborated in the international dimension the same dualistic conceptualization of
traditional/extremist Islam that it was applying domestically.
Russian foreign policy and the “Islamic factor”: an overview.
The definition of extremist Islam as ideology of terrorism has led Russia to adopt a
different stance than the West’s in its reaction to Islamic terrorism (see Chapter 6). As
Mesbahi (2013) notes, Russia’s eventual rejection of the Western “masternarrative” was
26

In Mesbahi’s definition, such “global masternarrative” about Islam is “a narrative about the universality
of the Islamic threat which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and which was qualitatively reinforced and
enriched in the post-9/11 era, primarily by the United States and its allies” (Mesbahi 2013: 2).
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visible also in Russia’s posture in its traditional sphere of influence – post-Soviet Central
Asia. In this region, however, the shift in perspective has been less complete. For
example, in Russia’s discourse on Afghanistan after the departure of U.S. forces, Russia’s
preoccupations are about the trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and human beings into its
territory, as well as about terrorism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, conversely,
which had been set in 1999 with the mission to counter “separatism, subversion, and
extremism”, was clearly addressing religious extremism and ethnic-religious nationalism
(separatism). The co-membership of the Central Asian republics and China, that maintain
a specific anti-Islamic-extremism language, may be one of the reasons why the SCO has
not followed the evolution of Russia’s counterterrorism doctrine.
While Western discourse maintains strong oppositional or skeptical overtones that
produce mixed results in relations with the Muslim world, conversely Russia’s official
acknowledgement of traditional Islam as part of Russian civilization – backed by Muslim
leaders’ support (see Chapter 4) – opens many doors for Russia. Because Muslims are
recognized as rightful members of Russian society, Russia can (and does) proclaim itself
“a Muslim state”. This quality provides the legitimation for Russia to partake of
international Muslim organizations, like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
in which Western representation is very limited or absent.
Finally, at the ideational-civilizational level, Russia’s Muslim community
presents itself to the world as a success story of participation to a secular, multi-ethnic,
and multi-religious state. An accurate study of the (re)established official and unofficial
relations of Russia’s Muslims with the international ummah reveals theological and
ideological exchanges that go far in space and time.
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Western analyses of the international connections of Russia’s Islam focus
narrowly on the influence of Arab Wahhabism and on the tracking of terrorist networks.
Other levels of relations have been significantly understudied – if noticed at all. The
Russian discourse is more articulated. Certain circles, especially political analysts, follow
the developments of extremist currents within Russian territory and across the borders.
Muslim intellectuals highlight theological and doctrinal exchanges, as well as
confessional ties. The broader public discourse, instead, shows an increasing interest in
cultural and political relations – for example the renewed Russia-Iran relations.
The discourse is very ample and, at times, repetitive. Some aspects of it, however,
deserve particular attention. The study of various texts reveals the Soviet origins of some
arguments that often combine Communist internationalism, religious eschatology, and
political militancy to produce aggressive geopolitical views. Even more noteworthy are
the intellectual and personal connections between Islamic thinkers and Russian (ultra)
nationalist groups sharing similar geopolitical perspectives. Not surprisingly, often these
individuals and groups are the same ones who share analogous views of Russia’s
domestic condition – and whom I have identified in Chapter 6.
It is impossible, here, to dedicate adequate space and attention to each of the
numerous areas in which the Islamic factor plays a more or less influential role. It is also
true that some issues are more significant than others in their impact and/or long-term
implications. Therefore, I will dedicate the remaining sections of the chapter to elements
from two sets of issues. One better reflects the interdependency of domestic and
international factors, and falls within a broader shift in Russia-West relations. The other
set of issues are those that work at the civilizational/ideational level. They are the attempt
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at coopting Crimean Tatars into Russian civilizational model, and Russian dialogue with
Iran. Although so far generally neglected, they must be exposed and their impact
assessed, in order to understand the on-going process of Russia’s self-(re)positioning on
the international arena.
Russia, Islam, and international security
The conceptual separation of traditional Islam from an Islamic ideology of terrorism not
only affects Russia’s position toward international terrorism, but has become a
fundamental element in its foreign policy in general. In fact, it has always been. The
central role played by Soviet conceptualization of world religions has been rarely
discussed beyond its most apparent trait of atheism. Mostly, studies have examined the
relationship of the Soviet regime with different Churches, notably the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Vatican (Kirby 2003). Even more seldom have studies of the nature of
Soviet relation with Islam as an ideology been conducted. Alexandre Bennigsen has been
one of the few who have turned their attention to the ideological-ontological debate
between Soviets and Muslims (see also Chapter 5 of this dissertation).
After Bennigsen, the centrality of the Islamic factor in Soviet and post-Soviet
Russian foreign policy has been highlighted by Mohiaddin Mesbahi. In a series of journal
articles and book chapters dedicated to the dynamics of Soviet-Iranian relations, Mesbahi
advocates the necessity to add to the “classical” series of foreign policy elements (energy,
security, military) also the religious factor. The acknowledgment of the importance of
Islam as ideological drive of the new Iranian Republic, and of the Soviet reaction to it,
allows Mesbahi to provide a powerful explanation to Soviet behavior during the Iran-Iraq
war. Further, it also frames Soviet-Iranian relations within a broader geopolitical and
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strategic perspective, which includes extra-regional agents (but with high stakes in the
region) like the United States.
In Mesbahi’s analysis, the fear of the spreading of the Islamic revolution brought
together USA and USSR in – at times contradictory – support of Iraq. Similar
preoccupations persisted throughout the 1980s and, partially, the 1990s decades. The
release of the Afghan pressure on the Soviet Union was soon substituted by the spreading
of Islamic separatism and inter-ethnic clashes in the newly independent Central Asian
republics. They found their most dramatic expression in the Tajik civil war of 1992-1997.
Here, too, the Islamic factor played a pivotal role in bringing together international actors
to facilitate a negotiated end to the conflict (Mesbahi 1997).
In Tajikistan, the two major mediators have been Russia and Iran. Their
cooperation revealed their communality of interests in ensuring stability in the region. It
also revealed, at a deeper level, the effects of a change in both countries’ stances to each
other and to world order in general. Perhaps unexpectedly, Islam was at the center of
them. Mesbahi (1993, 1992) notes that, at the end of the Iran-Iraq war,
[...] recent Soviet commentaries suggest the growing awareness by
Soviet leadership of the significant role played by non-western and
especially Islamic traditions in shaping intellectual consensus on the
global level. […] the Soviets cautiously, but surely, have shown signs
that they are willing to test the possibilities of an intellectual discourse
with the Islamic World. [Gorbachev] expressed the significant role of
[renowned Islamic philosopher] Termezi’s ideas, ‘in solving the moral
and ethical problems of our time’, and the ‘role of Islam in the
implementation of the idea of values common to all mankind’.
(Mesbahi 1992: 276)
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The new Western-Russian relations
The refusal of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, in October 2013, to sign an
already negotiated cooperation treaty with the European Union sparked an escalation in
internal socio-political relations in the country. Popular protests started in Kiev, but the
“Euromaidan27” upheaval soon escalated and split the country along two fundamental
oppositional lines: pro-EU (and against Russia’s influence) and pro-Russian (and antiWestern). Euromaidan caused the ousting of the incumbent Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych by the Parliament –illegally, by Ukrainian laws.
During the months of fierce contrasts between pro- and anti-government groups,
other major events followed suit throughout the country, which dramatically affected the
international system of state relations. The major ones were the proclamation of a
referendum for secession and annexation to Russia, in Crimea, and the establishment of a
self-proclaimed, openly pro-Russian independent state, in the southeastern territories of
Donbass. Contrary to what happened in Crimea, violent clashes between government and
separatist forces (suspected to be flanked by Russian troops) characterize what has been
called the “War in Ukraine” - still ongoing at the time of writing.
In Crimea, the Parliament of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic – a region with
an overwhelming majority of ethnic Russian citizens – called for a referendum to secede
from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. As justification for this self-proclaimed
referendum, illegal by Ukrainian law, the Parliament adduced the necessity to escape the
consequences of what they saw as a neo-fascist political coup in Kiev, and to put an end
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The name refers simultaneously to the central square in Kiev (Maidan Nezalezhnosti, “Independence
Square”), where protesters convened, and to the movement’s initiators’ support for the European Union.
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to decades of discrimination by the Ukrainian central government against the local
Russian population. In the name of the self-determination of peoples, and reminding the
example of Kosovo, in March 2014 Moscow welcomed Crimea as its new territory.
The Ukrainian crisis has significantly affected Russia’s position in the
international arena, especially its relations with the United States and the European
Union. With the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass, what seemed to be
an internal affair of Ukraine has now entered the global agenda. Allegations of Russia’s
direct military support to separatists in the Donbass – rejected by Moscow – led to the
establishment of economic sanctions by the U.S. and EU against Moscow. Although less
effective than expected, the sanctions are being felt by the Russian economy. Yet, they
have also provoked a reaction of Russian elites, who claim that Western assessments of
Russia’s position in the Ukrainian and Crimean situations are flawed. More significantly,
the hard line chosen by the Western countries has comforted Russia in its sense of being
encircled because of its unwillingness to bend to U.S. hegemonic ambitions, and
generated a very bold reply (President Rossii 2014a, 2014b). Consequently, the positions
of both sides, U.S. / EU and Russia, have further stiffened.
It is beyond the scope and purposes of this dissertation to discuss the events
leading to the Euromaidan and its effects at large within and outside Ukraine. However,
at least two of its consequences are directly relevant to the discourse about Islam. One is
the amplification of West-Russian differences in approaching international crises,
especially those involving state sovereignty, self-determination, and stability. They were
already evident with regard to Islamic terrorism, but now they find a much broader
expression in Ukraine. The other field in which Islam is significant is more closely
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related to Russia’s domestic arrangements. It regards the role of Russia’s Islamic official
institutions in support of the state, and their willingness to perpetuate the Russian/Soviet
tradition of sending Muslims as envoys to foreign Muslim communities – this time, to
Crimea. Both issues will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
International fight against terrorism: from cooperation to confrontation
An immediate consequence of Russia’s conceptualization of Islamic terrorism as a
fundamentally political, and not religious, phenomenon is its increasing reluctance to
participate in the global anti-Islamic discourse. It is true that, immediately after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, Vladimir Putin had declared himself ready to join the
“War on Terror” proclaimed by U.S. President George W. Bush. Russia’s support was
tangible especially in Central Asia, where it either offered the support of its military
bases, or facilitated the lease of Central Asian bases to the Western coalition.
It is also widely observed that Putin, while genuinely concerned for the spread of
international terrorism, had assumed an equally belligerent posture on the domestic front.
Claiming to counter Islamic extremism infiltrated from abroad, he engaged in a violent
confrontation with separatists in the North Caucasus, during what is known as the second
Chechen war (Malashenko and Trenin 2004). Commentators in the West and in Russia
have often accused Putin to use the “global war on terror” as a sham for a ruthless use of
force against separatists and political opponents in the south. In fact, the Russian official
narrative on the Chechen opposition soon overlapped Islamic rebels on organized
“bandits”, corrupted local officials, and simple criminals (Campana 2013; Omelicheva
2009; Malashenko and Trenin 2004). In this way, the Islamic religious component was
gradually, but increasingly, brushed off the narrative on the identity of Chechen rebels.
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The motives, details, and controversies of the conflict in North Caucasus have
been extensively discussed in the academic, policy-making, and journalistic literature (for
example, Sakwa 2005; Malashenko and Trenin 2004; Hunter 2004; Politkovskaia 2004).
This is probably the single topic concerning Russia’s Islam to have received the close and
sustained attention of Western commentators. To conduct yet another thorough analysis
of this issue would be an unnecessary redundancy, and is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. What is important to note, for my present discussion, is that Russian
discourse on Chechnya – from religious to political opposition – paralleled the general
shift in Russia’s position on international terrorism.
At the origin of the divide: the invasion of Iraq
The watershed event has been the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In his analysis of the event,
Yevgeny (Evgenii) Primakov (2009, originally published in Russian by the official
government newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta in 2006) starts by presenting the behavior of
the United States about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as at least hypocritical. He
recalls how, after the falsity of its government’s initial accusations was exposed, the U.S.
“sought to justify its actions by insisting that it was embarking on a mission to spread
democracy” (Primakov 2009: 358). However, the Middle East expert notes,
this was an American model of democracy that had pretty much
nothing in common with the historic or religious traditions of the Arab
nations, nor even with their present-day socio-economic situations or
ways of thinking. (Primakov 2009: 358)
In fact, Primakov accuses, “the American invasion actually helped fuel the spread of
terrorism” (Primakov 2009: 358), because it had diverted troops from areas of true
emergency, like Afghanistan.

212

Primakov blames the disruption of the religious balance in Iraq. In fact, he notes,
Saddam Hussein had created a secular regime that, with all its condemnable authoritarian
flaws, had succeeded in establishing a high degree of stability. Primakov attributes to the
elimination of the Ba’ath party by the U.S. the resurgence of conflicts among Iraq’s
groups: Shi’ias, Sunnis, and Kurds (not to speak of non-Islamic religions) – with
overemphasized religious notes. In this way, he observes, “after the U.S. occupation, Iraq
became a “faith-based state”. He confirms his previous statements about Islam not being
an intrinsically aggressive religion (see also Primakov 2004). However, he adds,
in a modern setting, a state built on the basis of faith – be it Islam,
Christianity, or Judaism – and with all its branches of power run along
theological lines, can hardly be said to be on the road to democracy
(Primakov 2009: 360)
While these remarks reflect Primakov’s modernist position, they do not seem to influence
his firm belief in a definition of Islamic terrorism as a political, ideological, but not
religious movement:
[The] supposed polarization [of the world along Huntington’s
civilizational lines] is understood to be the result of the emergence of
international terrorism, which is allegedly linked directly to the religion
of Islam. There is plenty of evidence to show how erroneous it is to
conflate the two in this way. [O]nly ignoramuses or spiteful
Islamophobes could equate one of the oldest and most widely practiced
religions in the world with terrorism. The reality today is that many
terrorist organizations, primarily al-Qaeda, do indeed wrap themselves
in the flag of Islam […]. (Primakov, 2009: 382-383)
For Primakov, it is “vitally important” (Primakov 2009: 383) that the world
understands the distinction between fundamentalist Islam, intended as a true attachment
to Islamic faith and habits, and extremist Islam, which recurs to the “use of force to
impose Islamic rule over a state or a society” (Primakov 2009: 383). As such, extremist
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Islam loses its true religious character and manifests itself as violent tool of international
politics. Primakov points to the incapability of the “Wise Men’s Group” led by Kofi
Annan to both properly identify the nature of terrorism’s threat and, consequently, to
provide internationally binding guidelines, that has led to the catastrophic Western
invasion of Iraq (Primakov 2009: 359).
Primakov claims that, because the West has adopted a “wrong” definition of
terrorism, its interventions in local religious dynamics, of which it ignores origins and
characteristics, are ineffective, or even harmful. Today, Primakov’s argument still lies at
the basis of the Russian critique to international interventions in the Middle East and
elsewhere. Several Russian authoritative sources not only replicate Primakov’s words,
but start from his analysis of the situation in 2003-Iraq and the Middle East in general to
build their critique of contemporary events. It is remarkable how, today, the whole
structure of Russian position on the Islamic State (ISIS) is supported, in almost identical
formulations, by Primakov’s analysis of Iraq.
The renowned Russian scholar Vitalii Naumkin28 analyzes the situation in Syria
and Iraq in a recent paper prepared for the Valdai Club (Naumkin 2014a). He notes how
The blitzkrieg launched by the […] Islamic State, was as sudden as it
was predictable. The current surge of jihad sentiment in this part of the
world is rooted in the recent past, which began when the US and its
allies invaded and occupied Iraq without UN sanction. (Naumkin
2014a: 2, italics mine).
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Vitalii Naumkin is the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is
also professor and chair at the faculty of world politics, Moscow State University, and president of the
Moscow-based Center for Strategic and Political Studies. He writes extensively on the Middle East,
especially on Israeli-Palestinian relations, and on geopolitical dynamics in the region.
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Naumkin identifies “three major mistakes” of US policy in Iraq that collectively were
intended to dissolve the state institutions: political, military, and bureaucratic. He
attributes these actions to U.S. fears that Iraq might revert to the old regime. Yet, he notes
While Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a cruel dictator […] these
decisions destroyed the state institutions that had supported what had
been a secular nationalist regime. (Naumkin 2014a: 2, italics mine)
In addition to disrupting the secular state, the American intervention, in
Naumkin’s as in Primakov’s view, is accused of having wrongly re-igniting relations
among religious groups, without being able to provide a satisfactory substitute for the
stability once offered by Hussein’s regime. Instead, Naumkin notes, today the Islamic
State – although also a terrible regime – “has created a semblance of order [...]. There is
fear but also stability”. Naumkin does not positively comment on the “stability” provided
by the IS, and it is clear throughout the paper that he strongly condemns it, but his
provocation intends to highlight the contrast between the purposes of Western
intervention, its inability to choose the right scenario (secular stability over sectarian
juxtaposition), and their unintended consequences.
The official journal of the Russian Army, Kraznaya Zvezda, in an article
published in 2014 (Kuzar’ 2014) on the Islamic State traces the origin of the conflict back
to the Sykes-Picot agreements. The author implicitly suggests that the greed and
incompetence shown by the Western colonial powers at that time still led their behavior
before, during, and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular, U.S. misjudgment of
internal relations had led to Western military training and support of groups that have
then moved to Syria to fight against Assad’s regime – and then returned to Iraq to join the
IS.
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Putting the official view into the international context, the Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov lament the negative effects of Western initiatives in the Middle
East (MID 2014). In his view, after the setback in Iraq, U.S.-led mismanagement of the
terrorist threat has led to the crises in North Africa and Syria, and to the strengthening to
the current level of the Islamic State. The West is accused to have wrongly, or
intentionally, supported certain Islamic groups to overrule what they labeled dictatorial
governments. In fact, Russian observers note, those secular regimes had been able to
ensure religious stability in highly fragmented societies. The collapse of legitimate
governments during the Arab Spring, instead, brought the mid-term effect of re-ignite
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts that, in absence of a strong, legitimate authority
to control them, have only precipitated the region into chaos (MID 2015, 2014; Naumkin
2014a; Kuzar’ 2014; Primakov 2009).
Differences in counterterrorism tactics
Conceptual and strategic differences on the nature of terrorism are reflected in divergent
policy and military approaches. At the society level, Russia places a high value on the
preventive effects of a “proper” Islamic education that should conform to “patriotic” lines
(see Chapter 5 of this dissertation). This is in contrast with Western usual calls for a
secular education that would limit the influence of religious precepts.
Politically, Russian observers lament the unwise dependency of the Western
forces on reluctant or scarcely transparent local allies. One of the most frequently cited
cases is the ambivalent position of “American ally Saudi Arabia” that has “spent millions
of dollars over decades to propagate this extremist ideology in the Muslim world and
continue[s] to do so even now” (Naumkin 2014a: 4). Kuzar’ (2014) goes further, and puts
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Saudi Arabia’s direct financing of IS combatants within a regional strategic context. The
journal points to Saudi intention to counter Iran’s influence in Iraq.
Another allegedly unreliable partner is Turkey. Naumkin (2014a) highlights that
Turkey’s primary interest may not be the overturn of the Assam regime in Syria, or the
elimination of the IS, but rather the liquidation of the Kurdish question. In turn, Kurdish
groups in Iraq (which are on the U.S. and Turkish lists of terrorist organizations) have
been armed against IS. Naumkin prospects a longer-term scenario when he mentions the
possibility that the Kurds may eventually turn against Ankara – well equipped with
Western weapons.
On the military level, Russia has repeatedly expressed concerns about the U.S.
decision to employ exclusively airborne forces to combat the Islamic state. In the opinion
of many Russian military and civilian leaders (MID 2015; Kuzar’ 2014), instead, it is
necessary to infiltrate the IS ranks. The (Jewish) President of the Middle East Institute,
Evgenii Satanovski, calls for the return of U.S. ground force to Iraq (Nezavisimaya
Gazeta 2014). He accuses President Barack Obama of reluctance to admit his own
“incompetence” in withdrawing from the country without having stabilized it.
Particularly significant is the involvement of Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the
Chechen Republic (and a close ally of Putin’s), in this regard. Confident of his own
(controversial) expertise in countering separatists in the North Caucasus, Kadyrov goes at
length to explain the rationale beyond his suggestion to infiltrate the terrorists’ ranks. He
adds that, in fact, Russians have already many undercover agents among IS troops.
Indeed, Kadyrov may have a broader impact than it would appear at first sight if, in June
2014, the King of Jordan, Abdullah II, visited Chechnya (but not Moscow) allegedly to
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ask for his advice to counter terrorists, and his example may be followed by others
(Saunders 2014)29.
Islamic terrorism and civilizational dialogue
Primakov (2009) identifies in the interruption of the dialogue between civilizations the
real cause of the spreading of Islamic terrorism. He calls for the international community
to restore inter-civilizational relations beyond the limits of technological and economic
globalization. Rather, Primakov argues, it is the mutual knowledge of cultural and social
factors that brings reciprocal respect and may defuse the threat of terrorism. In policy
terms, for Primakov this translates into an agreed-upon definition of terrorism, officially
approved by the international community at the United Nations.
By contrast, Primakov indicates an example of civilizational dialogue in the
Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group, which had met at least twice, in 2006 in
Russia (the meeting Primakov mentions) and in 2008 in Jeddah. It was composed of
representatives of Russia and Muslim countries, including Iranians. During the Group’s
meetings, Russian Muslim leaders advanced post-Soviet Russia as model of integration
(Muslims.ru, without date; Wahab and Samir 2008; see also Chapter 4 of this
dissertation). Tatarstan’s President Mintimer Shaimiyev boasted that Muslims of Russia
enjoy a high level of security, stability, and social participation. Primakov adds how the
fact that, in Russia, Muslims are “part of the indigenous population” has created “a very
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Saunders (2014) also notes that Chechen guerrilla troops loyal to Kadyrov may well have been deployed
in 2014 Crimea, against the new government in Kiev (he reports the official news that Kadyrov himself has
been awarded a medal “For the Liberation of Crimea”). Indeed, Kadyrov’s social media accounts (Twitter,
LiveJournal) show his close interest for the situation in Ukraine, including the Donbass, about which he
supports and reinforces Russia’s anti-Western line of arguments.

218

special community”. Additionally, he concludes, “Russia enjoys a unique position as
bridge between Europe and Asia” (Primakov 2009: 384).
Despite Primakov’s reiterated invitations to create a shared conceptual and policyrelated platform to address international terrorism, Russian authorities and commentators
continue to lament the opposition to, or oversight of, their position by the Western
community. The lack of a common conceptual platform to fight terrorism is considered
by the Russian leadership the main cause of the general failure of international initiatives,
first of all, because it hinders joint actions.
Russia and the Arab Spring
Russia’s stance about Iraq and Syria is consistent with what is often presented as its
increasingly strong resistance to U.S. (ambitions of) world hegemony. On several
occasions, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev
have expressed their disagreement with the idea of a U.S.-led unipolar world. Instead, in
Russia’s view the post-cold war system should be characterized by a more balanced
multipolar arrangement. This is at the basis of Russian foreign doctrine, and plays a
significant role in its calls to UN supervision and international cooperation in
counterterrorism.
For example, the contradictory position of Moscow that, while conceptually
calling for a global dialogue and mutual “civilizational” understanding, at the policy level
criticizes the Western states’ approach to link cooperation in counterterrorism to the
resolution of the contention about Ukraine, may be seen in this perspective. For Russia,
the international community should constitute an overarching platform to address issues
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of common concern. It should not be affected by bilateral relations, nor, more
importantly, be dominated by the interests of the United States.
Consequently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov insists on the necessity to
set aside divergences on specific, apparently unrelated issues to focus on the international
“priorities” of “terrorism, growing drug trafficking, and organized crime” (Lavrov 2014).
In his words, terrorists do not quarrel with each other, know no boundaries, and are
constantly on the move. The same should do Russia and “its Western partners”. Lavrov
repeatedly points at the negative consequences of the “freezing” of coordination in
counterterrorism that, he emphasizes, has been decided by the West – not by Russia
(MID 2015, 2014).
At this point, it is evident how the “Islamic factor”, even when it is not explicitly
mentioned, affects the perceptions of the parties involved and, ultimately, their
positioning toward one another. It is obviously more relevant in case of direct
involvement of Islamic terrorists or activists. This is the case of the Arab Spring
revolutions, and of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Malashenko (2014) notes that in the
Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia (2013) there is a reference to Islam as cause of
disorder in the Middle East. However, this does not imply a fundamental change in the
official interpretation of extremist Islam as “ideology” and not religion. On the contrary,
it confirms Russian official interpretations of the IS and of the Islamic opposition to
Syrian President Assad as forms of political activity.
Russia’s position on the Arab Spring events follows its assessment of the invasion
of Iraq: The ultimate culprit is the West, which, partly out of incompetence, partly out of
interest, has supported the ousting of stable, secular governments by stirring potentially
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explosive relations among domestic groups. The same accusation is made by the Grand
Mufti of Al-Azhar (on December 4, 2014).
While Russian insistence on country stability is presented as if in the interest of
the country’s populations, many commentators note that Russia’s reluctance to overturn
Saddam’s, Qaddafi’s, and now Assad’s governments reveals Putin’s fears of a possible
spread of revolutionary movements within Russia against his own rule. This
interpretation contains much truth, although it may be incomplete.
Putin is not the only one to be concerned for his own position. I have already
highlighted the sensitivity of both state leaders and citizens to revolutionary instances
(see Chapter 6). More specifically, in the case of the Arab Spring revolutions, at the time
when they were still rolling, an intense debate developed on Russian public outlet. In the
television duel (Solov’ev 2011) between Zhirinovskii and Dzhemal’ analyzed in Chapter
6, one of the guests is Rajab Safarov, head of the Center of Contemporary Iranian
Studies, a renowned expert of Iran and a public figure. Reassuring the audience, after
Zhirinovskii’s and other guests’ concerns about the possibility for an Islamic regime to be
established in Russia, he notes that, although Russia “must live” with Muslims on its
territory, this does not mean that a theocracy or a Caliphate must be created. In fact, he
reminds that
in the Islamic world there are examples of secular systems in which
Muslims defend the interests of the states. These states […] are able to
maintain very good relations with their neighbors. (Solov’ev 2011)
In his opinion, the fact that “the dictatorships that have been disrupted [Gaddafi’s,
Saddam’s, Mubarak’s] had been initiated and supported by the West, especially the
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United States” (37) would save Russia from being victim of the clear anti-Western
sentiment expressed by the Arab spring.
It is impossible to overlook the strong anti-Western bias of much of Russian
debate on international events. Even contradictory interpretations of the Arab revolutions,
presented either as fomented by the West to oust incumbent regimes or as genuine
popular movements against regimes perceived as Western puppets, lead to the same
conclusion – that the West is to blame. This narrative has soon joined Russia’s foreign
policy discourse to reinforce Russia’s allegations of an aggressive policy of the U.S. and
its partners, aimed at the control of vital resources and of Muslim societies. With the
deepening of the rift due to the Ukrainian crisis, these allegations have escalated to
become a steady part of Russian mainstream analyses – both professional and popular –
of international events.
Russia, Iran, and the (unexpected) ways of the “Islamic Factor”
Primakov’s (2009) call for a civilizational dialogue closely resembles the “Dialogue of
Civilizations” speech made in 1997 by the then-president of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Mohammad Khatami. Khatami affirmed that, “in our world, dialogue among civilizations
is an absolute imperative” (quoted in Esposito and Voss, 2003: 250)30. Although the date
of Khatami’s speech falls around the time when Primakov was implementing his new
vision of Russian foreign policy (and of Islam), there is no certainty of a direct
intellectual influence of either one on the other. What appears evident, however, is that
both leaders share the same concern for a lack, or inadequacy, of a civilizational dialogue
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In the words of Esposito and Voss (2003), Khatami has since become “one of the major advocates for the
dialogue of civilizations in the contemporary world”.
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that should not result in the defamation of one civilization by another, on the contrary,
should enhance mutual knowledge and trust.
It seems surprising that two leading exponents of such diverse traditions like the
Russian/Soviet and the Iranian could come to the same conclusion. In fact, years before
Khatami, Ayatollah Khomeini had elaborated a similar vision of world arrangements.
Having abandoned the idea of an outright exportation of Islamic revolution, after the
Iran-Iraq war (Mesbahi 2011, 1993), he sent a friendly letter to then-Soviet Union
President Mikhail Gorbachev (Khomeini 1989). In that letter, the ayatollah stated the, by
then proved, inadequacy of the Marxist ideology to fulfil the needs of the Soviet people.
Instead, he made a surprising proposal to the PCUS secretary:
let me call on you to study Islam earnestly, not because Islam and
Muslims may need you, but because Islam has exalted universal values
which can bring comfort and salvation to all nations and remove the
basic problems of mankind. A true understanding of Islam may forever
release you from the problem Afghanistan and other similar
involvements. We treat Muslims of the world as Muslims of our own
country and will ever share in their destiny.
[…]
I declare outright that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and
most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easily fill the vacuum of
religious faith in your society. In any case, our country, as in the past,
honours [sic] good neighbourhood [sic] and bilateral relations.
(Khomeini 1989, italics mine).
Gorbachev, a self-declared Soviet patriot, proved to be receptive to Khomeini’s
opening:
[...] recent Soviet commentaries suggest the growing awareness by
Soviet leadership of the significant role played by non-western and
especially Islamic traditions in shaping intellectual consensus on the
global level. [T]he Soviets cautiously, but surely, have shown signs that
they are willing to test the possibilities of an intellectual discourse with
the Islamic World. [Gorbachev] expressed the significant role of
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[renowned Islamic philosopher] Termezi’s ideas, ‘in solving the moral
and ethical problems of our time’, and the ‘role of Islam in the
implementation of the idea of values common to all mankind’.
(Mesbahi 1992: 276)
The Soviet cautious exploration of Khomeini’s ideational terrain took place in a
moment of great internal intellectual disarray. The sudden demise of the Soviet Union in
1991 and the subsequent strong inclination toward Western liberal stances are probably
one of the reasons why the Russian-Iranian dialogue did not take a more articulated form.
The images of civilizational relations envisioned by Khomeini, Khatami, and
Primakov share not only a positive perspective of dialogue, but entail potential competing
assumptions. Khomeini is explicit in predicting the ultimate victory of Iranian Islamic
paradigm as ontological, epistemological, and existential model for humankind. In the
case of Khatami, Esposito and Voss (2003) observe that
[d]ialogue with the West, in this perspective, becomes an important
way of strengthening Islam, because, as the West evolves and possibly
decline, there is the opportunity for Islam to regain its position as the
leading progressive world civilization. (254)
In his turn, Primakov prospects the model of the World Vision Group, in which
the Russian example is particularly praised. Each of these models contains the conviction
(or hope) to be the one destined to prevail, in the end. Mesbahi (1992) had already noted
it in the case of Soviet-Iranian relations:
Both the Soviet and the Iranian leadership have continued to emphasize
the superiority of their respective socialist and Islamic model. The
dialogue and interaction between Soviet new thinking and Islam, both
as an idea and polity, will take place in the context of Islam’s presumed
universal claim to hold the essential truth. Thus, a note of tension in the
relationship between the two would be unavoidable. (Mesbahi 1992:
278)
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The awareness of these competing scenarios are partially responsible for the
caution with which both Iranians and Russians expound these arguments in the public
sphere (Mesbahi 2010).
Russian-Iranian contemporary ideational relations
Much more effective, at least for the moment, in boosting Iranian-Russian relations are
common stances on regional issues. Both states agree on the regional priorities (Islamic
State and drug trafficking), against the Western strategy. Iran’s highly problematic
relations with the United States and part of the Western community is an additional
facilitating condition, in view of the growing tensions between the latter group and
Russia.
However, the recognition of common adversaries, in addition to shared interests,
has developed gradually. It is not the place, here, to dig into the long and complex history
of Iran/Persian and Russian/Soviet relations. It will suffice to say that reminiscences of
old dynamics are still vivid in the memories of both countries. Again, the Dzhemal’ –
Zhirinovskii debate in Vladimir Solov’ev’s program (2011) testifies of the permanence of
contradictory perceptions.
While the participants talk about the possible spread of Islamic revolutions to
Russia, inevitably the role of Iran is examined. To Solov’ev’s observation that, in Iran,
Russia is called “the little evil” (while the U.S. is the “great evil”), Safarov replies that
this definition belongs to the (near) past, and emphasizes Iran’s availability to tighten
relations with Russia, also with an anti-Western purpose. Zhirinovskii insists on the
danger that a “revolutionary” regime like Iran’s may acquire the atomic bomb. Safarov,
then, claims that “even a pro-Russian atomic Iran is better than a pro-West Iran”, because
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Iran is central to the region and it is in Russia’s interest to have friendly relations with it –
an argument that, exemplarily, advances geocultural as well as strategic considerations.
It is not by chance that the relations of Iran with Russia are called into cause
during that specific debate. In Chapter 6, I have already highlighted the intellectual
closeness of Geidar Dzhemal’ with some of the most prominent Iranian thinkers.
According to his own official biography (available on his website kontrudar.ru), he is
close to Khomeini’s son and has spent a few years in the Shi’a holy city of Qom, in Iran.
By his own admission, he has a high regard for the role of Iran as Islamic revolutionary
regime.
At the same time, Dzhemal’ is one of the most influential intellectuals of
contemporary Russia, a leading member of the circles of prominent right-nationalists (or
“patriots”) like Aleksander Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, and Maksim Shevchenko. The
intellectual glue that unites individuals with partially very distant positions is their
“patriotism”. Even more noteworthy, they place the origins of their national idea in
Russian imperial and, especially, Soviet models. They do not want to replicate the
Marxist-Communist ideology, but they advocate the restoration of the Soviet idea of
Russia as Eurasian nation with a great destiny. The concept of Russia’s uniqueness as a
bridge between Europe and Asia, by definition entails the possibility of a civilizational
dialogue. Additionally, the pervasive messianic tone of Eurasianism reveals its ambition
to establish a universal civilization, a model of peaceful coexistence based on shared
values.
To an attentive observer, it is apparent that, contrary to what many have claimed
after 1991, the heritage of Soviet ideology and practices has not been dispelled in the
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post-Communist euphoria. Nor is it expressed in the words of so-called Soviet nostalgics
who aspire at a restoration of the Soviet regime tout court. From the Soviet ideology, it
retains the strong geopolitical perspective, – although it is not a “neo-imperialistic”
project. Rather, it consists in the vision of an unspecified, but powerful, effect of a
Russian-led civilizational reform of the relations within humankind.
The search for a model of polity that could enable Russian messianic action is
evident in the “patriotic” discourse of ultra-nationalists and Eurasianists. The same
ambition is claimed by the Iranian ideational model prospected by Khomeini and
Khamenei. Through the Soviet heritage, on one side, and the turn in conceptualization of
Islamic revolution, on the other one, these two traditions might find a common ground.
The work of Geidar Dzhemal’, focused on political Islam, justice, and revolution, already
embodies an attempt in this direction.
The dynamics briefly discussed above are significantly understudied, especially
outside Iran or Russia. Even less attention is paid to the historical-ideational (and
ultimately, ontological) terrain on which they take place. A notable exception is
Mohiaddin Mesbahi’s work. In particular, in one of his essays on Russian-Iranian
relations (Mesbahi 2010), he notes how Iran’s renewed attention to Eurasia (its “Eastern
orientation”) finds, in fact, its deeper roots at the time of the Iranian revolution. Retracing
the development of the relations between the Islamic Republic and USSR/Russia,
Mesbahi underscores the alternating of hopes and disillusions of the Iranian elites in
building a relationship with Moscow based on “potential ideational bridges” (Mesbahi
2010: 180), and highlights the affinities that, on these same premises, Tehran seems to
have discovered, today, with Putin’s government.
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It is too early to evaluate how the possible (re)encounter of Russian and Iranian
ideational ambitions may develop. Nor can it be predicted whether, like many other times
in the long history in the relations of the two states, mutual mistrust and contingent
prevailing interests will eventually brush ideational discourses away (Mesbahi 1992). It is
not this the place to fill the research gap in Russia-Iranian relations. However, the crucial
place of both Russia and Iran in contemporary international relations makes it all the
more necessary.
Russia’s Muslims as envoys of the state: the case of Crimea
On March 21, 2014, the Annexation Treaty of the (until then Ukrainian) Republic of
Crimea to the Russian Federation was ratified. In subsequent remarks, Russian President
Vladimir Putin highlighted the vital importance of Crimean historical and cultural link to
Russia. He went as far as to declare that, for Russia, Crimea is like Temple Mount in
Jerusalem for Jews and Muslims (Gashkov 2014). However, despite Putin’s observation,
Russia’s strategy to facilitate the integration of Crimea does not depend on the Orthodox
Church.
In fact, for a great part, no integration measures are necessary. The present
demographic composition of the peninsula is characterized by a great majority of ethnic
Russians. Due to Russian and Soviet deportations, the original Tatar population has been
reduced to a small minority (about 13 per cent). The overwhelming Russian character of
Crimea is among the factors that originated the call of the separatist referendum in early
2014 and determined its outcome. Citizens of Russian origins were complaining about
the discriminatory treatment endured from Kiev, although Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol did enjoy an “autonomous” status. They welcomed their “return” to Russia,
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after the Soviet Union President Nikita Khrushchev had donated Crimea as a friendship
gift to the fellow Soviet Republic of Ukraine in 1954.
The reaction of the Crimean Tatars, instead, was not so overwhelmingly positive.
The history of Russian-Crimean Tatars relations is complex and controversial. The
Russian Empire conquered Crimea in 1783. One hundred years later, it fought (and lost)
on its territory a war (critically depicted by Lev Tolstoy31) against an alliance of
European and Ottoman powers that heavily hit the local population. Interestingly, Werth
(2002) considers the Crimean war the starting point of Russia’s view of Islam as a
powerful political factor, when half a million of its Muslim subjects fled to the Ottoman
Empire (and many fought, or plotted, against Russia from there).
After imperial Russia’s conquest, Crimean inhabitants were subject to the same
rule as the other subjects of the Empire. Yet, the generally well-educated and
cosmopolitan Tatars formed a particularly cohesive and active group (Ryzhkov 2014;
Yarosh and Brilov 2011). The modernist and reformist influence of the Crimean Tatar
intellectual Ismail Gaspriski (Gaspirali) spread throughout the Russian Empire, sparking
similar reflections in other Muslim communities, in particular in imperial Turkestan. As
discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Gasprinski’s intellectual heritage is still
prominent today, notably among the Volga-Ural Tatars in their self-identity
conceptualizations.
The Crimean Tatars supported the White Army during the post-Revolution Civil
War (1919-1923), which made them suspicious to the Bolshevik regime. During World
31

In the three Sebastopol Sketches (1855), a fictional elaboration of the author’s first-hand experiences in
the conflict. The tales became soon best-sellers (also praised by the tsar Aleksander II) and contributed to
form Russian public opinion on the war, Crimea, and patriotism.
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War II, Crimea was occupied by Nazi troops. After the Soviet regained control of the
territory, the Tatars were accused of collaborating with the enemy and, on these charges,
about 250,000 of them were deported to Soviet Central Asia, mainly Uzbekistan. After
Ukraine acquired independence in 1991, the Tatars still held the status of a small
minority. This gave them little political leverage even at the local level. The Tatar
language was abolished as an official language of the Autonomous Republic, while their
traditional religious institutions had to compete with Kiev-based Muslim organizations
for influence (Yarosh and Brilov 2011).
Attempts to mend a broken relationship
Although they share their name, there are very little connections between Crimean Tatars
and Tatars of the Volga-Ural regions. Both groups speak a Turkic language, but these are
not very similar32. The two groups established intellectual contacts at the turn of the
eighteenth-nineteenth centuries (pan-Turkism, jadidism), but their relations were framed
within general Muslim-Turkic commonalities (pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism), rather than
along nationality lines. Indeed, probably the strongest element that these two groups have
in common is their past as Muslim subjects/citizens of the Russian/Soviet regimes.
Apparently, this was enough for contemporary Russian authorities to put Russian
Islamic institutions in charge of the integration of Crimean Tatars after the March 2014
annexation. In Chapter 4, and throughout this work, I have demonstrated how official
religious organizations in Russia are not only responsible for the proper conduct of their
flocks as believers, but also for their adherence to the new Russian patriotism. Following
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A Tatar of the Ural-Volga can better understand official Turkish than the Tatar language of Crimea
(personal information to the author).
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Russia’s functional interpretation of the public role of religion (Schuppert 2012; Chapter
4 of this dissertation), Muslim leaders have taken prompt action to “help” their Crimean
counterparts conform to Russian arrangements.
At the time of the unrest in Kiev, the religious institutional picture in Crimea was
composite (Yarosh and Brylov 2011). Partly, it still reflected the structure molded on the
Spiritual Boards of Catherine II, replicated under Soviet rule. Although Muslims also live
in other areas of Ukraine, the largest community by far (about 250,000) is that of
Crimean Tatars. They control the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine
(DUMC), based in Crimea, which formed in 1992 as a spin-off of the Soviet Union’s
Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the European Part of USSR and Siberia
(SAMEUS). The DUMC, though, was experiencing the competition of the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Ukraine, based in Kiev (Yarosh and Brylov 2011: 257).
Outside the control of these two major institutions, “a significant part of Islamic life in
Crimea [thrived] in the so-called independent communities”, including Salafi groups and
international organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir (Yarosh and Brylov 2011: 254; 259).
Characterized by a strong sense of their Turkic heritage, Crimean Tatars have
established close contacts with Muslim organizations in today’s Turkey, which provides
teachers, educational materials, and even financial support for real estate development
(especially mosques and religious schools). The international movement led by Fetullah
Güllen and various Turkish Sufi groups have also been active in Crimea. Finally, Yarosh
and Brylov (2011) note that “recently, the politics of [DUMC] shows signs of an
influence of Arab Islamic centers, predominantly fundamentalist and modernist trends”
(259).
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Against this backdrop, it does not surprise that Russian authorities have felt the
necessity to bring the network of relations of Crimean Muslims under control.
Significant, in this regard, is the preparatory work conducted by Russia’s Islamic
organization prior to the annexation. In the weeks leading to the referendum in Crimea,
Russian media had already prepared national public opinion to a possible development of
the situation into some form of Russian protection (or protectorate) of Russian citizens in
Crimea (NG 2014). This approach reflected Russia’s interpretation of international law,
according to which Russia claims its right to intervene on foreign territory to protect its
citizens. This has been the official motivation for several actions of Russia’s, notably in
Georgia in 2008. In the case of Crimea, though, the novel element is the full engagement
of Muslim institutions to build a bridge to the Crimean Tatar community – and the almost
complete silence of the Orthodox Church about the Christian community there.
The (Volga Tatar) head of the Russian Mufties Council (RMC), Mufti Gainudtin,
has repeatedly reassured about the empathy of Russian Muslims for their Crimean Tatars
fellow believers. He has stretched his argument beyond religious brotherhood and,
thwarting historical and ethnic facts, has proclaimed the existence of a common, albeit
distant, ancestry of the two communities. Having completed his self-empowerment to act
as protector of Crimean Tatars, Gainudtin has proceeded, in a series of public
commentaries, to raise consensus among both Crimean Tatars and Russians. He started
by denouncing the unfair treatment of Tatars by Ukraine authorities and, in general, their
misplaced trust. On the RMC website, lengthy articles reconstruct the origins of the
wartime allegations against Crimean Tatars, denounce them as circumstances-induced
misunderstandings, and reassure about Tatars’ true patriotism.
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Noting how Gasprinski’s lesson is valued by both Crimean and Volga Tatars,
RMC leaders have also proclaimed a civilizational affinity between the two groups
which, they observe, has been (positively) enhanced by their common history under
Russian rule. With his speeches, Gainudtin “welcomes” Crimean Tatars into Russia’s
multi-ethnic, multi-religious state. His slightly patronizing tone shows that he speaks
from a position of force, as the official representative of Russia’s Islam and perhaps, as
Tatar, as an exponent of one of the most influential “founding” (korennyi) groups of the
Russian civilization (see Chapters 2-4),
It is noteworthy that the actions of the RMC are addressed to the Russian as much
as the Crimean Tatar populations. Its re-assessment of the Tatar betrayal during the war is
intended to create a better disposition among Russians – both in Russia and in Crimea –
toward Tatars as new citizens. This would reduce the possibility of resistance or protest
against Russia’s reinstatement of Tatar as the official language of Crimea alongside
Russian. A fairer assessment of the Tatars’ behavior in World War II is also meant to
soften Tatars’ historical skepticism toward Russian domination, and reduce the risk of
unrests or violent opposition to Moscow.
Reactions from the Crimean Tatar community
Despite the efforts of Russian institutions to present Russia as a benevolent elder brother,
there have been many negative reactions of Crimean Tatars to Russian annexation. The
head of the Crimean Tatar community in Moscow, Ernst Kudusov, declared already in
February 2014 that Russians are “hereditary slaves”, accustomed to being dominated by
their leaders (Regnum 2014). In contrast, he claims that Tatars have been historically
persecuted by Russians because of their independent spirit. Kudusov added that, in
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Crimea, Tatars were working to create enmity between Russians and Ukrainians,
claiming that “neither Ukrainians, nor Tatars” want to join Russia.
In a November 2014 article for Ekho Moskvy, republished by The Guardian, the
Russian historian and opposition politician Vladimir Ryzhkov harshly condemns Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as a major failure:
It became clear soon after the sudden annexation of Crimea in March
that modern Russia does not possess either the institutions or the tools
to integrate an ethnic group with a strong sense of its own identity and
a traumatic history. The usual methods employed by the Kremlin –
bribery, intimidation and displacement – will only aggravate the
conflict. (Ryzhkov 2014).
Like Kudusov, also Ryzhkov reports about the opposition of Tatars to the
referendum and their virtually total abstention from voting. He denounces the violent and
illegal actions of Russian authorities against the Tatar community and its religious
leaders. He leaves little hope for the rapprochement strategy of pro-Russian actors, when
he condemns the Russian-imposed ban on the commemoration ceremony of the
deportation of Tatars by Stalin. Whereas Russia seems to aim at canceling (or revising) a
key event in its relationship with Crimean Tatars, the latter do not intend to second it:
The ban was an insult to the Tatar people, for whom the deportation
remains the most terrible tragedy in their history. (Ryzhkov 2014).
Indeed, the effects of Crimea’s new obligations under Russian law have soon
become tangible. Religious organizations outside the protective wing of RMC have been
declared illegal, and required to re-register with Russian authorities. Predictably, a good
number of them, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and Güllen-affiliated centers, are going to be
denied authorization and, in some cases, to be persecuted. Foreign religious leaders,
especially from Turkey, have been expelled or denied re-entry. Concurrently,
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international observers denounce the introduction of a strict censorship on Tatar media
(Corley 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 2014).
Even within official Muslim organizations there will likely be disruptions.
DUMC’s rival Islamic institution, SAMEUS, had been created after 1992 further to the
suggestion of the head of Soviet Board, Talgat Tadzhuddin. The latter has been the
fiercest competitor of Gainudtin for the leadership of Russian official Islam (Silant’ev
2010) – although he is now a little more than a secondary figure, it is unlikely that
Gainudtin would leave him the possibility to maintain his influence on Crimea, adding
internal quarrels to an already tense situation.
The annexation of Crimea is an exemplary case of attempted instrumentalization
of religious influence at the service of both geopolitical and patriotic interests of Russia.
Religious affinities are being exploited as a bridgehead to conduct an operation of
assimilation through historical revisionism, with receptions that are mixed at best. In
particular, it appears evident that the tensions’ hub is the intention of Moscow to replicate
in Crimea the social, institutional, and, ultimately, political structures of twenty-first
century Russia. This strategy requires the control of the Crimean Tatar community and
the curbing of its independent stances. Because of the strong international network of
Crimean Tatars, the latter’s integration into Russian “civilization” runs necessarily
through the severing of religious ties, for example with Turkish and Arab groups, and the
control of Islamic leaders and influences on the territory.
Differently from the other geopolitical issues examined in this chapter, in the case
of Crimea the relevance of Islam is not – or not so much – in its religious or even
ideational value. Instead, what is being tested is the capability of Russian official Islamic
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organizations to play that institutional role that, as I have shown in Chapter 4, they have
been able (or allowed) to carve for themselves in the last decade.
Muslims in Crimea, Christians in Ukraine
While Muslims are being very active in reaching out to their fellow believers in Crimea,
the Orthodox Church in Moscow (ROC) has behaved much more cautiously. This
reluctance is in contrast with the usual dynamism of the ROC in foreign relations,
including in areas where Christianity is not preponderant or even relevant, such as the
whole Middle East, (Curanović 2012). Metropolitan Kirill’s prudence stands out even
more after Vladimir Putin’s declarations about the centrality of Crimea as Christian
cradle of the Russian civilization.
Katarzyna Jarzyńska (2014) argues that, in fact, the Church may be too involved
in both Russia and Ukraine to take sides. She notes that many Ukrainians are opposed to
Russia’s intrusion into their affairs, whether it be real or alleged. Increasingly, not only
are they expecting the ROC not to support Moscow, but they also ask it to condemn
Russia’s behavior. In Jarzyńska’s analysis, since Kirill has made of his “alliance of
Church and throne” the basis of the Church’s considerable influence, he is reluctant to
jeopardize it. Therefore, Jarzyńska comments, his only option is to strive to keep a
distance from either side.
What the Russian state expects from its religious organizations, though, is clear.
The multi-religious character of the Russian Federation creates an affinity between
domestic religious groups and their fellow believers abroad. Then, by metonymy, the
whole of Russia feels entitled to an affiliation with each of the religions in question.
Religious ties become political doors. Putin is making of civilizational-religious
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commonalities one important tool of its foreign policy. Despite Kirill’s restraint, other
personalities in the ROC seem more ready to support the government. Recently, a Church
high representative has claimed that Russians have “historical”, if not “religious” or even
“blood” commonalities with Orthodoxes in Ukraine, Muslims in the Middle East, etc.
(Russian Orthodox Church 2014). For all the Orthodox Church’s alleged influence on the
President, it may be increasingly difficult for Kirill to maintain his equidistance.
Conclusion
As was already visible in the previous chapters, Russia’s conceptualizations of Islam
have significant repercussions on its foreign policy.
As I have done throughout this dissertation, I have not limited my analysis to
apparent dynamics – however complex they may have been. Instead, I have sought to
expose how deeper-level perceptions, interpretations, and conceptualizations of the place
of Islam in Russian identity transfer into policy doctrines and measures. The study of the
sources has revealed not only foreseeable patterns of behavior – for example the
willingness of Islamic organizations to facilitate the entry of the Crimean Tatars into
Russian polity and society. The relevance of the “Islamic factor” has been clearly
identified even when the nature of Islam is not directly discussed, as in the current
conflict in Syria and Iraq and the changes in Russian-U.S. relations.
Most surprising, and interesting, is the suggestion that ideational encounters at the
regional level, originated by thematic crossings and overlaps that span over space and
time, may (again) be possible. Such encounters, sparked by geopolitical considerations,
and supported by religious or spiritual ontologies, generate geocultural considerations,
and aim to exert a political influence on governments.
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Despite the variety of issues concerning the geopolitical dimension of Russia’s
Islam, it is possible to devise the growing importance of an overarching Russian
civilizational dimension, of which Islam is a component. Beyond issue-specific elements,
it is becoming increasingly clear that Russia is developing much of its foreign relations
strategy along these lines. Paul Saunders (2014) notes that, more than on religion, it is on
the adherence to traditional values that Russia is attempting to build its appeal on Muslim
communities in the Middle East and elsewhere. Together with the shared perception of
the United States and the West as aggressively disrespectful of local habits, these
commonalities constitute a potentially fruitful platform to create an alternative to U.S.
“unipolarism”. Ryzhkov (2014) also points at Russia’s renewed attempt to “Russify”
Crimean Tatars. He even quotes the Tatar leader Refat Chubarov saying that
Moscow is now planning to repeat the “Chechen scenario” in Crimea,
that is, to find a second Ramzan Kadyrov among the Crimean Tatars
who could bring his turbulent people to heel using either money or
force, thereby guaranteeing its loyalty. (Ryzhkov 2014)
In a sort of dialogue at distance, Ryzhkov deems Moscow’s attempt at integration
an already failed project, but Kadyrov himself, who seems to have upgraded his status as
Putin’s special envoy in the Muslim world (Suchkov 2014), boasts the contribution of
“his” Chechen former-rebels in building the “new” Crimea (Saunders 2014).
The most recent and significant example of Russia’s civilizational stance has been
its reaction to the terrorist attack, in January 2015, on the offices of the French satirical
weekly Charlie Hebdo, an outlet famous for comics harshly satirizing various subjects,
including Islam. While blaming the attack and mourning the numerous deaths, many in
Russia have also condemned what they consider the disrespectful line of the magazine.
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State and religious leaders have reminded that any religion is holy to its believers and that
it is proper to societies to treat them with respect – and that it is the task of the
governments to ensure this. Russian spokespersons and media have reminded that this is
the spirit of the anti-blasphemy law in Russia33. The Head of Chechnya, Ramzan
Kadyrov, has authorized a demonstration on Grozny’s main square against religious
blasphemy. Although attendance estimates vary, the demonstration turned out to be one
of the largest of the last years.
Christian authorities have also taken a strong position against religious-addressed
satire, while clearly condemning the killings. The Roman Pope Francis has called for
respect for all religions, and added: “if […] a friend offended my mother, he should
expect to be punched [by me]” (Vecchi 2015). Along the same line is the Russian
Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill, who laments how Christianity, in fact, has been an
even more frequent target of Charlie Hebdo (Gashkov 2015).
The role attributed to religious organizations in “welcoming” new groups not only
to Russia, but into Russian civilization must not be underestimated in contemporary
Russia. The case of Crimea may be considered a special opportunity – it does not happen
every day that a major state acquires a new, significant territory. Yet so far, it is only the
most accomplished result of the preparatory work revealed in this dissertation: the
conceptualization of a new Russian identity, and the consistent pursuit of its pervasive
implementation into a new Russian state.

33

The law has been under the Western screens since, under its effect, the famous anti-Putin punk rock girl
group Pussy Riots have been sent to prison for playing in the Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior in
February 2012.
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A journalist of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta notes how in Russia this kind of satirical
tradition does not exist – partially because of government censorship. More important,
the “Russian civilization”, as opposed to the “European”, is one of integration and not
one of juxtaposition. The (controversial) strategy of Russification (which, the author
claims, derives from the Iranian/Persian model) that forced the conquered peoples to
abandon they specific habits and embrace the Russian ones, has fostered the integration
of all different groups into an all-encompassing Russian civilization.
The debate about the opportunity (or necessity) for Russia to impose Putin’s
model of Russian patriotism, and the inevitable resistance that such attempt generates, is
going to remain relevant in the future. Equally important, perhaps determinant, will be
the role that Russia’s Muslims and Islam will have in it.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

This dissertation has been sparked by the observation that, despite Russia’s Muslims’ rich
history, conventional narratives about them are univocal. Russian accounts depict
Muslims of the Empire and in the Soviet Union as reluctant subjects or rebel citizens,
covertly plotting against Russia, often on behalf of its Muslim enemies. This stereotyped
image of Russia’s Muslims is due in great part to the overwhelming influence of the
Orthodox Church. The Church, which as self-proclaimed founding force of Russian
civilization was openly intolerant of other religions, felt a particular aversion against
Islam, with which it was in competition for the hearts and souls of imperial subjects in
Russian Asian territories.
Although less harsh views on Islam and the Orient did exist in Russia, from
Catherine II to the Slavophiles, they could never fully dispel the perception that Muslims
were fundamentally alien to Russian culture and society. This interpretation was
supported by the rebellions of Russia’s Muslims against the imperial dominance and its
often colonialist manifestations, for example the attempts at Russification (later,
Sovietization). The ethnic-religious juxtaposition between Orthodox Slav and Muslim
non-Slavs became a fixed interpretative framework of the relations between these
communities.
Most contemporary analyses of Russia’s Islam, in Russia but especially in the
West, have not challenged this traditional assumption. The resurgence of nationalist
movements, the outburst of armed conflicts in the North Caucasus, and the participation
of Russian groups in international terrorist activities have only reinforced the perception
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of a self-repeating history of Muslims in Russia. In a vicious cycle, preoccupations with
national and international security, still associated with issues of socio-economic
“backwardness”, provide both the impulse to study Russia’s Islam and the guidelines to
research findings.
The richness of Russia’s contemporary discourse on Islam, however, is strikingly
at odds with the narrow perspective of most of the scholarly, political, and journalistic
literature. The revived interest in religious matters, revamped after 1991, has not been
limited to questions of spiritual and theological relevance. In the chaotic aftermath of the
Soviet Union’s demise, the necessity to reconstruct Russian society on new ideational,
social, and political foundations has opened an unprecedented window of opportunities
for new propositions of state building – including those of Muslims. The debate on Islam
has expanded to include topics that, in the traditional discourse, had been marginalized or
neglected or that, like jadidism, had had a short, but impactful, blooming.
The main purpose of this work has been to fill the research gap on Russia’s Islam
by acknowledging the variety of Russia’s discourse on Islam, exposing its ideational
impact on Russia’s self-perception and, ultimately, tracing its influence on policy-making
processes. I have not intended to provide an all-encompassing account of the vast arrays
of authors, topics, and visions. This would have not only required much more space and
time than suitable for a dissertation, but it would have also been, to paraphrase
Bobrovnikov (2007), a mere listing of information, with limited value.
I have focused, instead, on those aspects of the discourse on Islam that reveal, at a
deeper epistemological level, networks of ideas, mutual intellectual influences,
conceptual dynamics that, alone or in association with other ideas, concepts, or visions,
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contribute to processes of identity formation. I have followed these discursive threads to
demonstrate how they affect Russia’s geopolitical self-perception, determine institution
building, and influence policy conceptualizations and implementations. At the same time,
I have exposed the ways in which the discourse on Islam is, in its turn, influenced by
theological disputes, political interests of leaders, the international ummah, and even nonIslamic conceptualizations of Russian identity and Eurasian civilization.
I have deliberately abstained from applying pre-construed interpreting models,
especially Western ones, although I have signaled the existence of dominant narratives on
many issues. Instead, I have chosen a theoretically eclectic approach that, thanks to its
flexibility, has provided me with the interpreting tools most appropriate for each topic. In
this way, I have been able to reveal how several issues related to Russia’s Islam are
linked by factors other than just Islam, and how they participate in domestic and
international debates.
At the beginning is identity. Contrary to the traditional narrative of Muslims as
monadic communities within Russia, my analysis reveals that, in post-Soviet Russia,
Muslims have been elaborating a vision of their own identity that is included in – and not
separated from – a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Russian “civilization”. What appears
as a radical change in Muslims’ self-representation is, in fact, the evolution of an attitude
that was already developing in pre-revolutionary times (Crews 2006). The significant
difference, today, is that Muslims are no longer content with “tolerance”, but claim full
recognition of their legitimate belonging to Russian civilization and history.
This message comes from so many parts of the Muslim community in Russia –
Tatars, Caucasians, Sufis, Russian converts, and others – that it is very surprising that the
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(Western) literature has not yet fully captured its impact. This is not the case for Russian
authorities, who have been attentively following the development of the debate and have
attempted to accommodate several of its stances into new systems of governance and
institutions (with uneven results). Many Russian media have followed suit.
It does not surprise, instead, that the Islamic official organizations have advocated
for a better recognition of the history of Muslims in Russia. It may have been just a tactic
for survival, to temper the growing influence of the Orthodox Church, but Muslim
leaders’ insistence on a common heritage of Orthodox and Muslim Russians suggests that
there is more at stake. It is noteworthy that, between the two major, competing Islamic
organizations, it has been the much more assertive Russian Mufties Council (RMC) that
has prevailed. Contrary to its rival, it is less complacent with the state and with the
Church, and expresses a more independent point of view of Muslims on several issues.
It is unprecedented in Russian history for an Islamic organization to have reached
the same institutional status as the Orthodox Church. The RMC has achieved this
position, expanding on traditional tasks assigned to Islamic leaders by the Russian states
(foreign relations and management of the Muslim communities). Now, the RMC is
officially on par with the Orthodox Church and sits at the same institutional tables. Yet,
such historical change has gone overlooked in the general debate on Russian religious
institutions, which is mainly preoccupied by the renewed, alleged aspirations of the
Orthodox Church to political power.
The fundamental definition of traditional and extremist Islam, too, has not been
fully appreciated – so far – by most observers. In this work, I have demonstrated how, in
fact, what was initially considered one of many attempts to pacify an explosive socio-
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political phenomenon has become a key tenet of Russia’s geopolitical conceptualization.
Two important consequences of the definition of traditional Islam are its desecuritization
and the denial to extremist Islam of its religious value. These effects have laid the
legitimizing premises for the incorporation of Islam into the Russian system.
As part of Putin’s “patriotic” project, traditional Islam is expected to ensure the
participation of Russia’s Muslims. Therefore, the role of a “correct” Islamic education
has been reassessed. No longer a suspicious activity, Islamic training is now defined as a
primary tool for the prevention and countering of Islamic “terrorist ideology”. This
attitude reflects a fundamental difference from the conception of the Western world to
keep religion out of the public sphere. In conformity to the historical function of official
religion in Russia, legitimate Islam must remain within set boundaries – institutionally
and doctrinally. Because religion in Russia does belong to the public sphere (Malashenko
2012), deviations from official forms of cult are punished. In the case of Islam, they are
outlawed, and extremist doctrines are denied their religious status. Although this
arrangement is still highly imperfect (definitions of legitimate and non-legitimate Islam
are heavily influenced or even determined by the state, political considerations overcome
theological considerations, etc.), Russia’s model of relations with Islam, especially
domestic ones, may offer valuable suggestions for other countries.
Less unique, but bearing equally relevant consequences, is Russia’s treatment of
extremist Islam as an “ideology of terrorism”. The development of Russian
counterterrorism doctrine, that considers terrorism a violent instrument of political
struggle, has accentuated the conceptual rift between Russia and the West, especially the
United States, which tends to treat Islamic terrorism as a religious issue. As the debate,
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initiated by Primakov, on the necessity of a shared definition of terrorism shows, a
seemingly technical difference in terminology reveals, in fact, increasingly diverging
worldviews. If the West is conducting a war against religious fundamentalism, Russia is
countering the spread of political oppositional movements.
In search for the reasons of this diversity, I have found that, contrary to narratives
that deny, or underestimate, the heritage of the Soviet experience in favor of an imperial
nostalgia, the effects of the October Revolution are still impinging on many Russians.
Beyond simplistic allegations that Putin would value stability abroad to avoid losing
power at home, fears of political disorder as bearer of violent opposition and, ultimately,
of revolution are powerful motives that gear Russian foreign policy and provide the
legitimation of (for the West) “irrational or counterproductive” behaviors (Kanet and Piet
2014).
Finally, this work shows how the “Islamic factor” in Russia’s geopolitical selfperceptions has superseded mere security preoccupations and has acquired a much
broader policy outreach. Divergences in the interpretation of Islam as a threat, which
have first affected regional dynamics, have then fueled pre-existing tensions in the
international system, especially between Russia and the U.S. Contentions have then
ensued at various levels of international relations and with different degrees of intensity,
from Russian qualified condemnation of the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, to
the Russia-West confrontation in Ukraine, in which also Russian Islamic organizations
are contributing to the “Russian civilization” project.
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Suggestions for further research
This work is the result of the study of a large, but necessarily selective, amount of
primary sources about Russia’s Islam. Within this material, specific issues have proved
relevant for my discussion, while I have not included in my final work minor details, or
other topics. Often, what I have left out of my dissertation would have opened an equally
intriguing analytical path, but the space at my disposal was just too limited. The necessity
to choose among a great variety of sources carries, together with analytical dilemmas, the
comforting notion that Russia’s Islam is indeed a complex and intriguing research topic
that offers a great, untapped potential for future studies.
Each of the chapters of this dissertation may be expanded into one or more books.
The number of texts considered can be increased, to include more authors on a specific
issue: A longer work would avoid being a simple list of names and works and offer a
much more detailed discussion than a dissertation chapter – or a section of it – allows.
For each chapter’s main topic (identity, security, etc.), additional circumstances can be
identified, or details added to the discussion. For example, given the great relevance of
geopolitics in Russia’s domestic and international behavior, Chapter 7 offers much
potential for future studies. Russia’s preoccupations with the future of Afghanistan, the
objectives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its complex internal dynamics,
and Russia’s purposes within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, of which it is an
observer member, are major research topics that I could not include in this work due to
space limitations.
Another relevant theme, although more frequent in the literature, “Globalization”
is a concept that engages many Muslims in Russia. Historically, Russia’s Islam (and
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Islam in general) has been characterized by a strong transnational component. In its
golden times, from the beginning of the Islamic era until the seventeenth century, the
territory of “Turkestan” (former Soviet Central Asia plus the Russian Volga region) was
the center of Islamic culture. From Central Asia, people, ideas, and religious movements
spread throughout the Muslim world and beyond. Especially the Turkish Muslim areas,
from the Bosporus to Western China, but also Afghan and Persian territories, enjoyed an
intensive exchange with Central Asian centers.
After centuries of decadence in prestige and the Soviet-imposed interruption of
contacts, today globalization has brought back to Russia’s Muslims the benefits of
renewed religious exchanges and cultural renaissance. For entrepreneurial Tatars, it has
also opened up new possibilities of economic prosperity. For example, Tatarstan has
invested in the development of halal food industry. Kazan’ hosts a major trade fair
dedicated to halal production, very well attended by operators from the entire Muslim
world.
Analogously, Tatarstan strives to become a major center of Islamic banking,
although with less convincing results (Lossan 2014; for a less optimistic analysis, see
Eremenko 2014). In both instances, Russian central authorities have been quick to
meddle with the Tatar initiatives –adding an international conference on halal guidelines
to Moscow’s calendar of events, or shutting down a bank under vague allegations of
illegal activities. Are these signs of Moscow’s fears of excessive entrepreneurship in
Tatarstan? Does Moscow want to have the last word on institutional relations with the
Islamic world? Conversely, is Tatarstan just confirming its cosmopolitan nature? These
are some questions that could be addressed in dedicated studies.
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When Islam is not a factor
It would also be important to establish those instances in which Islam does not play a
significant part in Russia’s geopolitical considerations – even when the contrary would be
expected. In recently revamping relations with Egypt, Russia has not apparently acted as
fellow Muslim country. Rather, it appears to be motivated by opportunist considerations
of strategic alliances in the Middle East. Analogously, despite the possibility that a shared
civilizational approach lingers among intellectual groups in Russia and Iran, as discussed
in Chapter 7, Russia’s improved relations with Iran might just be a continuation of a
century-long history of alternate mutual trust and diffidence. Considerations of economic
and strategic nature, reinforced by the view of the United States as common adversary,
may have been stronger than ideational affinities.
It is not granted, however, that seemingly self-evident explanations of geopolitical
issues are also the most effective ones – in fact, each of the cases mentioned here would
benefit from an in-depth, multi-level analytical approach like the one I have proposed in
this work.
Final considerations
The unprecedented availability of Russia’s Muslims to participate to the shaping of
Russia’s identity, and the willingness of key agents to accommodate Muslims’ claims,
have so far produced significant results. As I have shown in this dissertation, they go
beyond simple declarations of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, to affect important
sections of state policies. Although the encounter of Muslims with the Russian state and
the society at large is not devoid of frictions, it would seem that Putin’s “patriotic”
nationalism has envisioned a primary place for an Islamic component.
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This new version of “Russian civilization” embraces neo-Eurasian perspectives
historically present in Russian thought (Slavophiles, Trubetskoi’s Eurasianism, etc.). The
most notable difference from the past is the supremacy given to the state, and not the
Church, as major driving force and to the state’s strength (domestic and international) as
ultimate objective. A thorough discussion of the consequences of the substitution of a
religious messianism with a state purpose is not possible here. It will suffice to note that
it has changed the relative status of Church and Islamic institutions, in favor of the latter,
which are now on par with their Christian counterpart.
Although my work has demonstrated the role of Islam within Russian new
patriotism, a certain degree of uncertainty remains about the motives of each actor in
participating in the project. The Orthodox Slavic majority that leads the Russian state
might just have found a suitable formula to make renewed ambitions of dominance
acceptable to Russian minorities. It is undoubted, also by his own admission, that Putin’s
line follows the examples of Russia’s most charismatic tsars – Peter I and Catherine II
(both “Great”). They were aware of the necessity to integrate Muslims and the Orient into
imperial structures, but not necessarily ready to acknowledge a parity of value between
Muslims and Orthodoxes. Putin is careful in not favoring, at least in public, one religion
over another, but he might as well far from believe in a joint Slavic-Muslim Russian
civilization. He has often expressed his acknowledgment of the fundamental
civilizational role of the Russian Orthodox Church since its inception, and reinstated
several religious festivities as national holidays. As I have mentioned in Chapter 7, he
maintains close personal relations with some exponents of the Orthodox clergy, which,
according to some observers (Trenin 2014) may have a certain influence on him.
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Analogously, Russia’s Muslims, especially Tatars, might support the central state
for reasons of pure opportunism. As Bennigsen and Wimbush (1979) note, this would not
be the first time that Muslims in Russia embrace the dominant ideology to carve out their
own advantage. The motives of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, which after their
renewed booming in the 1990s have lost in popularity, are still lingering in the
background of Muslim communities, and might just be waiting for an opportunity to reemerge. It is true, however, that Tatars have already experienced, at the end of the
nineteenth century, a “golden age” (in Tatar accounts) of peaceful and fruitful
cooperation with the Russian central state. At that time, key Tatar thinkers and important
jadidists developed an original discourse that enjoyed wide influence in the entire
Muslim world. Today, many Tatar intellectuals and leaders are rediscovering the ideas of
those thinkers and adapting them to fit their arguments in favor of a Russian Muslim
identity.
Whether the cooperation between the state and Muslims in Russia, which is
producing notable effects at many levels, will continue, and what form it will take under
Russian patriotism is a question that cannot be easily answered –even in the light of the
key findings of this dissertation. It remains, however, a priority in the comprehension not
only of Russia’s attitude toward Islam and Muslims, but also of the processes of
formation of Russia’s ontological and epistemological conceptions.
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